The Carolyn Yeager Set

Carolyn Elizabeth Yeager came to National Socialism and Holocaust denial late in life. She has written that she was born in June 1941 while Hitler was at the height of his power, and elsewhere identifies June 29 as her birthday. Her parents were Stephen A. Yeager and Barbara J. Schillinger Yeager, both born in Illinois. All four grandparents came from German families originating in Sanktanna, then a German settlement in Hungary. Yeager eventually made this ancestry central to her identity. She has published genealogies taking the Jäger, Schmidt, Schillinger and Reck lines back into eighteenth-century German-speaking Central Europe.

The ideological Carolyn Yeager appears to have been largely a creation of her later adulthood. Her own retrospective says that she became increasingly interested in Germany, World War II and the Holocaust beginning around 2005. That date matters. She was already in her sixties. In a 2014 interview with Lana Lokteff, she discussed an earlier life that included work as a professional artist, something listeners who had known her only through political broadcasting said they had not known. She also described family arguments about Hitler that she remembered from childhood. Her father and grandfather disagreed about him, which means she did not grow up inside a uniformly Nazi household.

Her private life had also long since taken its course. Yeager says she was married to Larry Kahant from September 1971 until April 1981. The marriage resurfaced decades later because Rodney Martin tried to portray Kahant’s surname as evidence that he was Jewish. Yeager responded by publishing photographs and a defense of her former husband.

The political break seems to have occurred during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Her surviving writings from 2007 are National Socialist. In “Women and National Socialism,” written that May, she argued that women should understand motherhood and racial reproduction as their highest social roles and defended National Socialism against feminist criticism. Another surviving essay from April 2007, “Blood, Sweat and Soil,” connects gardening, self-sufficiency, nature and ethnic rootedness. These early pieces show that her politics initially included a substantial cultural and sex-role component alongside race.

Her first organizational home appears to have been Bill White’s American National Socialist Workers Party. Secondary accounts place her as the ANSWP’s Texas state leader from April through August 2007 and as an assistant editor of its National Socialist magazine. Yeager’s own 2014 retrospective confirms that her movement history began in January 2007 with “Bill White and his ANSWP and National Socialist magazine.” She did not remain an organization woman for long. Her later career was overwhelmingly independent.

The decisive turn came when German history replaced contemporary organizing as the center of her work. In 2008 she met Wilhelm Kriessmann online. Kriessmann was an Austrian-born former Luftwaffe officer who had lived through the Third Reich and war. The two developed an unusually productive collaboration. Yeager edited his autobiographical writings and worked with him on translating sections of Hermann Giesler’s memoir Ein Anderer Hitler. Portions appeared in The Barnes Review between 2008 and 2011. She later created a permanent online Kriessmann archive from documents, photographs and writings he had sent her.

A 2009 trip to Germany and Poland accelerated her movement toward Holocaust denial. In March 2010 The Barnes Review published her 48-page Auschwitz: The Underground Guided Tour. Yeager presented observations from Auschwitz-Birkenau as evidence against the established history of the camp. These claims place her squarely within Holocaust denial. “Revisionism” is her preferred term, but the distinction matters because her central assertions include rejection of the well-established mass murder of European Jews in homicidal gas chambers.

March 2010 also transformed Yeager from a writer into a broadcaster. She launched The Heretics’ Hour on the Voice of Reason Network on March 1. By March 2013 she was celebrating its 150th episode. The show evolved from a recorded one-hour program into a live two-hour broadcast. For several months in 2011 she simultaneously hosted a daily program, The Revisionist Report, on Republic Broadcasting Network. Radio gave her something print had not. It made her a node through which a remarkable collection of white nationalists, National Socialists, Holocaust deniers and eccentric revisionist researchers encountered one another.

Bradley Smith became another important relationship. In July 2010, with assistance from Smith and the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust, Yeager established Elie Wiesel Cons the World. Over the next six years she says she wrote nearly 130 articles scrutinizing Wiesel’s biography, memoirs, photographs and Auschwitz identification. Her thesis that Wiesel had fabricated his concentration-camp history is unsupported by the historical record, but the project became one of the largest sustained bodies of her work. She eventually closed the dedicated site at the end of 2021.

The White Network was the high point of her institutional ambition. Yeager says she conceived it in early 2012 after becoming dissatisfied with Voice of Reason. She wanted a broadcasting network restricted to whites. TANSTAAFL, the pseudonymous programmer behind Age of Treason, possessed the technical skills she lacked. They created The White Network and launched it in May 2012. Its slogan was “Whites talking to Whites about White interests.” Yeager transferred The Heretics’ Hour there and added other programming while TANSTAAFL built and maintained the technical infrastructure.

Their partnership lasted less than two years. In April 2014 TANSTAAFL concluded that Yeager had moved away from the white-nationalist mission they had agreed upon and shut down new programming without consulting her. Yeager believed the opposite. She argued that TANSTAAFL had become rigidly attached to an American white-nationalist abstraction while she was moving toward a more explicitly German and ethnonational conception of identity. The breakup became extraordinarily bitter. Each accused the other of betraying the project. Yeager created a permanent site devoted partly to documenting her version of the collapse.

By the mid-2010s Yeager was increasingly uncomfortable with generic “white nationalism.” She cared more about ethnicity, nations and Germans in particular. In 2014 she devoted a two-hour program to the differences among race, ethnicity and ideology. In 2017 she attacked the alt-right because it accepted Jews as participants and generally accepted the historical reality of the Holocaust. She criticized Richard Spencer, Greg Johnson, Jared Taylor, Kevin MacDonald, Red Ice and others from a position considerably more uncompromising on Jews and Hitler.

Her relationship to Hitler also became less ambiguous. By 2019 she was openly calling him “the greatest German,” describing him as a source of continuing inspiration and writing that she had been born into a world he was “powerfully influencing.” Whatever ambiguity the word “revisionist” might create disappears here. Yeager became an explicit admirer of Adolf Hitler and defender of National Socialism.

The other unusual feature of her career is the sheer number of relationships that turned into public feuds. Rodney Martin went from guest and movement colleague to the subject of lengthy investigations into his education, employment and biography. TANSTAAFL went from trusted partner to “coward and cur.” Wayne Prante went from someone who approved of her attack on Martin to the subject of a Yeager exposé. Giacomo Vallone, later known as Jack Sen, sought an alliance with her before she decided she wanted nothing to do with him. Deanna Spingola provided Yeager with airtime before Yeager concluded that Spingola’s judgment had become so poor that she should leave broadcasting.

Fredrick Töben is the rare case where Yeager admitted her own role. She met the Australian Holocaust denier in person in 2010 and remembered them as “quite good friends.” They later became estranged for more than three years before his death in 2020. Looking back, Yeager attributed the rupture partly to her “own tendency toward intolerance.” That may be the best single autobiographical sentence for understanding her movement history.

The feuds were not random. Yeager’s method demanded consistency. Once she decided that some proposition was true, compromise became evidence of weakness or dishonesty. Mark Weber’s retreat from aggressive Holocaust denial became intolerable. Kevin MacDonald’s unwillingness to make Holocaust denial central became a problem. White nationalists who admitted Jews, National Socialists who criticized Hitler, Hitler admirers who treated Table Talk as unreliable, and broadcasters who continued giving airtime to people Yeager considered frauds all became potential targets. Her archive reads partly as historical research and partly as an accumulating record of ideological boundary enforcement.

At the same time, she did serious archival work by the standards of an independent amateur researcher. The conclusions were often driven by her ideological priors, but the work ethic was real. She collected documents, compared editions, traced genealogies, translated German material with collaborators, preserved private archives, interviewed elderly Germans and Austrians, and spent years organizing the papers of Kriessmann and the Wenger family. After Kriessmann’s death in December 2012, she preserved his papers online. Willy Wenger later provided her with his brother Leopold’s wartime diaries, photographs and letters, which she also organized and published.

This culminated in The Artist Within the Warlord, published in 2017 under the names Carolyn Yeager and Wilhelm Kriessmann. It assembled their translation and commentary on selections from Hermann Giesler’s Ein Anderer Hitler. Giesler had been one of Hitler’s favored architects. The project suited Yeager perfectly because it attempted to recover a private, cultured and aesthetically serious Hitler from a memoir written by someone who knew him personally.

Yeager spent her later public years near Kerrville, Texas. By then the operation was increasingly a one-woman archive. The Southern Poverty Law Center listed carolynyeager.net as a white-nationalist entity in Kerrville in its 2015 survey, although critics of the SPLC later pointed out that calling a single-person website a “group” exaggerated what was actually there. That criticism is fair as a matter of organizational scale. Yeager’s influence came from publishing and broadcasting.

Her output gradually diminished. On January 1, 2024, at eighty-two, Yeager announced that she was ending active work on the website. She wrote that she had been receiving signs that it was time to “bow out.” The site now describes her as “Now Retired but Still Readable.” Her archive remains online. A later retrospective from one of her long-term collaborators likewise described her as in her eighties and having stopped writing.

Yeager lived most of her adult life outside extremist politics, married and divorced, pursued artistic interests, and only in her sixties entered the organized far right. From about 2005 through 2010 she moved rapidly from curiosity about German history to National Socialism and Holocaust denial. Between 2010 and 2015 she became a prolific Internet broadcaster and movement connector. After the destruction of The White Network, her work became more solitary, more German-centered, more openly Hitlerian and more concerned with policing the beliefs of people ostensibly on her own side.

She created a small intellectual world around herself and then repeatedly expelled people from it when they failed her tests of historical or ideological consistency. Her career is a study in late-life radicalization followed by progressive purification. The coalition gets smaller as the doctrine becomes more exact. By the end, the website and archive were almost the perfect political institution for Carolyn Yeager because she could run them alone.

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The TANSTAAFL Story

TANSTAAFL, the pseudonymous writer behind Age of Treason, built a systematic body of writing and audio in the American white nationalist Internet of the 2000s and 2010s while keeping his legal identity out of public view. The racial ideology for which he became known arrived after most of the important decisions of his adult life had already been made. He had chosen a profession, married his college girlfriend and had children before he developed a worldview that eventually caused him to classify his own marriage as a racial mistake.

His pseudonym comes from “There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch,” the expression most closely associated in American popular culture with Robert A. Heinlein and The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress. His Blogger profile says he began blogging in September 2005. The name suited the outlook he would develop. TANSTAAFL increasingly interpreted politics as a field in which every apparent universalism concealed somebody’s interests and every benefit imposed a cost somewhere else.

I got the fullest account of his early life when I interviewed him in March 2018. He told me that he grew up in New York City. He attended public school through eighth grade and then a private Catholic college-preparatory high school. He went on to college, where he studied mathematics and computer science. Carolyn Yeager, who later worked with him closely, described him as a professional computer programmer.

College also supplied the relationship that would become the central private complication of his later politics. He met his future wife there. Her father was Jewish and her mother was not. Her father had married outside the Jewish community and died when his daughter was about ten. According to TANSTAAFL, his wife received little Jewish religious or cultural formation and did not identify as Jewish as an adult. Describing her simply as “Jewish” therefore misses part of the story. TANSTAAFL eventually regarded her as racially half Jewish even though she did not understand herself that way.

He knew before the marriage that her father had been Jewish. At the time it meant almost nothing to him. He remembered visiting her grandparents before the wedding and being inspected by her Jewish grandfather’s friend, who remarked that “it doesn’t get much more goy than this.” TANSTAAFL told me he did not even know what “goy” meant. Decades later he remembered the remark differently. By then he had developed a theory in which Jews possessed a strong and persistent ethnic consciousness while whites had been trained to suppress theirs. A minor encounter from his youth became retrospective evidence for a theory acquired much later.

For roughly twenty years after college, he told me, politics occupied little of his attention. Career and family came first. The political awakening appears to have occurred in stages after he moved to Southern California. Immigration supplied the issue that eventually organized the others. In a later autobiographical account he wrote that watching Southern California’s demographic transformation forced him back into politics. At first he thought politicians had misunderstood what Californians wanted. He eventually decided that political and media elites understood the opposition perfectly well and were ignoring it.

His reconstruction of the period incorporates many of the political shocks that shaped conservative Southern California from the early 1990s onward, including the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the O.J. Simpson trial, September 11, the Iraq War and immigration. The immediate stimulus for public writing appears to have been the political and racial argument surrounding Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Age of Treason began that September.

He remembered growing up with racial indifference. His early political movement was toward ordinary American conservatism and then toward neoconservatism, which he initially regarded as more intellectually serious than the alternatives. The radicalization came through reading and argument rather than through an inherited movement milieu.

Among the important transitional figures were Steve Sailer, Jared Taylor and Lawrence Auster. His surviving 2007 writing allows us to watch some of the movement almost in real time. In November of that year he was writing about “White Nationalism and Anti-Semitism” while remembering how strongly he had once recoiled from talk about specifically white interests. Within the next few years race became the organizing principle through which he interpreted immigration, political institutions and history.

The decisive intellectual influence appears to have been Kevin MacDonald. MacDonald supplied TANSTAAFL with something more powerful than a collection of grievances. He supplied an explanatory system. TANSTAAFL increasingly interpreted Jewish history, political behavior and institutional success through an evolutionary account of group competition. The attraction is easy to understand at the level of intellectual form. A collection of apparently unrelated events could now be reduced to a few mechanisms involving ethnocentrism, coalition, reproduction, group persistence and competition.

By TANSTAAFL’s own account, he began criticizing Jews explicitly around the end of the 2000s. Then his new theory collided with the biography he had already lived. Around 2010 he published what he remembered as “A Personal Disclosure,” telling readers that his wife’s father was Jewish. The disclosure mattered because TANSTAAFL had reached a conception of Jewish identity that was biological as well as religious and cultural. A fact about his wife that had been incidental when he married her had become, inside the theory he now believed, a fact about himself.

He described that realization to me with extraordinary severity. He said he felt “compromised.” He believed that if his racial analysis was correct, his own descendants occupied a category his political commitments told other whites to avoid creating. Yet the discovery produced no corresponding domestic crisis. When I asked what consequences his increasingly anti-Jewish politics had produced for his marriage, his answer was immediate: “None!”

His explanation was that his wife knew what he believed and largely agreed with him. She did not identify as Jewish and apparently did not experience his attacks on Jews as attacks on her. Her father had married a non-Jewish woman and died while she was young. TANSTAAFL consequently treated her ancestry and her identity as two different things. His politics insisted that ancestry mattered. His marriage demonstrated that lived identity could matter more in the ordinary conduct of a family. He never reconciled those propositions philosophically. He simply lived with both.

He did not revise the theory to accommodate the woman he loved. He absorbed his wife and children into the theory. He told younger white nationalists that his life should not be interpreted as permission to imitate him. He described marrying someone of Jewish ancestry as a mistake and said he wanted younger white men and women to avoid making it. The family endured while the doctrine became harsher.

The movement from blogger to broadcaster began before the creation of the White Network. TANSTAAFL appeared with Carolyn Yeager on her broadcasts in early 2012. Yeager later described approaching him because she wanted to create an independent Internet radio operation and knew that he possessed the programming skills she lacked. The resulting White Network launched in 2012 around the slogan “Whites talking to Whites about White interests.” TANSTAAFL handled much of the technical architecture while producing Age of Treason Radio.

The partnership placed him inside a white-nationalist project. An archived account of their first broadcast records him explaining that his conception of white nationalism could encompass broad racial solidarity while retaining narrower attachments to family and local people. His hierarchy began with family and extended outward through progressively larger groups.

That same early broadcast contains one of the few clues about his later geographical life. TANSTAAFL said that he had moved “to the mountains here in Appalachia.” He described encountering a culture different from the one he knew and accepting that he might never fully become part of it, while hoping that his children and grandchildren would.

If true, the move gives his life an evocative geography. He began in New York, came of age in a Catholic educational environment, studied mathematics and computing, built his adult career and family, experienced his political awakening in Southern California, then moved toward Appalachia while developing a politics organized around ancestry, place and group continuity. The movement from metropolitan New York to Southern California to the Appalachian mountains almost reads like a physical counterpart to his ideological search for increasingly bounded forms of belonging.

The White Network lasted until April 2014. Its ending was ugly. TANSTAAFL concluded that Yeager had departed from what he understood as the network’s white-nationalist purpose. Without obtaining her agreement, he stopped new programming and shut down the collaboration. Yeager regarded this as a betrayal and spent years publishing hostile accounts of his conduct. Her testimony after the rupture has to be read with that history in mind, although both sides agree on the basic facts of the breakup.

Yeager also fell out publicly with Rodney Martin, Fredrick Töben, Wayne Prante, and Giacomo Vallone/Jack Sen.

The dispute reveals something about TANSTAAFL’s temperament. His politics repeatedly became arguments about classification. Who counted as white? What was a nation? What distinguished white advocacy from white nationalism? What was the relationship between ancestry and identity? What did a political term smuggle into an argument before the argument had begun? His background in mathematics and programming may be relevant here. He approached political language as though conceptual errors could propagate through a system like bad assumptions in a formal model.

He was temperamentally distant from one of the styles that later defined the alt-right. He disliked endless layers of irony. During my 2018 conversation with him I remarked on how unusual it was to talk with someone from that milieu who seemed to mean exactly what he said. “I hate sarcasm and irony,” he replied. That made him easier to interpret than many contemporaries who moved continuously between assertion, joke, provocation and retreat.

His preferred style was earnest, analytical and taxonomic. Science, history, anthropology, psychology and political events were brought together in an attempt to construct one explanatory account of group conflict. Admirers noticed the same feature. A sympathetic 2022 retrospective praised his methodical presentation and his effort to extend MacDonald’s framework. It also preserved TANSTAAFL’s own chronology: Age of Treason began in September 2005, the radio project began through the White Network in June 2012, and the writing and audio were consolidated at age-of-treason.com beginning in May 2014.

His public radicalism continued after the Yeager split. In 2014 he appeared on Majority Rights. By October 2015 Red Ice introduced him as a pseudonymous “racialist blogger and podcaster” whose interests included science, history, psychology, language and Jewish influence. The description captures the strange mixture that made Age of Treason distinctive. It looked like an attempt to manufacture a comprehensive anthropology of political conflict.

The worldview eventually carried him far beyond immigration restriction or racial separatism. By the time I interviewed him in 2018 he spoke sympathetically about National Socialism and Hitler. At one point he said “Hitler did nothing wrong.” When I laughed, he emphasized that he meant the statement seriously.

Yet even at the point of maximal ideological radicalism, the family contradiction remained intact. TANSTAAFL could describe Jews collectively as an enemy while remaining married to a woman whose father was Jewish. He could regard ancestry as politically decisive while describing his own marriage as successful. He could warn strangers against reproducing the family pattern that had produced his children while speaking about those children as part of the intimate center from which his conception of group loyalty radiated outward.

His theory told him the marriage had been a mistake. His life told him to remain married. His theory told him Jewish ancestry had biological significance. His experience told him that his wife’s loyalties, beliefs and conduct aligned her with him. The doctrine won the argument in the abstract. Ordinary attachment won the decisions that had to be made every day.

TANSTAAFL’s radicalization occurred largely in middle age. The familiar story of Internet extremism involves young people encountering an ideological subculture while their identities are still being formed. TANSTAAFL appears to have been professionally established, married and a father before he constructed his mature politics. The Internet supplied an arena in which a middle-aged technical professional could spend years rebuilding his interpretation of history from the ground up.

His output declined after the middle of the 2010s. Yeager claimed that he had begun repeating himself. TANSTAAFL expressed something similar in less hostile terms, saying that he increasingly felt he had already said what he wanted to say and was devoting more attention to his profession. Podcasting diminished. Blogging continued at a slower pace. The Age of Treason archive nevertheless remained online, and sympathetic readers continued circulating his older audio long after his most productive period had ended.

That gives his public career a coherent arc. He moved from political disengagement into immigration restriction, from immigration into racial consciousness, from racial consciousness into MacDonald’s account of Jewish group behavior, from blogging into white-nationalist broadcasting, and finally into an increasingly comprehensive racial interpretation of Western politics. At each stage the explanatory system became more encompassing. By the end, almost every major political conflict could be assimilated into competition among racial and ethnic groups.

The cost of such explanatory power is visible in the marriage. A theory that can explain everything also acquires the capacity to redescribe everything. The woman TANSTAAFL had met and married before any of this began became, retrospectively, evidence of his former racial unconsciousness. A joking remark by her grandfather’s friend became evidence of Jewish ethnic awareness. His children’s ancestry became evidence of his own failure. Experiences that once possessed ordinary meanings were reassigned places inside the new system.

His importance lies in the unusual amount of intellectual archaeology his surviving work permits. We can see the before and after. We know enough about the man he says he was before 2005 to watch the later man reinterpret him. We can watch a political theory move backward through a biography and change the meanings of events that happened decades before the theory existed.

That process may explain both the intensity of his work and its eventual exhaustion. Once immigration, race, Jewish history, liberalism, conservatism, war, media, psychology and family had been incorporated into the same framework, fewer questions remained. The theory had reached its mature form.

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The Christopher Caldwell Career

Christopher Caldwell’s career is a story of institutional migration. The strongest longitudinal evidence comes from The Weekly Standard, whose archive contains 428 Caldwell bylines from 1995 through 2018. In the mid-1990s he was recognizably a movement-conservative generalist writing about Medicare, Jack Kemp, electoral politics, Haiti and culture. By the middle 2000s, Europe had moved toward the center of his work. The European Union, borders, democratic legitimacy and the durability of national political communities became recurring subjects. The financial crisis added the euro, oligarchy, welfare states and the political consequences of economic integration. By 2018 his writing was saturated with Brexit, immigration, populism and sovereignty.

That chronology matters because it means Caldwell’s intellectual transformation largely happened before The Weekly Standard disappeared. The post-2018 change was institutional. His publication ecology split into two tracks. One ran through Claremont Review of Books, Compact, The Lamp, UnHerd and The Spectator. The other remained inside prestige institutions, most conspicuously The New York Times. Simon & Schuster’s biography still describes him as both a contributing editor of Claremont Review of Books and a contributing Opinion writer for The New York Times.

What is surprising is how little ideological code-switching this arrangement appears to require. Caldwell does not seem to write one politics for The Times and another for his postliberal readers. The same questions cross the boundary. Is globalization compatible with democracy? Can international institutions override national electorates without eventually provoking revolt? Does immigration change the character of a political community? Does American universalism produce foreign-policy disasters? Do supposedly neutral legal regimes transfer power from voters to administrators, judges and experts?

His New York Times work makes the point. He has used the paper to criticize the political power acquired by finance through climate policy, to argue that the United States helped create the conditions for the Ukraine war and to introduce American readers to the German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck. Caldwell’s engagement with Streeck, a longtime contributor to New Left Review, complicates the idea that Caldwell simply moved farther right. Streeck argues that neoliberal globalization constrains democratic choice and helps generate populist revolt. Caldwell has found that analysis useful for understanding movements of both left and right.

Caldwell began as a Reagan-era conservative, but his mature political economy has absorbed arguments that sit uneasily with Reaganism. Free trade loses its presumptive innocence. Global economic integration becomes politically suspect. Democracy becomes inseparable from national sovereignty. American democracy promotion becomes dangerous. Populism becomes a predictable attempt by electorates to recover powers that political institutions have surrendered.

That makes “radicalization” an inadequate description. Caldwell did not simply become a more intense version of the conservative he already was. He abandoned or revised important elements of the political settlement within which his early career began. Parts of the anti-globalist left supplied concepts that helped him do it. His mature work therefore occupies a space in which Streeck, Brexit, Orbán, Trump, Syriza and Sahra Wagenknecht can appear inside the same analysis because they are responses to a common problem: the widening distance between democratic electorates and institutions insulated from them.

There is also evidence against the claim that Caldwell’s principles merely follow coalition advantage. In Compact he has attacked Trump from within the newer nationalist ecosystem. In 2025 he criticized Trump for threatening Columbia University through federal civil-rights enforcement, the machinery Caldwell had spent years criticizing when progressives controlled it. He also criticized Trump’s tariff policy and opposed the Iran war. These are useful within-person tests. Caldwell’s hostility to certain institutions does not disappear when his political side gains control of them.

The result is a career with two publication ecosystems but little discursive bifurcation. The New York Times often gets Caldwell the translator, explaining Streeck, European nationalism, Ukraine or populist discontent to readers who may dislike his conclusions. Claremont Review of Books gets more of Caldwell the theorist and historian. Compact gets the faster political polemicist. The Lamp gets more of the religious and literary foundations. The Spectator and UnHerd get current political diagnosis. The genre changes with the venue. The underlying questions travel.

Caldwell’s postliberal turn occurred largely inside the institutions of the old conservative establishment. After those institutions weakened or disappeared, his work migrated into a new nationalist and postliberal ecosystem while he retained access to major liberal prestige outlets. He became more distant from the liberal consensus without becoming illegible to its gatekeepers. That may be the most unusual fact about his career: Caldwell acquired two audiences without acquiring two political voices.

Caldwell research.

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Faculty Fashion Since The 1960s

Over the past sixty years the American professor stopped dressing to mark distance from students and started dressing to mark distance from administrators, consultants, and money. In the 1960s the jacket and tie helped make the professor visible as a professor. By the end of the century, authority could survive open collars, sweaters, jeans, T-shirts, beards, sneakers, and deliberate eccentricity. The profession gained sartorial discretion and lost a uniform.

A longitudinal study of Duke University yearbooks makes the transition measurable. The 1965 Chanticleer photographed the people heading Duke’s academic departments. Twenty-four of the 25 wore neckwear. Twenty-three wore conventional ties and one wore a bow tie. Eighteen wore civilian jackets or blazers. The sample contained no open collars, T-shirts, beards, or hair reaching the collar. Among the named academic adults in the 1970 Chanticleer, conventional ties appeared on 12 of the 18 people whose neckwear could be judged. By 1975, the comparable number was six of 12. T-shirts appeared. Five of 11 observable faculty had hair reaching the collar. Three had beards. In the 1990 Chanticleer faculty sample, only two of 12 observable professors wore conventional ties, while eight of 11 showed open collars.

The old costume dissolved by components. The tie became optional before the jacket. Open collars spread before jackets disappeared. Long hair and beards arrived after tie optionality was already visible. Formal and countercultural elements could then be recombined. A professor could wear a tie with long hair, a jacket with an open collar, a beard with a blazer, or a T-shirt with enough academic authority that nobody needed an explanation.

That Duke evidence comes from a ChatGPT coding project. Each garment variable was coded present, absent, or not observable. Missing visual information stayed missing. The study separately recorded photographic setting because a formal publicity portrait, office photograph, classroom scene, laboratory image, outdoor candid, and deliberately comic portrait create different opportunities for clothing. Selection mechanism was also kept separate because a rank-defined roster of department heads differs from an editor’s selection of interesting personalities.

A 1969 Virginia Tech thesis, Nancy Garland Dearing’s “Selected clothing practices of male university professors,” surveyed 440 male professors about what they wore and sorted the answers by age, rank, and field. Faculty over fifty, whose clothing closely resembled that of full professors, were the likeliest to wear suits, white shirts, ties, wing tips, and tweed or corduroy jackets. The youngest professors favored turtlenecks, colored oxford shirts, open collars, sweaters, loafers, beards, cuffless trousers, and jackets removed in class. Business professors owned the most expensive suits and were especially likely to keep their jackets on. Natural scientists favored sweaters and open-neck shirts. Architects favored tweed, corduroy, and bow ties. Engineers wore ties but bought cheaper suits and removed their jackets in class.

Dearing caught the professoriate immediately before its visual grammar fragmented. The differences by field already matter. The natural scientist and business professor inhabited different occupational worlds. Academic casualization therefore began from several baselines. A law professor dealing with judges, alumni, clients, and practicing lawyers lived closer to the suit. A laboratory scientist could remove the jacket. An architect could convert formality into tweed. A literary intellectual could make refusal of commercial polish into part of the intellectual persona.

The old costume distinguished the professor from two neighboring elites. Gray flannel, oxford cloth, tweed, knit or rep tie, leather shoes, perhaps the famous leather elbow patch, made him look respectable without looking commercial. He was a gentleman of modest means. The banker’s smooth worsted suit and the salesman’s shiny prosperity were as wrong as the undergraduate’s sweatshirt.

Mid-century faculty and elite students often shared a formality. A jacket and tie did not always say “professor rather than student.” It could say adult, respectable, educated, male, institutional, and middle or upper-middle class. Universities enforced dress expectations on students as well as faculty. College students had already contributed greatly to the invention of American casual clothing, but formal campus spaces remained formal.

The social revolution of the late 1960s changed the reference groups. The younger cohort hired during the great university expansion of the 1960s and 1970s wore jeans, work shirts, corduroy, turtlenecks, boots, beards, and open collars as student dress codes collapsed and political identification with the Vietnam-era establishment became toxic in many academic fields. Casual dress signaled solidarity with students, labor, artistic bohemia, or the counterculture.

The crucial movement was relational. The professor could distinguish himself from businessmen and administrators by looking closer to students. Academic informality communicated distance from one hierarchy by borrowing the costume of another group.

In November 1970 the Harvard Faculty Club was holding a referendum on whether to retain its coat-and-tie rule. Nobel laureate George Wald called the requirement “ridiculous,” “embarrassing,” “anachronistic,” and “stuffy.” One defender of the rule wrote, “Keep out the riff-raff.” Another suggested that Harvard should encourage individuality, prompting the reply, “Individuality? yes, in the color of ties.” Two years earlier the undergraduate Houses had stopped requiring coats and ties at dinner.

The humor of the referendum comes from a status system recognizing that its signals were losing consensus. The tie had once been ordinary enough to disappear into the background. By 1970 wearing or refusing it could express a position.

The University of Virginia recorded the same transition through an almost perfect anecdote. Its institutional history describes professors going barefoot and a Berkeley-trained assistant professor being mistaken for a disheveled student. A senior professor saw the young man outside his office and sent a secretary to tell the supposed student to make himself presentable. The secretary returned with the news that he was the new assistant professor of physics.

Clothes had once provided enough information to sort professor from student. Now they could mislead.

Duke lets us see that casual professors existed before the institutional costume collapsed. The 1965 yearbook organized its Faculty section around department chairmen who coordinated staffs and academic programs, linked faculty with administration, and represented the university’s academic excellence. The photographs then represented those officeholders through an overwhelmingly formal code. Twenty-four of 25 wear neckwear.

Elsewhere in the same volume, Duke ran a Campus Personalities feature. Peter Klopfer, a zoology professor, appears in a short-sleeve open-collar shirt with no jacket or tie. The prose describes his intellect, humor, scientific curiosity, classroom style, and participation in civil-rights marches. Reynolds Price appears as an intense young creative-writing teacher. Robert Durden is remembered for his pipe, vest, bow tie, boutonniere, and informal manner. Richard Leach appears as an associate professor whose easygoing manner carries into his teaching.

The formal 1965 university therefore contained several professorial types. Institutional office compressed them into a narrow costume. Personality representation let some differences through.

That is why the 1965 Duke Chanticleer result cannot support the sentence “professors wore ties.” Rather, when Duke’s yearbook represented academic institutional authority through department heads, almost everybody wore neckwear.

The 1970 Chanticleer changes both the clothes and the editorial machinery. Its academic sequence mixes professors, departments, deans, teaching scenes, offices, outdoor photographs, and activity portraits. W. B. Peach appears in jacket and tie. Henry Fairbank is photographed sitting on a car in a sweater. Thomas Langford wears a tie without a jacket. Peter Klopfer again appears in a short-sleeve open-collar shirt. Richard Kramer teaches at a blackboard without a tie. Buford Jones remains fully formal outdoors.

Conventional ties fall to 12 of 18 observable academic adults. Jackets remain on ten of 17. Open collars appear in three of 16. Yet hair reaching the collar remains zero among 20 observable people, and beards remain zero.

That finding overturns one of the attractive stories with which the project began. Long hair does not lead the transition in these Duke samples. The tie is already losing its obligatory character while hair remains visually conventional.

The Duke coding therefore separated environmental portraits, staged activities, and documentary candids. Among those comparable photographic modes, conventional ties appear on about 67 percent of observable academic adults in the 1970 Chanticleer. In the 1975 Chanticleer the raw comparable rate falls to about 45 percent. Reweighting the 1975 photographs so their mix of photographic modes matches 1970 raises the estimate only to about 51 percent. The decline remains.

Jackets tell a different story. After the same adjustment, 1975 jacket prevalence is roughly the same as 1970. Open collars rise.

The suit-and-tie package decomposed. The tie lost compulsory force early. The jacket survived as an adaptable garment that could bridge old and new codes. A professor could retain the jacket while abandoning the tie. The jacket could then coexist with an open collar, beard, long hair, unusual shirt, or casual trousers.

The 1975 Chanticleer makes that recombination visible. Victor Strandberg wears a jacket and striped tie with hair reaching his collar. Martin Miller wears a short-sleeve open-collar shirt with longer hair and a full beard. Janis Antonovics appears in a greenhouse in a T-shirt with longer hair. Frank Borchardt teaches in a jacket over an open-neck shirt with a beard. Charles Berquist sits in his office with his feet up on his desk. Roger Corless appears in a cafeteria in an open-collar shirt with beard and longer hair.

Allan Bone remains formal between 1965 and 1970. Peter Klopfer remains casual. Buford Jones remains formal between 1970 and 1975.

George Pearsall supplies the most valuable changing case. In 1970 he is represented as Dean of Engineering and wears a conventional tie. Twenty years later, in the 1990 Chanticleer, he appears as a professor in Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science wearing an ordinary open-collar shirt with no jacket.

Pearsall changes across time, but he also changes represented role. The same person can carry different visual obligations when the image says “dean” and when it says “professor.”

The strongest test of this distinction comes from the 1970 yearbook. After the academic sequence, the volume presents senior university administrators. The chancellor pro tem, president, provost, vice president, deans, and registrar produce ten jackets out of ten. All nine whose neckwear is clearly observable wear conventional ties.

The academics in the same book are much less uniform. Same university. Same year. Same student publication. Same surrounding culture. The major difference is the role being represented.

The president, dean, department chair, provost, and registrar embody offices. Their photographs communicate organizational authority. Clothing helps make the office legible. A scholar’s authority increasingly comes from another bundle of credentials: publications, tenure, disciplinary reputation, grants, prizes, endowed titles, expertise, citation, and classroom recognition. As those signals strengthen, the clothes can carry less of the burden.

The result also explains why administrators often remain formally dressed after faculty casualize. The administrator benefits from looking like the institution. The professor may eventually benefit from showing distance from it.

Different professions became differently informal. Dearing’s 1969 data already show business professors dressing differently from natural scientists and architects. The relevant boundary was occupational. A law professor who met judges, clients, alumni, and practicing lawyers lived closer to the suit. A physicist could remove it. An architect could replace it with tweed. A literary theorist could make refusing it part of the theory.

Harvard Law School later produced an almost laboratory-quality example. Douglas Ginsburg joined the faculty in the 1970s and, according to a 1987 Los Angeles Times profile, continued wearing suits and ties to class through a period when colleagues remembered him as strikingly untouched by the political and cultural upheavals around him. Duncan Kennedy of Critical Legal Studies went in the opposite direction. A 1992 Vanity Fair account described Kennedy’s black turtleneck, jeans, work boots, and beard as part of his challenge to the traditional Harvard professor’s role. Same institution, same profession, same broad generation. Ginsburg retained the visual language of courts, government, and professional authority. Kennedy dressed against it.

By 1990, Duke’s Chanticleer has an Academics section that presents professors as intellectual personalities. Frank Lentricchia talks about teaching, Duke undergraduates, the English department, Durham, and the intellectual controversies surrounding his field. Kristine Stiles discusses scholarship, teaching, art, and the relation between them. Bruce Lawrence talks about research, classroom preparation, history, religion, expertise, and the work of faculty. George Pearsall talks about engineering education.

Open collars, sweaters, and casual jackets sit comfortably beside serious discussions of scholarship and teaching. Faculty casualness has ceased to look oppositional. A behavior has completed its transition when observers stop needing a story about why it occurred.

The 1990 student comparison strengthens the point. The fixed sample of 20 editor-selected student portraits contains three instances of neckwear if the bow tie is included, while the faculty sample contains two conventional ties among 12 observable professors. Jackets are also surprisingly close in raw prevalence.

The similar garments sometimes carry different meanings. Students use formal clothes theatrically. Lawrence Glazer wears a bow tie and formal jacket. Douglas Perlman wears a matching dark suit and tie. Karen Weaver combines a plaid blazer and loose tie with a T-shirt. Formality has become one style among other available student performances.

Faculty casualness is quieter. Pearsall wears an open shirt. Edward Hill wears a polo. David Paletz wears a sweater over an open collar.

The visual institution changes alongside the clothes. In 1965 the faculty section explains the hierarchy. In 1970 professors appear in environments and activities. By 1975 documentary sequences show academics teaching, sitting, eating, working, and relaxing. The 1980 Chanticleer no longer gives Faculty, Administration, or Academics their old formal categories in the table of contents.

When Academics reappears in 1990, the editorial object is the intellectual personality. By 2000, it becomes the stylized academic personality. The 2000 Chanticleer photographs Jairo Moreno through a mirror, George Gopen holding a book, Steve Nowicki juggling outdoors, the Nightingales together among flowering branches, and Michael Montague-Smith leaning against a work surface in jeans.

The 2000 clothing results are another warning against fitting a smooth decline. Three of eight profiles wear conventional ties, a rebound from 1990. Formal clothing survives and can return.

The ranks also damage the simple status theory. Jairo Moreno is an assistant professor and wears no tie or jacket. David W. Johnson is an instructor and wears a tie. Steve Nowicki is an endowed associate professor and appears in a sweatshirt while juggling. George Gopen and Richard Stubbing, both carrying professor-level practice titles, wear jackets and ties.

Women entered this transformation under different conditions. Stanford supplies a perfect sentence. When Myra Strober arrived in 1972 as one of the Graduate School of Business’s first women professors, Stanford was simultaneously hiring pioneering women in law and engineering. The university arranged a press conference to display these new appointments. Strober asked Stanford Law School’s first woman professor, Barbara Babcock, what they should wear. Babcock replied, “Myra, we are the dress code.”

Male professors inherited a costume that could be accepted, rejected, mocked, or neglected. The first woman in a department was helping invent what a woman professor looked like. Dressing like the men could establish seriousness while also emphasizing that authority remained coded male. Rejecting professional clothes could identify her with the new academic culture while exposing her to a judgment the radical man could more easily survive. Stanford’s history recalls that when Strober arrived at the business school in 1972, she could barely find a women’s restroom.

In January 1995, Black law professor John Calmore appeared on an Association of American Law Schools panel immediately after Duncan Kennedy. Kennedy was wearing tattered dark jeans, a faded flannel shirt, and a battered leather jacket. Calmore was beautifully dressed in a suit with a silk tie. Calmore joked that he hoped someday to be able to dress like Kennedy. He then explained the joke. As a Black man traveling through airports, hotels, and cities, he felt he had to dress up to reduce the hassles attached to being read first as a Black man and only later, if at all, as a professor. Even then he had trouble getting taxis. Robert Chang and Adrienne Davis preserved the episode in their Harvard Journal of Law & Gender article “Making Up Is Hard to Do: Race/Gender/Sexual Orientation in the Law School Classroom.”

A 1994 New Yorker profile described Cornel West in his habitual navy three-piece suit, white shirt, tie, watch chain, and cufflinks. West explicitly connected the costume to W. E. B. Du Bois, whose Victorian three-piece suit he saw as dignifying the intellectual vocation, and to the Black preaching tradition’s ideals of “excellence, elegance, and dignity.”

A secure academic can sometimes move downward from the norm, like Kennedy in jeans, upward from it, like West in a three-piece suit, or sideways from it, like the fashion-conscious academics of the 1990s. What status buys is the right to deviate without having the deviation automatically interpreted as evidence of incompetence.

The 1990s made this visible because academia developed both a strong anti-fashion norm and a small fashion avant-garde. In 1991 NYU cultural-studies professor Andrew Ross appeared at the MLA convention in a Comme des Garçons jacket, a Japanese hand-painted tie, earrings, and wedge-heeled suede shoes. Ross said the designer jacket was a send-up of the academic male convention of yellow polyester. By 1997 Princeton literary critic Elaine Showalter could publish an essay in Vogue titled “The Professor Wore Prada,” asking whether a feminist intellectual was allowed to enjoy fashion at all.

A superb 1998 Chronicle of Higher Education article, “Frumpy or Chic? Tweed or Kente? Sometimes Clothes Make the Professor,” caught academics explaining these codes while they were still alive.Wayne Koestenbaum talked about the “semiotic codes” of dress, hair, and makeup and connected his own appearance with changes in his intellectual allegiances. Physicists described pride in dressing down. Emily Toth said academic frumpiness could demonstrate devotion to the life of the mind. Nancy K. Miller observed the brutal asymmetry between candidates and incumbents. Scholars hunting for jobs were expected to look much better than scholars who already had one. The article opens with a hiring committee spending ten minutes discussing a candidate’s green polyester pants.

While the tenured professor could make not caring about clothes into a sign of seriousness, the candidate could lose a job because his trousers sent the wrong message.

Experimental psychology eventually caught up with what the professors were doing. Silvia Bellezza, Francesca Gino, and Anat Keinan’s 2014 Journal of Consumer Research paper “The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity” showed that deliberate violations of dress norms can increase perceived status and competence. The mechanism was perceived autonomy. Someone who visibly knows the rule and chooses to break it can look more powerful because observers infer that he can afford the social cost.

Nonconformity works when observers recognize the norm and interpret the violation as intentional. If they think the person simply does not know how to dress, the signal changes. The famous professor in sneakers can look autonomous. The nervous job candidate who arrives at the wrong interview in sneakers can look clueless.

Bellezza, Gino, and Keinan began from the observation that accomplished professors at professional meetings often dressed less conventionally than students and junior scholars. Their academic evidence found an association between research accomplishment and informal dress. Success provides independent evidence of competence. Once the CV speaks loudly enough, the tie can stop speaking.

Damon Phillips and Ezra Zuckerman’s 2001 American Journal of Sociology article “Middle-Status Conformity” argues that conformity can follow an inverted U. The people at the top have enough security to violate norms. People at the bottom may have little membership to protect. People in the middle often conform most because they have achieved enough status to value their position but not enough to treat it casually.

Applied to a university, that predicts that the most conventionally dressed person may be the assistant professor on the tenure clock, the visiting professor hoping to stay, or the candidate giving the job talk.

The Duke experiment complicates that prediction. Its 2000 Chanticleer lower-title faculty were more casual than the higher-title group. In 1975 the rank cases also scatter. Victor Strandberg, an associate professor with tenure, appears in jacket and tie with longer hair. Arif Dirlik, then an assistant professor, appears formally dressed. Janis Antonovics appears in a T-shirt. Academic rank alone fails to order them.

Matteo Prato, Emmanuel Kypraios, Gokhan Ertug, and Yonghoon Lee’s Academy of Management Journal paper “Middle-Status Conformity Revisited: The Interplay between Achieved and Ascribed Status” distinguishes status one earns inside a field from status attached to social categories before individual achievement is considered.

An academic may possess tenure, publications, reputation, and institutional rank while still receiving weaker presumptions of authority from strangers.

Mara Aruguete, Joshua Slater, and Sekela Mwaikinda randomly showed students otherwise equivalent Black and white professors in formal or casual clothing. Their 2017 Journal of Negro Education paper, “The Effects of Professors’ Race and Clothing Style on Student Evaluations,” found that students trusted the Black professor more when he was formally dressed. For the white professor the effect reversed. Casual clothing increased trust.

The same clothes were doing opposite work because they landed on different bodies. If observers grant unequal presumptions of authority, conventional dress can operate as compensatory evidence. Informality becomes cheaper for the person whose competence is already presumed.

Beverly Yuen Thompson found the same structure in interviews. Her Fashion Theory article “Academ-Ink: University Faculty Fashion and Its Discontents” describes a university stretching from power-suit administrators to professors in activist T-shirts. Faculty generally enjoyed considerable latitude, but straight white male professors received the greatest latitude. Academics with more marginalized identities reported greater pressure to conform to conservative expectations of professional dress.

A member of a group whose authority is readily presumed can use casualness to buy warmth, authenticity, eccentricity, or anti-corporate distinction. Someone whose competence is already being tested may need the clothes to continue supplying evidence.

Sebastian Oliver and colleagues conducted three experiments involving 1,361 participants. Their Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education paper “Fitted: The Impact of Academics’ Attire on Students’ Evaluations and Intentions” found that formal academic dress increased perceptions of competence but reduced perceptions of warmth. Casual dress did the reverse. Other information about the professor’s success and the norms of the discipline could reduce the competence penalty attached to informality.

Formal clothing supplies authority when authority remains uncertain. Informal clothing can spend authority that has already been established.

The Duke evidence adds another proposition. Formal clothing also supplies institutional office. The 1970 administrator comparison is stronger than the rank comparison because it occurs inside a single yearbook. Nine of nine senior administrators with observable neckwear wear ties. Ten of ten wear jackets. Selected academics in the same volume have already broken away from the code.

The person representing Duke as president remains tied to formal professional dress. The person representing himself as zoologist, historian, engineer, or teacher has more room.

By the 2010 Chanticleer, even the category “Faculty Spotlights” has become unstable. Its four featured people include a James B. Duke Professor, an associate university archivist, a counseling-center administrator, and a center director with faculty affiliations. The questions concern family, restaurants, hobbies, exercise, student advice, and surprising personal facts.

The editorial category has migrated from faculty as institutional class toward interesting adults associated with university life.

That change recalls Richard Sennett’s argument in The Fall of Public Man. Public roles depend on conventions that let strangers recognize a social position before knowing the individual occupying it. Clothing can provide one of those conventions. As personality becomes more culturally important, attention moves from office toward person.

Duke’s yearbooks perform that movement visually. In 1965 the category is department chairman. In 1970 it is selected academic adult. In 1975 it becomes teacher, scholar, personality, environment, and activity. In 1990 professors speak as intellectual selves. In 2000 they are stylized. In 2010 the boundary between professor and interesting university adult becomes porous.

Corporate America was becoming more casual too. In 1992 Dockers mailed its “Guide to Casual Business Wear” to roughly 25,000 human-resources managers. Levi Strauss cites surveys showing that the proportion of companies allowing some casual dress rose from about two-thirds in 1992 to nine in ten by 1995. Khakis and open collars ceased to distinguish the professor from the managerial world as effectively as they once had.

Professors, scientists, engineers, architects, and artists had been cultivating forms of occupational informality long before the tech billionaire in a T-shirt became a cliché. Silicon Valley detached casual dress from low income. By the 2000s a fleece, sneaker, open collar, or quarter-zip could belong to someone richer than everyone in the room. Informality could mean that the wearer was so secure that conventional displays of money and authority had become unnecessary.

That destroyed another old academic distinction. The 1950s professor could reject the businessman partly by dressing like a learned man of modest income. The contemporary millionaire technologist could wear clothes that looked more casual and less expensive than the professor’s.

Price and formality separated. Price and visible status separated too. Cashmere, minimalist shoes, unbranded knitwear, technical outerwear, and expensive garments designed to hide expense allow affluence to coexist with anti-display.

Academic anti-fashion therefore became harder to interpret. Frumpiness could signal devotion to scholarship. A designer jacket could signal cultural capital. A three-piece suit could signal conservatism, Black dignity, preaching tradition, aesthetic preference, irony, or eccentricity. Jeans could signal solidarity with students, disciplinary custom, indifference, youth, tenure, comfort, politics, or nothing at all.

In Distinction, Pierre Bourdieu says taste derives meaning from social differences and from mastery of distinctions that appear natural to those who possess the relevant cultural capital. In Homo Academicus, the university itself becomes a field of competing forms of capital. Put the two together and studied neglect becomes legible. Dressing as though one has forgotten the rules can be a display available most safely to someone whose position proves that he knows them.

Development officers, senior managers, outside counsel, recruiters, and consultants inhabit roles in which organizational authority often benefits from remaining externally legible. Faculty possess a different bundle of capital in publications, tenure, disciplinary reputation, grants, prizes, citations, and institutional affiliation. The administrator often benefits from looking like the office. The professor can sometimes benefit from showing that he is not the office.

Tom Wolfe understood the code before social psychologists gave it variables. He observed that intellectuals who look as though they do not care about clothes are often using clothes as carefully as bankers or soldiers do. They are communicating a different status allegiance.

In I Am Charlotte Simmons, the faculty at fictional Dupont University choose deliberately cheap-looking shirts worn open at the throat with uncreased jeans, khakis, or corduroys. The clothes distinguish them from the middle class. Academic anti-fashion functions as fashion because members of the status group learn its meaning.

In his 2006 Jefferson Lecture interview, Wolfe remarked on how rarely writers allowed themselves to be photographed in neckties. The open collar had become a bohemian sign of contempt for convention. Then, as Wolfe put it, “Then it becomes a convention itself.”

He placed the phenomenon in the history of bohemian status competition. Bourgeois artists and intellectuals adopted unconventional clothes, poverty, manners, and sexual styles partly to prevent themselves from being mistaken for the bourgeoisie from which many had come. They were defining themselves against a neighboring status group.

Wolfe noticed the inversion under Communism. Writers in the Czechoslovak Writers’ Union dressed like businessmen. His explanation was simple: “They were on top.” Once the intellectual becomes part of the establishment, businesslike formality can lose its old stigma.

That observation gives us a hypothesis extending beyond Duke. Professorial informality should be strongest when academics understand themselves as culturally prestigious outsiders confronting a commercial, bureaucratic, or political establishment. Where intellectuals understand themselves as the establishment, the meaning of formal clothes can change.

Wolfe’s own white suits performed the reversal. In a literary milieu where casual bohemianism communicated authenticity, he dressed like an exaggerated Southern banker. He called his taste counter-bohemian. The rebel could rebel against rebellion.

His larger claim was that clothing opens a route into status. Brands, shoes, furniture, manners, treatment of superiors and inferiors, and sartorial detail reveal what people expect their place in the world to be. In The Bonfire of the Vanities, he wrote, “You never realize how much of your background is sewn into the lining of your clothes.”

Clothes contain a miniature institutional history.

The Duke study remains one university and one publication. It cannot tell us how American professors as a population dressed in 1965, 1975, or 1990. The changing yearbook formats prevent false precision. Its value lies in making several mechanisms visible enough to test elsewhere.

Berkeley has placed online an extraordinary sequence of portraits of Sather Professors in Classics running from 1913 through the 1990s. Because institution, field, prestige, and photographic purpose remain relatively stable, the series comes close to a natural visual experiment. The early portraits belong unmistakably to the jacket-and-tie world. Later incumbents become progressively more varied. The University of Chicago’s photographic archive is even more useful because images are dated and often classified as formal or informal. In September 1980, for example, political-science chairman Leonard Binder was photographed informally in his office, tieless and open-collared. The photograph does not prove the theory. It shows how easily the theory could be tested.

Harvard holds the material needed for a larger study: faculty portraits from 1909 to 1972, News Office photographs from the 1970s, and Graduate School of Design faculty photographs from 1970 to 1990. Berkeley, Chicago, Princeton, Stanford, Duke, and Yale have overlapping institutional photographic collections.

Take five departments at seven universities. Sample faculty photographs every five years from 1960 onward. Code tie, jacket, matching suit, denim, open collar, knitwear, T-shirt, athletic shoe, beard, tattoo, unusual hair, and identifiable brand where the image genuinely permits it. Record field, rank, administrative office, year, gender, and race from reliable biographical records rather than visual guessing. Most importantly, code photographic setting. A formal publicity portrait, classroom photograph, office candid, commencement photograph, conference appearance, and press conference are not interchangeable. Otherwise the project risks measuring the casualization of university photography instead of the casualization of professors.

Code deans, provosts, presidents, development officers, and senior administrators separately. The Duke experiment now gives a strong reason for doing so. Its best within-year finding is the persistence of formal dress among officeholders while faculty representation diversifies.

The outcome should also move beyond a single casual-to-formal score. Duncan Kennedy in battered jeans and Cornel West in a three-piece suit occupy opposite ends of that scale while sharing a capacity to depart from the local median and remain authoritative.

Measure conventional formality and distance from the expected costume of people in the same institution, field, role, sex, and period. Then ask whether high achievement predicts variance, whether institutional office predicts conventional formality, whether insecure positions predict conformity, and whether the cost of deviation changes by race and gender.

Dearing’s field differences should remain in the model. A physicist, business professor, literary scholar, law professor, engineer, and architect occupy different occupational ecosystems. The relevant norm has always been local.

The Duke findings generate several falsifiable expectations. Conventional academic formality should fall after the 1960s. Ties may decline before jackets. Institutional officeholders should remain closer to contemporary business-professional dress than ordinary faculty. The relationship between academic rank and informality should be weak or nonlinear. Representation should become increasingly environmental, personal, and individualized. Race and gender should modify the credibility cost of deviation. Field should matter substantially.

The direction of elite nonconformity may reverse again. When everyone wears ties, status can be expressed by removing one. When everyone wears hoodies, quarter-zips, sneakers, and open collars, putting the tie back on can become the deviation.

COVID pushed the underlying mechanism to absurd clarity. In 2020 Duke president Vincent Price filmed himself at home wearing a sport coat and shirt, then stood up to reveal khaki Bermuda shorts. “Zoom attire,” he called it.

The joke condenses sixty years of academic clothing. The camera sees the institutional role, so the jacket stays. The unseen lower half escapes the requirement. Context determines which pieces of clothing have work to do.

The professor’s clothes once helped establish the role before the professor spoke. Today the CV, title, institution, publications, reputation, disciplinary standing, web page, awards, and setting can do more of that labor. Clothing becomes freer as authority becomes legible through other channels.

Where those channels are weak or unequally recognized, clothing still works hard.

That is the connection between the Duke department heads, Peter Klopfer, Duncan Kennedy, John Calmore, Cornel West, the assistant professor on the job market, the president on Zoom, and the professor in a T-shirt. Each body arrives with a different amount and kind of authority already credited to it. Dress can supply authority, conserve it, spend it, reject its conventional form, or convert it into another status signal.

The 1950s professor distinguished himself from commerce by looking like a gentleman of modest means. The 1970s professor could distinguish himself from the establishment by looking closer to his students. The 1990s professor could turn frumpiness into intellectual seriousness or designer clothing into cultural capital. The modern professor can use expensive clothes that look inexpensive, formal clothes that look eccentric, or casual clothes that once would have made him indistinguishable from an undergraduate.

The clothes track who possesses authority before getting dressed.

Fifty years ago the jacket and tie could say, “I am the professor, not one of the students.” Today the hoodie can say, “I am the professor, not one of the administrators.” Only some people can make the hoodie say that. For others it may still say student, staff, unserious, young, outsider, or person who wandered into the wrong room.

The Duke yearbooks let us watch the old certainty dissolve. In 1965 the institution presents its academic chiefs through a nearly uniform costume. In 1970 professors begin separating the tie from the role while senior administrators retain it. In 1975 formal and countercultural elements mix freely. By 1990 casual professorial dress no longer asks to be interpreted. By 2000 formal and informal styles coexist as personality. By 2010 “faculty” itself has become an elastic category of university personalities.

The history is therefore larger than professors becoming casual. The common costume of academic authority lost its compulsory force at the same time that universities changed how they represented academic people. Office yielded ground to personality. A single visual code gave way to several legitimate ones.

Some professors kept the old costume. Some discarded parts of it. Some turned excessive formality into individuality. Some adopted anti-fashion. Some bought designer anti-fashion. Administrators stayed closer to professional-business dress. Women and minority professors often faced higher costs for informality. Famous and secure academics could sometimes violate expectations in either direction. Fields maintained their own codes.

The old costume disappeared unevenly because it had carried several kinds of information at once. Gentleman. Adult. Scholar. Professional. Department head. Member of an elite institution. Person entitled to speak. As those meanings separated, their clothes separated too.

The jacket survived the tie. The open collar survived its association with rebellion. The beard moved from deviance to banality. The T-shirt crossed from student life into faculty life. Formality survived as an option and sometimes became more distinctive because it was optional.

Academic freedom in clothing eventually made academic clothing difficult to identify.

American fiction noticed the professor’s clothes long before social scientists began treating dress as a measurable status signal. Novels preserve meanings that photographs cannot. A photograph can tell us that a professor wore a beard, tweed jacket, black suit, or T-shirt. Fiction can tell us what another professor thought the beard meant, why a young academic worried about looking wrong, why a shabby coat could become a moral statement, and how a three-piece suit might cease to mean conformity once almost everybody else had abandoned one.

The literary record also complicates the familiar story in which American professors dressed formally until the 1960s and then discovered casualness. Academic anti-fashion is older. Shabby gentility, tweed eccentricity, cultivated indifference to commercial polish, and the idea that excessive concern with clothes betrayed an insufficiently intellectual mind were already available professorial styles. What happened after the 1960s was an enlargement of the repertoire. Deviations that had once existed inside a highly legible formal system moved toward the center of academic representation. Eventually the system became so permissive that there was no longer one costume from which everyone was deviating.

The Professor’s House, published by Willa Cather in 1925, gives an early version of the distinction between the public professor and the scholar at work. Godfrey St. Peter’s intellectual life is centered in an inconvenient old sewing room. There he can work in clothing chosen for warmth and bodily convenience rather than institutional presentation. Cather even allows us to encounter “the Professor in pyjamas.” The professor as private scholar barely needs a costume. The public university role creates the stronger demand for one.

Professors have always had bodies offstage. The historical question is which parts of that private informality become permissible onstage.

Stoner, published by John Williams in 1965 but set across the first half of the twentieth century, makes academic clothing part of class mobility. William Stoner arrives from a poor Missouri farm and enters a social world for which he has little preparation. He wears the same black broadcloth suit, white shirt, and string tie in every season. Williams describes the clothes as fitting him like a uniform that had belonged to someone else.

That metaphor carries most of the sociology. Stoner has acquired the costume before he has fully acquired the identity. The suit gives him provisional membership in educated life. It is austere rather than luxurious. It distinguishes the scholar from his farming origins without making him look commercial or rich. He is learning how to become a professor partly by inhabiting a form that existed before him.

The old academic suit could facilitate accession. Clothing allowed someone without inherited cultural fluency to enter an institution whose codes he was still learning.

Pnin, published by Vladimir Nabokov in 1957, presents a different imperfect fit. Timofey Pnin wears tweed, flannels, conservative shoes, strange socks, and memorable ties. He is formal and eccentric at once. His clothes carry European manners into an American college environment that he understands imperfectly.

Pnin shows how much variation was already possible inside the jacket-and-tie regime. Formality did not eliminate eccentricity. Indeed, the old code gave eccentricity something against which to register. A ridiculous tie could be ridiculous because everybody understood the ordinary tie. Mismatched details were legible because the general costume remained stable.

Pnin is formally dressed while simultaneously violating taste. The clothes express nationality, generation, displacement, class, professorial identity, and individual oddity. He belongs to the code and fails at it in ways that make him more recognizably himself.

The Groves of Academe, published by Mary McCarthy in 1952, reveals that academic shabbiness could itself communicate moral distinction. Henry Mulcahy’s ill-fitting, impoverished appearance marks his distance from prosperity, worldly advancement, polished administration, and bourgeois success. McCarthy turns neglect into a social manifesto.

This academic type existed well before jeans and student radicalism transformed the campus. The professor who looked indifferent to material presentation could imply that his commitments lay elsewhere. Commercial failure could be translated into intellectual seriousness. Poverty, or the appearance of poverty, could become a status resource inside a culture that distrusted overt commercial ambition.

The professor’s shabby trousers and the banker’s perfect suit belonged to rival moral economies.

Pictures from an Institution, Randall Jarrell’s 1954 academic novel, finds a female counterpart. Jarrell’s professors inhabit a small college where clothing, speech, manner, intellectual allegiance, and social rivalry become readable with extraordinary precision. Female academic dress can already include an anti-glamour repertoire of tweed, sweaters, practical clothes, and deliberate distance from conventional feminine display.

Women entering academic life confronted several incompatible expectations. Academic seriousness could require distance from fashion. Femininity could require attention to it. Professional authority might reward resemblance to male colleagues while penalizing a woman who seemed insufficiently feminine. Fiction recognized the unstable category of “woman intellectual” before universities had settled on any visual convention for it.

The most revealing pre-1960s boundary test may come from A New Life by Bernard Malamud. The novel was published in 1961, but its academic world begins in 1950. S. Levin arrives for a junior teaching position with a beard. A colleague quickly tells him that students may think he is an oddball. Nobody on the faculty wears one. The administration is clean-shaven. Students grow beards. The president’s wife supposedly associates facial hair with radicals.

The scene is almost a miniature theory of academic fashion. It contains rank, institutional conformity, faculty-student differentiation, political coding, grooming, local norms, and reputational risk.

Levin is also new.

That detail is fundamental. The question is not merely whether a beard is permitted. It is whether this person, at this career stage, in this institution, can afford one. A famous senior professor might be eccentric. A new instructor risks looking as though he does not understand where he is.

Malamud therefore anticipated a distinction that later status research would formalize. Deviation has a cost. The cost falls hardest on people whose membership remains uncertain.

The novel also gives useful context to the Duke evidence. In Duke’s 1965 yearbook, beards are absent from the complete Department Heads sample. By 1975 they have become visible among faculty. Malamud’s fictional 1950 institution makes the earlier prohibition intelligible. A beard could collapse distinctions that the university still wanted clothes and grooming to maintain.

Yet McCarthy’s shabby professor reminds us that not every kind of informality was equally threatening. A professor could already look materially unsuccessful while remaining recognizably academic. Facial hair, student resemblance, bourgeois polish, eccentric ties, and shabby clothes occupied different positions in the code.

The 1960s changed academia’s anti-fashion vocabulary and broadened its political meaning. Older academic anti-fashion could say: I care more about ideas than money. The newer repertoire could add: I am closer to students than administrators. I identify with bohemia rather than business. I reject the establishment. I belong to a discipline in which corporate polish would look suspicious. I possess enough academic standing that I no longer need conventional professional clothes to establish seriousness.

That enlarged vocabulary becomes visible in White Noise, Don DeLillo’s 1985 academic novel. DeLillo gives the College-on-the-Hill several sartorial systems at once. Jack Gladney, chairman of Hitler Studies, has deliberately constructed himself. His name, physical bulk, dark glasses, academic role, and clothing contribute to an authored persona. Department heads wear black academic tunics around campus. The robe makes even an ordinary movement theatrical. Institutional office has become literal costume. Across the university, another academic tribe looks completely different. The American Environments faculty wear rumpled clothes, need haircuts, cultivate facial hair, and resemble an occupational subculture with its own anti-professional signals.

DeLillo’s achievement is to show both costumes as costumes. The formally robed chairman and the rumpled cultural-studies professor appear different, yet both participate in systems of academic signification. One exaggerates institutional office. The other performs distance from it. The second style only looks natural because its participants have learned to experience their own conventions as nonconventions.

Thisresembles the empirical result at Duke. In 1970, senior administrators remain overwhelmingly jacketed and tied while selected academic adults have already diversified. Formality adheres more strongly to represented institutional office than to academic identity in general. DeLillo turns that structural difference into satire.

Stoner inhabits a uniform. Pnin mismanages one. Levin negotiates permission to violate one. Gladney designs one.

By the 1980s the professor can increasingly become his own visual editor.

The Secret History, published by Donna Tartt in 1992 and set in the 1980s, reveals what happens when campus casualness has become ordinary enough that formality can become the rebellion.

The strongest clothes belong to Julian Morrow’s students. Henry Winter wears dark English suits and moves through a campus containing hippies, punks, preppies, and other contemporary styles while seeming to inhabit another era. Francis dresses with aristocratic theatricality. Richard Papen studies the group’s appearance because entry into Julian’s seminar means entry into an aesthetic jurisdiction. He changes his own clothes while trying to gain admission.

The reversal is complete. In Malamud, looking too much like a student threatens professorial identity. In Tartt, students can acquire distinction by dressing like an imagined older elite. Old clothes have become countercultural. That is exactly what should happen once a norm reverses. When almost everybody wears ties, removing one can signal independence. Once casualness becomes dominant, wearing a severe dark suit can accomplish the same thing.

Tartt also reminds us that professors can influence clothing without being the most conspicuously dressed people in the room. Julian’s power lies in defining taste. His students reorganize themselves around his conception of beauty, history, learning, exclusivity, and social difference.

The professor can generate a sartorial microculture.

This runs against a simple one-way history in which students innovate and faculty eventually follow. Cultural transmission can move in either direction. High-prestige academic enclaves can teach students how to distinguish themselves from other students.

Straight Man, Richard Russo’s 1997 academic comedy, supplies another correction to the idea that status steadily produces informality. Hank Devereaux encounters the visual memory of his younger self as a writer. The earlier author is shaggy and bearded. The older professor is balding and cleaner-cut.

The direction is the opposite of the easy theory.

Age and professional security have not released Devereaux into ever greater bohemianism. The young writer had stronger incentives to perform literary intensity and outsider identity. The established academic no longer needs that particular costume.

Different kinds of cultural capital reward different appearances. The aspiring novelist may benefit from looking like an artist. The department chair may benefit from looking like someone who can survive a budget meeting. The same person can move between those systems over a career.

The Duke repeated-person cases point in the same direction. Some professors remain formal across years. Some remain casual. George Pearsall changes from tie-wearing dean to open-collar professor. Individual careers do not follow one sartorial law.

Wonder Boys, Michael Chabon’s 1995 novel, gives us the mature version of the disordered creative-writing professor. Grady Tripp’s rumpled appearance belongs to a broader persona of writerly disorder, unfinished work, marijuana, damaged relationships, and institutional indulgence.

His appearance is interesting partly because nobody doubts that he is a professor.

The dishevelment has lost Malamud’s danger. It does not make Tripp look as though he wandered into the faculty by mistake. It helps identify the kind of professor he is.

That is an enormous historical change.

Once an institution contains stable subtypes such as the disheveled novelist, tweedy historian, laboratory scientist, fashion-conscious theorist, suited law professor, fleece-wearing engineer, and power-suited dean, academic dress has moved from a common costume toward a taxonomy of personalities.

Blue Angel, Francine Prose’s 2000 campus novel, pushes the collapse of the old professor-student visual distinction further. Its most conspicuous dresser is the student Angela Argo. Her dyed hair, piercings, leather, chains, and subcultural styling belong to a world in which the old debate about whether a professor may wear a beard feels almost quaint.

The professor no longer has to out-formalize the student to remain legible as faculty. Institutional context, age, title, classroom position, tenure, and social role do the classificatory work.

That is the world Duke reaches by 1990. The open-collar professor requires no explanation because clothing has ceased to bear the full burden of occupational identification.

On Beauty, published by Zadie Smith in 2005, may offer the richest fictional treatment of academic clothing after casualization because it places dress inside ideological, racial, aesthetic, and professional competition.

Monty Kipps, a conservative Black public intellectual, is a three-piece-suit academic. Howard Belsey, his white liberal antagonist, belongs to a different academic culture. Other scholars inhabit their own combinations of professional formality, racial presentation, generational identity, and disciplinary style.

The suit no longer possesses a single meaning. It can communicate conservatism. It can communicate dignity. It can connect a Black intellectual with traditions of clerical or public leadership. It can establish professional authority. It can mark ideological distance from a casually dressed liberal academy. It can also simply fit the occasion.

This is where the formal-casual axis finally becomes inadequate. Duncan Kennedy in battered jeans and Cornel West in a three-piece suit can be opposites in conventional formality while resembling one another in another respect. Each has enough authority to make a conspicuous departure from a local median intelligible as personal style rather than incompetence.

Fiction arrives at the same idea through characters. The important variable is sartorial discretion.

That discretion has several directions. A professor can deviate downward toward shabbiness. He can deviate toward bohemian casualness. She can deviate toward fashion. He can deviate upward toward archaic formality. Someone can deliberately dress more professionally than colleagues because professional dress communicates racial dignity or institutional seriousness. Another can dress less professionally because distance from administration or commerce improves his standing within his academic tribe.

The same deviation can also have different costs on different bodies. That problem sits near the center of The Human Stain by Philip Roth, although clothing is not Roth’s primary instrument. Coleman Silk spends a lifetime controlling how institutions classify him. Professor, dean, Jew, white man, Black man, outsider, insider, authority figure, sexual transgressor, and old man become categories attached to a body that other people repeatedly think they understand.

Roth’s subject is social legibility.

Clothing belongs to the same system as name, voice, skin, accent, manners, credentials, institutional office, and biography. Observers build identities from visible cues, often with enormous confidence and incomplete information. That is why academic fashion cannot be understood apart from race and sex. The freedom to become visually ambiguous depends on the amount of authority an observer grants before the clothes are interpreted.

A professor who is immediately presumed to belong can afford to look unlike a professor. Someone whose membership is doubtful may need the clothes to settle the question early. The fiction therefore suggests another variable beyond formality and sartorial discretion: legibility. Stoner’s suit makes him more legible as an educated man. Pnin’s clothes make him legible as professor while preserving his foreignness and eccentricity. Levin’s beard threatens legibility because it makes faculty and student categories overlap. McCarthy’s shabbiness remains legible because scholarly poverty is already an understood academic type. DeLillo’s robe exaggerates institutional legibility until it becomes comic. Tartt’s formal students deliberately make themselves illegible as ordinary contemporary undergraduates. Grady Tripp’s rumpled clothes identify a recognizable subtype rather than confusing anyone. Coleman Silk’s story reveals how deeply mistaken social legibility can be.

The history of faculty fashion can therefore be read as a history of how much visual ambiguity professors are allowed. In the older university, the professor’s clothes answered the question before he spoke. A suit, tie, haircut, age, posture, office, and institutional setting jointly established the category. Some eccentricity was permitted, but the general grammar remained stable. By the late twentieth century, other signals increasingly carried that information. A classroom, faculty directory, university web page, endowed title, publication record, disciplinary reputation, office door, conference badge, CV, or familiar name could establish authority independently of clothing.

That change creates room for ambiguity. The contemporary professor can sometimes enter looking like a software engineer, preacher, aristocrat, student, artist, consultant, mechanic, activist, novelist, or someone who forgot there was a meeting. Context resolves the classification afterward.

The old academic anti-fashion depended on a visible norm. Mary McCarthy’s shabby professor could make neglect meaningful because respectability remained easy to recognize. Malamud’s beard could shock because the administration remained clean-shaven. Pnin’s bad tie could be funny because a correct tie existed. The unconventional professor depended on convention for his unconventionality.

The post-1960s transformation weakens that background. As more styles become legitimate, deviation becomes harder to locate. A beard loses political force. An open collar loses bohemian force. Jeans lose their student monopoly. T-shirts become ordinary. Even deliberate frumpiness becomes an academic stereotype. Then the signaling game changes again.

Once casualness becomes expected, formality can carry the information previously carried by casualness. Tartt’s students can make suits look rebellious. Zadie Smith can make the three-piece academic ideologically distinctive. Cornel West can turn extreme formality into personal authorship. A young scholar today could conceivably use a tie to distinguish himself from a faculty full of quarter-zips and sneakers.

The direction of nonconformity reverses with the norm. This is why fiction gives access to the meanings surrounding the garments. Photographs tell us what changed. Novels tell us what the changes could mean to people living inside them.

The fictional chronology also helps reinterpret the Duke yearbooks. Duke’s 1965 department heads do not prove that every professor dressed formally. McCarthy and Malamud make that proposition implausible before we even look elsewhere in the yearbook. Duke itself confirms the point when Peter Klopfer appears casually in the Campus Personalities section. The 1965 finding is institutional. When the yearbook wanted to represent departmental authority, it used an extraordinarily narrow visual code. By 1970, the code begins breaking apart. Professors appear in classrooms, outdoors, in offices, and in activity photographs. Ties become optional while senior administrators remain formally dressed. By 1975, the old and new visual languages coexist inside the faculty sequence. Tie with long hair. Jacket with beard. T-shirt in greenhouse. Open collar in office. The individual combinations matter because they show that no replacement costume has taken command. By 1990, casual professorial dress hardly functions as a statement.

That trajectory fits the fiction. Malamud shows a beard threatening junior faculty membership. DeLillo shows departments possessing rival costumes. Tartt shows old formality becoming subcultural distinction. Russo shows that career progression need not mean increasing casualness. Chabon shows academic dishevelment becoming an established character type. Smith shows the suit returning with new racial and ideological meanings.

The novels therefore suggest a revision to the standard history. The professor did not move from fashion to anti-fashion. Academic life contained competing forms of fashion all along. Mid-century academia had a formal institutional code and several tolerated deviations within it. Shabbiness could mean intellectual seriousness. Tweed could mean scholarly vocation. A flamboyant tie could mean eccentricity. A beard could cross the line into dangerous student resemblance. The upheavals after the 1960s expanded the permissible zone. Political identification with students and hostility to commercial or bureaucratic authority gave casualness additional meanings. The occupational costume weakened. Academic subcultures became more visually autonomous. By the end of the century, the direction of deviation mattered less than the capacity to survive it.

Sartorial discretion is the ability to make the observer uncertain about what your clothes mean without making the observer uncertain about whether you belong. The junior professor in Malamud cannot safely do that. The established professor in DeLillo can. The rumpled novelist in Chabon can. The aristocratically dressed classicist in Tartt’s world can. The modern professor who already carries enough recognized authority may be able to let title, reputation, context, or performance resolve whatever ambiguity the clothes introduce. The older professor’s clothes told you who he was before he opened his mouth. The modern professor can sometimes make you wait.

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The Bliss

Some people close to me regularly stun and wound me with their observations that contradict everything I’ve ever shared with them.

If you are close to me and yet you tell me, “Great news, Luke….” and then your great news is something that I experience as bad news, that hurts my feelings. It might even infuriate me.

How could you know me so well and for so long and assume I will experience this news as great? Why do you talk to me as though I am the opposite person than what I really am?

I know a man who has been happy for as long as I have known her. I love his happiness. I love his company. But sometimes, both things drive me up the wall.

He is not happy the way people are happy after good news. He is happy the way weather is warm. It does not depend on what is going on around him. He walks into a room of people who are tired or grieving or furious and he brings the same brightness she brought to the last room, and most of the time the room adjusts to him.

For years I filed this under obtuseness. Some years ago he wrote to me before a party with what he called great news. The great news was that a person I had spent decades telling him I did not like was joining us. Nothing I had said in thirty years supported the word great. He used it anyway, and he meant it. I read the email three times looking for the joke, couldn’t find it, and then I went ballistic for the next 72 hours and then I finally turned sullen for a day. On the fifth day, I got over it.

More recently he told a mate who left school before he could write a paragraph, that he should go get a bachelor’s degree. He said it the way you might suggest a nice restaurant. My mate was left wondering what he had been looking at all these years.

The word I reached for was willful. He must be choosing this. Nobody could miss that much by accident.

Then I asked a better question. What is the payoff?

In Debtors Anonymous they say that debting is a disease of vagueness. The debtor does not know what he owes, does not open the envelope, does not add up the month. The vagueness feels like freedom. The bill comes anyway, but it comes to a person who has spent the intervening weeks lighter than he had any right to be.

That is my friend. He runs a vagueness about other people’s inner states, and the vagueness buys him a bliss that a more attentive person could not afford. If he registered how the man felt about school, he could not hand him a degree like a gift. If he had tracked what I said for thirty years, he could not write great news. The not-registering is the engine. His happiness is real. It is also unfunded.

Who funds it? Everyone within reach. When someone that cheerful misreads you, correcting him feels cruel. You would be the one who brought the cloud. So you swallow it, and he goes on, and the swallowing confirms his reading of the room. He rarely meets the evidence that might puncture the picture, because the people who hold that evidence keep it to themselves out of something like kindness. The loop closes. The bliss gets subsidized by silence.

I was the subsidy for thirty years. I answered the email politely. I did not say, nothing about this is great news to me, and you know that, or you should. I said something like, looking forward to it. And so from his side the party went beautifully.

There is a second payoff, and it took me longer to see. A person who does not spend attention tracking the states of others has a great deal of attention left over. He has done more with his later decades than most people do with their whole lives. I used to think the cheerfulness and the obliviousness were two facts about him. Now I think they are one fact, and that the achievement is a third face of the same thing. Attention is finite. He spends none of it on how you feel, and look what he can build with the surplus.

Willful was the wrong word. Willful means he could look and chooses not to. The man who left school got the same treatment I got, and he had done nothing to earn it. That argues for a setting rather than a grudge. Somewhere far back he stopped spending attention on other people’s weather, and the decision has run so long it no longer feels like one. From the outside, chosen and incapable look identical. The difference determines whether saying it flatly would land or just bounce.

I have not said it. I am not sure I will. I can’t ignore it. I can’t steel myself for it. It still winds me up. I’ll never graduate from this vulnerability.

Believe me, my friend could write a more compelling essay than I have given you about the prices he has paid for my company. A disinterested observer would note that I’ve been the taker in this relationship overall. I tend to be exquisitely sensitive to myself and oblivious to others.

What I owe him is hard to say. Some of the warmth in the rooms he walks into is warmth he made, and I have stood in it and been glad of it. The bill for his happiness was split among the rest of us in small amounts over many years, and most of us paid without noticing. I noticed. That may be my own disease of a different kind, a vagueness about nothing and an accounting of everything.

* I’ve changed some facts in the above for obvious reasons.

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Yale YT Course: Introduction to the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) (RLST 145) with Christine Hayes

She teaches the way a good trial lawyer opens. Before the jury hears any evidence, she tells them what to distrust, and the thing she asks them to distrust is everything they walked in with. At 16:02 she says that most of our cherished presuppositions about the Bible rest on claims others have made on its behalf, claims the Bible never makes for itself. That sentence tries to disarm the fundamentalist and the village atheist in the same stroke, since both of them argue with a book she says does not exist.

The five myths (it’s a book, it’s pious parables, it’s for children, it’s theology, God wrote it) are the standard critical-scholar liturgy. The best of them is the fourth. She points out at 23:11 that biblical Hebrew has no word for religion, and that becoming an Israelite worked like naturalization: you joined the community, kept its law, revered its lore, and died its death. That is a more useful description of how Judaism still functions than most things said about it from pulpits, and it explains why arguments between Jews and Christians about “belief” so often talk past each other. The catechism model of religion, she says at 23:45, is alien to the Bible.

The frame she opens with is Yehezkel Kaufmann’s. At 1:37 she says the Ancient Near Eastern people with the most lasting legacy was a people that had an idea, and at 5:25 that what counted was less the number of gods than that this God stood outside and above nature.

Hayes says: “This people that had an idea. It was a new idea that broke with the ideas of its neighbors, and those people were the Israelites.”

The line comes from Yehezkel Kaufmann. Hayes assigns him for the second week, and her opening is a paraphrase of his opening. Kaufmann was a Ukrainian-born Zionist who taught at the Hebrew University and wrote an eight-volume history of Israelite religion between 1937 and 1956, which Moshe Greenberg abridged into English in 1960 as The Religion of Israel. His target was Julius Wellhausen. Wellhausen’s Prolegomena (1878) told an evolutionary story: Israel began as a tribal polytheist people like its neighbors, the eighth-century prophets invented ethical monotheism, and the priestly law came last, in the exile, as a fossilization of prophetic spirit. Kaufmann inverted almost every piece of that. Monotheism came first, as an original intuition at the founding of the nation; the prophets applied it; the priestly law was old and pre-exilic. The idea did not evolve out of paganism. It broke with paganism at the start.

His argument was less about God’s number than about God’s nature, which is why Hayes says at 5:25 that number counted for less than that this God stood outside nature. Pagan gods, in Kaufmann’s account, are born, have parents, marry, die, eat, and answer to something above themselves, a fate or a primordial realm that magic can manipulate. The biblical God has no biography and no superior. There is no theogony in Genesis. Nobody coerces Him with a spell. Kaufmann’s cleverest piece of evidence was an argument from absence. The Bible’s polemic against idolatry treats idols as wood and stone, fetishes with eyes that do not see. It never engages the mythology that the idols represented. Kaufmann took that as proof that the writers had lost contact with real pagan thought so long before that they no longer understood it. A people still tempted by Baal’s story would have argued with the story. These writers mocked the statue.

Henri Frankfort’s group at Chicago made a parallel argument in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (1946), later republished as Before Philosophy, whose closing chapter describes the Hebrews’ “emancipation of thought from myth.” Hayes’s phrase about a god known through history rather than nature comes from that tradition too. Behind both stands the nineteenth-century notion of ethical monotheism as Israel’s gift to the world, which Reform Judaism used to justify its own existence and which Kaufmann, a secularist, nationalized: the idea as the creation and property of a people. That is why the sentence says a people had an idea. The grammar is Zionist.

The last fifty years have gone hard against him on the history. In 1975 and 1976 excavators at Kuntillet Ajrud in the Sinai found eighth-century inscriptions with blessings “by Yahweh of Samaria and his Asherah,” and a tomb at Khirbet el-Qom near Hebron gave a similar line. Hundreds of small clay pillar figurines of a woman holding her breasts turn up in Judahite houses from the same period. Mark S. Smith’s The Early History of God (1990) and The Origins of Biblical Monotheism (2001) laid out the case that now dominates the field: Israel’s God started as a member of the Canaanite pantheon, absorbed the high god El’s traits, then displaced Baal and Asherah over centuries, and the flat statement that no other god exists first appears in the exilic chapters of Isaiah. The Bible keeps fossils of the older picture. Psalm 82 has God standing in a council of gods and sentencing them to death. Deuteronomy 32:8, in the reading preserved at Qumran and in the Greek, has the Most High dividing the nations among the sons of God, with Israel as Yahweh’s share. Kaufmann read those as dead metaphors. Smith reads them as memory.

Morton Smith gave the sociology in Palestinian Parties and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (1971). A “Yahweh-alone party” existed for centuries as a minority faction, sometimes in power under kings like Hezekiah and Josiah and often not, and it won for good in the exile because its members were the ones who wrote and edited the surviving texts. On that account the idea did not save the people. A party that held the idea captured the archive, and the archive then told the people that the idea had saved them. Hayes concedes the substance of this at 5:10 when she says the Israelites shared the pagan worldview early and that “some Israelites, not all at once and not unanimously,” broke with it. That sentence and Kaufmann’s cannot both be the story. She teaches the first in the body of the course and uses the second for her opening.

Kaufmann’s argument from absence has also been turned around. Ezekiel describes women weeping for Tammuz at the Temple gate. Jeremiah’s opponents tell him things went well when they baked cakes for the Queen of Heaven. Psalm 29 is a Baal hymn with the name changed, and the sea monster Leviathan and the sea itself as an enemy appear throughout the poetry in ways that match the Ugaritic tablets found at Ras Shamra after 1929. The writers knew the myths. Calling idols wood and stone was polemic, and polemic is a sign of contact, since nobody argues with a corpse. Benjamin Sommer’s The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (2009) went after the transcendence claim from another side, showing that in the older strands God has a body, appears in several places at once, and walks in gardens and eats with Abraham. The God outside nature is the priestly and Deuteronomic God, and the Torah’s editors let the other one stand beside Him.

Akhenaten worshipped the sun disk alone in the fourteenth century, a generation or two before any plausible Moses, and Freud built Moses and Monotheism on the coincidence. Babylonian scribes wrote hymns that made Marduk the sum of all the other gods. Xenophanes in sixth-century Greece mocked gods with human bodies and posited one god unlike mortals in form or thought. None of those became a surviving religion, which is Kaufmann’s real point and Hayes’s: the idea alone counts for little, and the Israelites made a people out of it. Jan Assmann, in Moses the Egyptian (1997) and The Price of Monotheism (2003), accepts that something new happened but locates it elsewhere. The novelty is what he calls the Mosaic distinction, the split between true religion and false, which pagan religions did not have since their gods were translatable across borders. Zeus was Jupiter was Amun. Yahweh had no translation. Assmann thinks that distinction gave the West its notion of religious truth and also its habit of religious violence, and that Kaufmann’s admiring account skips the bill.

Then there is the causal claim, that the idea ensured survival. The Bible’s own answer to why Judah outlived Babylon has more to do with practice than doctrine, which fits what Hayes says later in the same hour about religion as naturalization. Circumcision, Sabbath, food laws, and endogamy are boundary markers that work in a foreign city without a temple, and Deuteronomy’s centralization of sacrifice in Jerusalem had already made worship a matter of one place rather than every hilltop, so losing the one place hurt without dissolving the pattern of daily life. The deportees went as an elite in a body and were resettled together on the Chebar canal, where they could keep a scribal class alive. Fifty years later Cyrus let them go home and Persia funded the rebuilding. Ezra then imported the book. Every one of those factors could have happened to a people with a different idea, and the northern tribes with the same God and the Samaritans with the same Torah show that the idea by itself guaranteed nothing. And the survival that matters to Hayes’s students is the survival past 70 CE, which the rabbis engineered by turning a temple religion into a text religion, an invention the Bible does not contain.

By the exile, a group of Judahites held a picture of God with no rivals, no biography, and no dependence on nature, and they wrote it into a text and a legal code that a small people could carry through the loss of its state. Nobody else did that, and the results are still with us. The strong version, that the idea appeared whole at the beginning and explains the nation, is the thing Hayes calls overstated at 42:09. She opens with it anyway because it is a better first sentence than the truth, and because it lets the students feel they are studying a revolution instead of a slow argument among Iron Age priests.

This rhetoric reminds of the “America is an idea” crowd. They are the same move made by different parties for different purposes. Both claims take a people whose existence has ordinary causes, land, kin, war, luck, law, a scribal class, and say the decisive thing about them was a proposition. Both come from writers. Kaufmann was a scholar. The American version runs from Lincoln, a lawyer who read all night, through G.K. Chesterton’s line that America is a nation with the soul of a church, through Gunnar Myrdal’s “American Creed” in 1944, through Richard Hofstadter’s remark that it has been America’s fate to have no ideologies but to be one, down to every speechwriter since. Max Weber said it a century ago: intellectuals are the bearers of ideas by trade, and the history they write assigns the causal role to the thing they produce. A blacksmith would tell you the plow made the nation. The man who writes for a living tells you the idea did.

Ideas can be taught, and a people defined by an idea can be handed to the people who teach. Ideas can be violated, which means the people who hold them can indict the nation in its own name. The prophets did that to Israel and Lincoln did it to the Union. The idea is a standard held over reality, and a standard has to be somewhat at war with reality or it is useless.

Now the contrasts. Kaufmann’s idea belongs to a people. His whole point was that the Israelite folk possessed monotheism as a national intuition, present from the start, and the Bible agrees with him in this at least: Israel is Abraham’s seed before it is anything, and the covenant binds a family. Blood and idea come together. The idea does not travel; you join the people by naturalization, as Hayes put it, and the people keep the idea. Assmann’s Mosaic distinction between true and false religion is a wall, and the wall is the point.

The American version runs the other way. The idea owns the people. Anyone who assents can belong, which is why the claim has always been most useful to immigrants and their children and to the coalitions that want more of them. Myrdal was a Swede. Many of the loudest twentieth-century voices for the creed were Jews, Catholics, and their descendants, for whom the alternative account, Samuel Huntington’s Anglo-Protestant settler culture with a creed as its by-product, meant standing outside. Huntington’s Who Are We? (2004) is the Mark Smith of this argument: the idea came late, from a specific people with a specific religion and language, and it survived because that people’s institutions carried it. John Jay in Federalist No. 2described the Americans as one people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion. That is a Kaufmann sentence about America. It is now unsayable in the same rooms where “America is an idea” is applause.

So the two claims serve opposite coalitions. Kaufmann’s serves a nation that wants to be a nation, which is why a secular Zionist wrote it. The American creed serves a state that wants to be a church, open to converts. And each has a mirror in the other’s tradition. Kaufmann’s frame descends from Reform Judaism’s ethical monotheism, which German Jews in the nineteenth century used to argue that Judaism was an idea any modern man could respect and therefore its holders could be citizens. That is the American creed in Jewish dress. And the American creed has its own tribalists, who say the idea was English and Protestant and note how many of its proponents are recent arrivals. That is Kaufmann in American dress.

Both claims get contradicted the same way, by digging. Kuntillet Ajrud and the pillar figurines show the Israelites worshipping a goddess two centuries after the supposed intuition. The American equivalent is any county history: the country ran on land, slaves, oceans, coal, and common law, and the idea got quoted at dinners. Both claims also carry the same cost, which Assmann named for monotheism. Once a people is an idea, disagreeing with the idea makes you not part of the people. Israel has its idolaters and America has its un-Americans, and each word does work that “foreigner” cannot.

Ideas are part of reality. Deuteronomy’s demand for one sanctuary, an idea, made the loss of that sanctuary survivable in a way it could not have been for a hill-shrine religion. The Declaration’s sentence about equality, an idea, gave Frederick Douglass and King a weapon they used to change facts on the ground. Ideas act when a people carries them, and a people gets carried by institutions and kin and land. The intellectuals cut the second half because the second half is where they stop being needed. The realists cut the first half because they distrust the people who make the first half their living.

Hayes then assigns Kaufmann for next week and tells students at 42:09 that his ideas are important but overstated. So she borrows his thesis for her own opening and flags the loan as inflated in the same hour. The thesis that an idea saved Israel is a theologian’s causal story. A historian might point to the Babylonians deporting the Judahite scribal and priestly elite as a body and settling them together, which preserved the people who could write, and to the Persian policy of return, which gave them somewhere to write from. Ideas need carriers. The northern tribes had the same God and vanished. She half concedes this at 3:16 when she says the north was lost “to a large degree,” and the Samaritans, who kept the Torah and are still around, get no mention at all. Her line at 3:30 that the Israelites alone emerged after the death of their state is the kind of sentence one says to open a course, not to close one.

Her flood comparison is the strongest ten minutes. She lists the shared narrative elements of Ziusudra and Noah at 11:31 and then makes the point that the borrowing is less important than the rewriting: the Mesopotamian gods drown mankind because the noise keeps them awake, and the biblical God does it out of moral outrage at creatures He made and loves. “It’s saying something different,” she says at 12:54. That is the method of the course in miniature. Read the parallel, then read the deviation, and the deviation is where the writer’s values live. It also quietly reframes the whole question of originality. The Israelites did not invent the flood. They invented the reason for it.

In the passage on faith in the room, 27:41 to 29:31, she says no one in the course wishes to undermine religious faith, then says that when a student asks a question driven by an article of faith, she will invite him to consider the article of faith producing the problem, and will not debate its merits. That is a fair rule and it is also an asymmetric one. The critical method gets to be the floor everyone stands on; the believer’s premise gets treated as a symptom to be examined. She is right that this is the only common ground a Yale lecture hall can have. She is also softer than the truth when she says the course does not undermine faith. The source-critical account of the Pentateuch does undermine some faith positions, the literalist ones, and she knows it, which is why she says at 26:50 that there is no basic incompatibility between believing in inspiration and acknowledging human editing. That sentence is true for many believers and false for others, and she leaves the second group to find that out on their own.

Two things date the lecture to 2006 and to Yale. The first is the sales pitch: at 14:47 she says we tend to think of the Bible as an old fuddy-duddy document, and promises it is instead a revolutionary cultural critique. A professor in a secular elite college has to make the Bible sound like dissent to get the room to lean in, and she does. The second is her taste. Job is “possibly the greatest book of the Bible” (18:31), Ecclesiastes “reads like an existentialist writing from the twentieth century” (18:13). Those are the two books a modern skeptic with a literary education loves, and they are the two she promotes. Leviticus gets one clause about holiness. That is a preference, and it shapes what a million viewers now think the Bible is about.

She also gets a few things loose in a way that live lecturing produces. The Dead Sea Scrolls site as maybe “a pottery factory or something” (39:06) is a hedge on a scholarly dispute she does not want to spend time on, and she is right that Esther is the one book missing from Qumran. The claim at 21:34 that she will not let her twelve-year-old and eight-year-old read the Bible is a good laugh line and also a serious claim about the text: incest, rape, murder, and characters who deceive and repent. Her point that the Bible rarely moralizes and leaves the reader to draw conclusions (22:24) is correct and is the strongest argument for reading it as literature rather than as instruction.

What the lecture is, in the end, is an argument that the Bible is a human anthology of dissenting voices that later Jews chose to bind together without reconciling, and that the reader should not reconcile them either (19:04). That is the modern academic consensus, delivered with charm. What it is not is neutral. It is a tradition of its own, going back through Kaufmann and Wellhausen, and it has its own articles of faith, the chief one being that a text with many authors and many voices is more alive than a text with one. She does not invite the students to consider that premise. Nobody teaching from inside a tradition ever does.

Her stated thesis is Kaufmann’s: an idea saved a people. Her best ten minutes, 23:11 to 24:37, say the opposite. Biblical Hebrew has no word for religion; nobody joined Israel by assenting to doctrines; you joined by living an Israelite life and dying an Israelite death; the process was naturalization. That is Mearsheimer’s anthropology stated by a Bible scholar. People are born into groups that form them before they can reason, and the group’s code is imposed before the child can weigh it. If he is right, then the second passage describes the engine and the first passage describes the paint. The idea did not save Judah. A group with hard boundaries and a long apprenticeship saved Judah, and the idea was the group’s flag.

Deuteronomy reads like his theory written as law. Chapter 6 tells the father to teach these words to his children when he sits at home and walks on the road and lies down and rises, to bind them on his hand and write them on his doorposts. Chapter 11 repeats it. Passover is built around a child asking a question and receiving a scripted answer. None of that is an argument for monotheism. It is a schedule for socialization, and it targets the years Mearsheimer says count, the long childhood before the critical faculties arrive. Kaufmann’s own strongest evidence points the same way. He argued that the biblical writers no longer understood paganism, which he took as proof the idea was ancient. On Mearsheimer’s account it proves the idea was inherited rather than reasoned. The writers mocked idols as wood and stone because they had been raised to, and a taught contempt does not need to understand its object.

This also settles the question of what the idea was. Hayes stresses content, a God above nature, known through history. Mearsheimer would stress function. A God who has no translation into Marduk or Baal, who forbids marrying the neighbors’ daughters and eating their food and resting on their days, is a boundary. The content could have been almost anything so long as it was exclusive. That is why the northern tribes, who had the same God, vanished. They lacked the priestly and Deuteronomic apparatus that turned the God into a fence, and they were scattered by the Assyrians in ways that broke the fence anyway. And it is why the Samaritans, who kept the Torah and the fence, are still on Mount Gerizim.

Hayes tells students at 29:05 that when a question comes from a prior commitment to an article of faith, she will invite them to consider the article of faith producing the problem and leave them to think about it. The premise is that faith is socialization and criticism is reason. Mearsheimer denies the distinction. Reason is the least of the three sources of our preferences, and the critical method is a value infusion too, administered by an institution to eighteen-year-olds who arrived with one set of loyalties and will leave with another. The teaching fellows, the sections, the exegesis paper worth a large share of the grade, the warning at 45:22 that missed sections will be punished: that is a naturalization process. Hayes gives the students an Israelite account of how one joins a people and then runs one on them without naming it. Her own description fits her own lecture hall.

He adds something to her reading of the text as well. At 22:24 she says the Bible rarely moralizes, puts people in situations, and leaves conclusions to the reader. At 8:01 she calls its picture of man as a moral agent revolutionary. That is a liberal reader’s Bible, the individual before the page drawing his own conclusions, and it describes how a Yale seminar reads the book. It does not describe how the people the book made encountered it, which was by chant, on a fixed cycle, in a community, under law, with the conclusions supplied by the sages. The moral agent of the Hebrew Bible is corporate more often than individual. Achan sins and his household dies. The nation goes into exile for the sins of the kings. The prophets address Israel in the second person singular because Israel is one body. Hayes says at 24:37 that the narrative is the odyssey of a people, which is the Mearsheimer sentence, and then at 18:25 praises the Psalms for their individual piety, which is the liberal one.

The link back to “America is an idea” tightens. Mearsheimer’s book argues that nationalism beats liberalism whenever the two collide because nationalism fits how people are built and liberalism does not. The Hebrew Bible on his reading is the earliest surviving record of that outcome. A universal God, above nature, the same for everyone, chooses one people and gives them a land and a law, and the particular half of that arrangement is what survived. Hayes’s students hear the universal half called revolutionary. The tribal half is what they are being asked to buy the Jewish Study Bible to read.

David Pinsof’s target is the intellectual who believes the world’s problems are misunderstandings and that his job is to correct them. Hayes’s second chapter is titled “Common Myths about the Bible.” She spends thirteen minutes crossing items off a list, and at 15:54 she says what we have are popular misconceptions that come from how the Bible has been used or misused. That is the genre he is describing. The lecture presents itself as a cure for error, and on his account the first question to ask about any such cure is who profits from the error and who profits from the cure.

Take the myths one at a time. The belief that God wrote the Bible, which Hayes dates at 25:54 to a religious doctrine of a much later age, is held by people whose institutions run on it. A text with one divine author cannot be edited by a professor; a text with many human authors can. The pious-parable reading she mocks at 19:49, the Sunday school version where Jacob is a role model, is a socialization tool that churches use because it works on eight-year-olds. The fuddy-duddy view she names at 14:47, where the Bible is an outdated document, serves the secular student who wants a license to skip it. On Pinsof’s reading none of these are misunderstandings. Each is a belief its holder has an incentive to hold, and the people who hold them are not waiting to be corrected. They are defending an asset.

Hayes says at 27:24 that the course concerns culture, history, literature, and thought rather than faith, and at 28:08 that no one wishes to undermine belief. Those are stated motives. Pinsof’s method is to ask what the enterprise does regardless of what it says. What a university Bible course does is move authority over the text from clergy to professors. The student who finishes it cites Kaufmann and the Jewish Study Bible where he used to cite his pastor or rabbi, and the people who wrote the Jewish Study Bible’s articles are Hayes’s colleagues. The exegesis paper and the sections that carry a quarter of the grade train the student in the academy’s method and no other. That is coalition work, and it is savvy. It does not require anyone to have lied.

Her rule for faith questions at 29:05 fits his template. When a student asks something driven by a prior commitment, she will point out the article of faith producing the problem and decline to debate it. She treats the question as a misunderstanding the student has not noticed in himself. Pinsof would say the student knows what he is doing. He is displaying loyalty to a group whose good opinion he needs more than hers, and the question is a flag, not a confusion. And her refusal to argue the merits is savvy in turn, since an argument on the merits would put the academy’s own premises on the table, and those premises are no more the product of pure reason than the student’s.

Hayes describes the biblical writers at 14:31 as voicing discontent with their culture and at 15:01 as authors of a revolutionary critique. That is the misunderstanding story applied to the Iron Age: Israel’s neighbors and most Israelites held wrong beliefs about God, and a few writers set them straight. Pinsof’s question is what the writers were competing for. The answer in the text is the state and the sanctuary. Josiah’s reform in 2 Kings 23 tears down the rural shrines, slaughters their priests, and routes every sacrifice and its revenue through Jerusalem. Deuteronomy’s one-sanctuary law is the charter for that seizure. The prophets’ denunciations of idolatry are attacks on a rival priesthood’s clientele, and the polemic that calls idols wood and stone, which Kaufmann took as innocent ignorance, is the kind of strategic stupidity Pinsof means. The Yahweh-alone party understood Baal fine. Misdescribing him was a weapon. So the idea that saved Israel was a faction’s flag in a zero-sum fight over the coercive apparatus of a small kingdom, and it survived because the faction that held it also held the archive.

The Bible’s own anthropology is on his side, not hers. Hayes says at 22:24 that the text rarely moralizes and leaves conclusions to the reader, as if the book trusted men to reason their way to the good. The book does not trust them. Jeremiah 17:9 calls the heart deceitful above all things. Deuteronomy’s answer to wrong belief is a law backed by stoning, and its answer to the next generation is drilling, not persuasion. The prophets diagnose a stiff neck and a hard heart, which are motives, and they rarely diagnose a bad argument. The Hebrew Bible reads like a document written by people who had reached Pinsof’s conclusion that the problem is bad motives and had decided the only remedy was force and ritual. The misunderstanding model is later, Greek, and academic, and Hayes imports it into a text that argues against it.

Her favorite books tell the same story. At 18:31 she names Job as possibly the greatest, and at 18:13 she says Ecclesiastes reads like twentieth-century existentialism. Those are the two books that say the world cannot be fixed and the wise man should stop pretending. Pinsof ends his essay with a hole that cannot be climbed out of. He has written a gloss on Ecclesiastes, and the professor who thrills to Ecclesiastes and Pinsof are sharing a taste that a lecture hall full of undergraduates does not, which is one reason Hayes calls the book a fun surprise and one reason his blog is called depressing.

Stanley Fish’s claim in Is There a Text in This Class? (1980) is that a text has no meaning apart from the interpretive strategies readers bring to it, and that those strategies belong to communities, which is why readings are stable within a group and vary between groups. Meaning is what a community trained a certain way sees. Put that beside Hayes’s sentence at 29:21 about helping students read “what the text is actually and not ideally saying,” and the lecture turns into an example of the thing Fish spent a career denying: that under the readings there is a text that says something on its own.

Her list of myths becomes, on his account, a list of other communities’ reading conventions. Churches and synagogues read the Bible as one book because they read with rules that make it one: harmonize the contradictions, read Genesis in light of Exodus, read the Old in light of the New. Fish’s own example in the book is Augustine’s rule in On Christian Doctrine that any passage which does not teach charity must be read figuratively until it does, a rule under which the text can only ever mean charity and the reader never meets a counterexample. Source critics read with a different rule: treat contradictions as seams, assign them to authors, refuse to harmonize. Under that rule the text can only ever be a library. Hayes states her community’s rule at 19:04. The editors “didn’t strive to reconcile the conflicts, nor should we.” The cacophony of voices she promises at 14:25 is what that rule produces. A community that reconciles hears a chorus. Neither sound is in the text. Both are in the ear.

The same holds for the question of what the Bible is. Hayes says at 33:20 that any course runs into the problem of defining its object because different Bibles served different communities, which is Fish’s thesis in her own mouth. Then she resolves it by taking the twenty-four books common to all Bibles as a neutral floor, and at 38:00 concedes that the floor is the Jewish Tanakh. She prefers “Hebrew Bible” to “Old Testament” as “more accurate” (35:47), assigns the Jewish Study Bible, and asks the students to get used to BCE and CE. Fish would not call any of that wrong. He would say “accurate” means “what my community calls it,” that the choice of the Tanakh as the shared core is a Judaica scholar’s choice, and that presenting a community’s conventions as the neutral ground is exactly how interpretive communities reproduce. Her own field’s canon is the one that gets to look like no canon.

Her handling of believers follows. At 29:05 she says a faith commitment can make it hard to read what the text says and that she will point the article of faith out and leave the student to think. Fish’s anti-foundationalism denies there is anywhere to stand that is not an article of faith. The student who reads Genesis as Mosaic and the professor who reads it as J, E, and P are both reading inside communities with rules about what counts as evidence, what a contradiction is, and what a text is. Hayes’s community happens to be the one with tenure. Her invitation to consider the belief behind the question could be returned to sender with no loss of force, and Fish, who enjoys this kind of thing, would say the honest version of her rule is: in this room we read by these conventions, and if you want the grade you will read by them too. He thought that version was fine. He wrote a book, Professional Correctness (1995), arguing that disciplines should teach their practices without pretending to neutrality or world-saving. What he would object to is the sentence at 28:08 that nobody wishes to undermine faith. Teaching a student to see seams changes the Bible he has. You cannot induct someone into an interpretive community and leave his old one intact.

There is a stretch of the lecture Fish would claim as his own. At 22:24 Hayes says the Bible rarely moralizes, puts people in situations, and makes the reader do the work. That is reader-response criticism, the tradition Fish belonged to before he pushed it to its end, and in biblical studies it runs through Robert Alter’s The Art of Biblical Narrative (1981) and Meir Sternberg’s The Poetics of Biblical Narrative (1985), whose puns and gaps and ironies are what Hayes promises the sections will surface. Fish’s early book on Milton, Surprised by Sin (1967),argued that Paradise Lost works by trapping the reader into Satan’s rhetoric and then rebuking him, so that the reader’s experience is the poem’s meaning. Hayes’s Bible does the same to the reader who arrives wanting Jacob to be a saint. But Fish’s later move undoes the comfort. The reader who does the work is a reader trained to do that work. Sunday school readers also work, and their work produces a Jacob who is a model. The seminar’s work produces a deceiver who grows. The text supports whichever reader it is given.

At 8:19 Hayes describes the enormous body of interpretation and commentary built on the Bible, and she schedules the history of interpretation as a treat after the real reading. Fish would invert the order. The history of interpretation is the Bible’s meaning, all there is of it, and the critical reading is one more floor on the edifice with a later date. The claim at 25:54 that the Bible itself does not claim divine authorship assumes the text can make or withhold claims apart from readers. A community that reads “the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah” and “Moses wrote this Torah” in Deuteronomy 31 as covering the whole finds the claim; a community that reads them as covering an oracle and a scroll does not. Fish holds that the finding is all that ever happens.

Wellhausen’s Israel, an evolving tribe that grew up into prophetic ethics, is a Protestant German reading. Kaufmann’s Israel, a folk born with a national intuition, is a Zionist reading. Mark Smith’s Israel, a Canaanite branch that pruned its pantheon, is a reading by a community that trusts inscriptions over narrative. Each Israel is what its community’s rules let the evidence become. Hayes teaches from the third while opening with the second, and Fish would say the switch tells you which community she talks to in print and which she talks to in a lecture hall.

This one is better than the first because she spends the last eleven minutes taking apart the man she spent the first thirty-five building. At 37:43 she says that when you read Kaufmann it is clear he often has to force his evidence, and force it badly. At 44:32 she says biblical religion was less a revolution of Israel against the nations than a civil war of Israel against itself. That second sentence is the thesis of the lecture, and it makes the opening line of Lecture 1 about a people with an idea into something she no longer believes by Wednesday. The idea belonged to a party. The people worshipped what their neighbors worshipped, with an extra god on top.

Her method for presenting Kaufmann is to build him as a deductive system. Posit a realm before and above the gods, and, as she says at 10:14, all of these things follow: limited gods, no sovereign will, mythology, magic, an amoral universe. Remove the realm and, at 23:06, the opposite list follows. That is a good way to teach a thinker and a bad way to describe a religion, and she knows it. At 37:15 she says monotheism and polytheism in the abstract rest on divergent intuitions, then adds that she is not sure either exists anywhere in the world. That aside is the crux. Kaufmann’s “pagan religion” is an ideal type assembled from Greek fate, Babylonian theogony, and Canaanite fertility rites, and no pagan held all of it. Egyptians had Ma’at, a moral order the gods uphold and the king serves. Hammurabi’s Shamash is a god of justice. The Babylonian Theodicy and the Egyptian Instruction for Merikare, which says the god knows every name and cares for men as his cattle, do not describe an amoral cosmos of siblings at war. Kaufmann’s paganism is the Bible’s polemical picture of paganism written up as sociology, and the comparison he runs is between an edited theology and a caricature. Hayes flags the abstraction. She does not say where the caricature came from.

Several of the strong claims she voices for him are overstated in ways a student in section could catch. At 24:49 she says there is no life after death in the Hebrew Bible, that people live seventy years and that is it. Sheol runs through Psalms and Job as a gray survival, the witch of Endor brings up Samuel, and Daniel 12 promises that many who sleep in the dust will awake, which is in the canon even if it is late. The defensible claim is that most of the corpus offers no reward after death, which is a different and more useful sentence. At 25:06 she says magic is represented as useless. Numbers 5 has a priest write curses on a scroll, wash the ink into water, and make a suspected adulteress drink it so that her belly swells. Elisha’s bones raise a dead man. His axe head floats. Kaufmann’s answer, which she gives at 26:19, is that the editors recast every working magic as a witness to God’s will. That answer cannot lose. Any spell that fails proves magic is empty, and any spell that works proves God willed it. A thesis that absorbs both outcomes is not being tested by the text.

At 32:39 she quotes God’s warning to Cain that sin couches at the door and its urge is toward you, and offers it as proof that evil has moved from the metaphysical to the moral realm. The Hebrew verb behind “couches” is robets, and since Speiser’s Anchor Bible commentary scholars have linked it to the Akkadian rabisu, a lurking demon that crouches at doorways. Her proof text for the demythologizing of sin has a demon crouching in it. That does not sink her point. It shows how the text does what she says it does, by keeping the old furniture and changing what it means, and it shows the process is visible on the page rather than finished before the page was written.

The same holds for her claim at 31:41 that no one in the Hebrew Bible ever says the devil made me do it. In 2 Samuel 24 the Lord incites David to take the census that brings a plague. In 1 Chronicles 21, retelling the same story a few centuries later, Satan does it. The devil is being invented inside the canon, by a writer who could no longer stand the earlier version, and the two texts side by side are the strongest evidence anyone could want for her civil-war reading. She does not use them. Nor does she engage the verses where the sovereign good God claims the other side of the ledger, Isaiah 45:7 forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil, or Amos 3:6 asking whether evil befalls a city unless the Lord has done it. Her rebuttal at 34:00 to the student who asks whether monotheism just renamed the metadivine realm as God is that this God is only good. The verses say otherwise, and the theodicy problem she names at 30:02 as a huge problem for monotheistic thought is that problem, produced by the very claim she uses to answer the student.

Her distinction from Geller between Israelite-Judean religion and biblical religion (38:18 to 39:22) is the right tool. Yahweh had no consort in the text (23:41) and had one in the inscriptions, and the gap between those two facts is the gap between what people did and what the editors wanted. The historicized festivals she describes at 28:42 show the process mid-stride: Leviticus 23 gives Sukkot an agricultural rationale and Deuteronomy 16 and Leviticus 23:43 give it a historical one, and both survive. Genesis 6 with its divine beings marrying human women she calls, at 41:25, a fluid boundary if you ask me. Psalm 82 gets a paraphrase at 41:45 in which God stands up in the council and tells the other gods they do not know what they are doing. All of that is Mark Smith’s case, and the “minority movement that grew to prominence over centuries” at 43:38 is Morton Smith’s Yahweh-alone party. Neither is named. An undergraduate lecture rarely credits the scholars whose conclusions it delivers, and the effect is that Kaufmann gets a name and a hundred pages while the people who refuted him arrive as “most scholars conjecture.”

One thing she gets that Kaufmann’s critics sometimes lose. At 37:34 she holds that the difference between Israel’s God in the monotheizing sources and the gods of the neighbors is qualitative, and the case for that survives the demolition. A god who is the source of all being, with no birth, no consort, no rival, and no substance a magician can work on, is a different kind of object from Marduk even if Marduk’s hymns sometimes reach toward the same thing. The lecture’s own trajectory is the argument: the object was not there in 900 BCE, was there in the sixth century, and the road between was a fight inside Judah that the text records without meaning to.

Posted in Bible, Christine Hayes | Comments Off on Yale YT Course: Introduction to the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) (RLST 145) with Christine Hayes

Jason Arday – Serial Fabulist, Plagiarist & Dissertation Supervisor

The late Jason Arday claimed to be supervising 15 Ph.D. students. That figure comes from the September 2025 Carter-Ruck letter sent on his behalf. The same letter said he had “examined over 35 PhD theses as an external examiner.”

Rehana Awan’s 2025 Open University EdD thanks Alison Davies, Naomi Watson and Arday and explicitly calls all three her supervisors. Sasha Henriques’s January 2026 Cambridge Ph.D. repository record lists Jason Arday as an adviser, and the underlying thesis materials identify him as one of the Ph.D. supervisors.

Arday’s January 2020 CV listed only two Ph.D. supervision assignments, Christopher Jones at Durham as third supervisor and Sohil Alqazlan at Warwick as second supervisor. And The New York Times reported last month that when Cambridge appointed him in 2023, he had moved between universities without remaining at one long enough to oversee a normal three-year-plus doctorate from beginning to end. Cambridge nevertheless required a “proven successful track record” of Ph.D. supervision for the post.

I see two Arday-examined Ph.D. theses that are receiving substantive public scrutiny right now.

Damilola Folayan, Cambridge, 2025. Her own professional biography says Arday and Laura Serrant examined the thesis. Benjamin Ryan and Colin Wright published a detailed attack on its academic rigor on September 2, focusing on its three interviewees, autoethnographic material and “Critical Poetic Inquiry.”

Rebecca Loy, Liverpool, 2023. Liverpool’s repository confirms Searching for Critical Consciousness; in the Pursuit of Freedom. Loy herself publicly thanked Arday as her external examiner and said he gave her “overwhelmingly positive feedback.” Ryan began circulating the thesis today, September 4, highlighting the six personally known interviewees, including her aunt.

I just found two additional completed doctorates for which the graduates themselves identify Arday as an examiner: Bonita Corrie-Lunn’s Oxford Brookes Ph.D. on antisemitism in British football and Fezile Sibanda’s Sussex Ph.D., Echoes of Empire: A Collective Story of Black Brit-ish Academics Working in Higher Education Institutions in England.

Posted in Academia, Jason Arday | Comments Off on Jason Arday – Serial Fabulist, Plagiarist & Dissertation Supervisor

LAT: ‘Payouts in L.A. County’s $4-billion sex abuse settlement delayed to two largest law firms’

Rebecca Ellis writes:

Slater Slater Schulman, which represents roughly 3,700 people in L.A. County’s $4-billion sex abuse payout, told clients it has “temporarily paused” payouts.
Downtown LA Law Group, which represents roughly 2,700 plaintiffs in the case, has not yet received any money to distribute to victims.

Rebecca Ellis wrote Oct. 26, 2025:

On Oct. 14, Lawrence Friedman, a former Department of Justice attorney who headed up the federal watchdog office for the bankruptcy system, spearheaded a blistering motion asking Houser to reduce Slater’s attorneys fees, which he estimated were at least $20 million. Friedman is seeking to push them out of the case, alleging the firm had “run amok” and “dangled the prospect of lottery sized payouts” in front of clients without vetting them.

Here’s that Friedman motion filed in the Delaware bankruptcy court in Case No. 20-10343 (LSS), administered by Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein.:

This Motion is the culmination of what happens when you let trial lawyers run amok in the bankruptcy system. After the Boy Scouts filed this bankruptcy case, the race was on amongst a group of technology firms and law firms to bundle or aggregate as many claims as humanly possible to be filed in the bankruptcy case to take the largest portion of available funds they could. In that singular goal they succeeded. The unfortunate result was that an estimated 2,000 claims quickly exploded to become 82,000 claims. Among the top leaders in this effort is the law firm of Slater Slater Schulman (“SLATER”). SLATER together with other claim aggregators including the marketing “law firm” of Pintas & Mullins (https://www.pintas.com/) (“Pintas”) acquired approximately 14,600 claims which were filed in this bankruptcy case.

The SLATER law firm has little if any quality controls in place to validate the information in the 14,600 claims other than validating that they were real people who had filed the claim. In fact, there is no financial incentive for SLATER to have quality controls because the firm gets paid based on total claims filed where validity of the claims does not matter to them. The claim aggregators working with SLATER as well as with other law firms such as Van Arsdale aka AVA Law Group (https://avalaw.com/) (“Van Arsdale”) used every form of technology and media available to search out and target victims of sexual abuse. Then SLATER dangled the prospect of lottery sized payouts in front of the victims while at the same time failing to disclose mandatory information required by ethical and professional rules – think conflicts – as well as any practical information regarding expected recoveries.2

As this Motion discusses in detail, the SLATER firm was and is still so singularly focused on its own pecuniary interests – estimated to be between $50 million and $100 million – that the firm has completely lost sight of the ethical and professional obligations to all of its 14,600 clients. Amongst the most brazen and incriminating of these violations is the fact that SLATER hid from its clients that the claims it filed have been under investigation by the Trustee of the Settlement Trust for seventeen (17) months. SLATER never disclosed this fact to any of its clients. This blatant misinformation and deception from the SLATER firm continues even today.

The Claimants represented by the SLATER firm will attest that when they contacted the firm over the preceding seventeen (17) months, they were told by SLATER that their claims were “in the queue” to be reviewed. This was blatantly false. When the Claimants informed the SLATER firm that they desired to terminate its legal services, the Claimants were told by SLATER that the contingency agreements are “iron clad” and that the Claimants will have to pay SLATER no matter what, and further that the Claimants will have to pay SLATER in addition to any fees charged by their new counsel. The firm went on to bully the Claimants by telling them that SLATER will file a lien against their award and so the firm is guaranteed to get its fees and “there is nothing the client can do about this”. This of course is false and extremely heavy handed. It is this lien threat which necessitates the request that this court opine on the reasonableness of fees (if any) as it is integral to the termination and substitution of counsel.

For the reasons discussed in detail below, the Claimants request this court to allow their representation to be transferred to Friedman Partners and the Scheer Law Group, and further that this Court determine the amount of appropriate compensation – if any – to be awarded to the SLATER firm. Claimants also seek injunctive relief in an order directing Slater to cease its dissemination of misinformation and proactively notify all their clients as to their actual rights in this matter.

II. ARGUMENT

The bankruptcy scheme in which the SLATER firm and other similar law firms have engaged is simple. The SLATER firm solicited clients promising to represent them as lawyers when in fact it delivered nothing more than claim preparation services delivered through contractors and paralegals. As such, SLATER should be compensated the same as a petition preparer under 11 U.S.C. §110, as its services amounted to nothing more than proof of claim preparers.

Moreover, in the case of the SLATER firm, due to that continuing fraud, SLATER should be denied all of its fees for the numerous breaches of its ethical and professional duties to its clients.

As this Court is well aware, mass tort bankruptcy cases are an entirely different breed of animal. In the mass tort context, the problems started when individual cases were filed by attorneys who took the tangible risks typical of personal injury cases and performed all of the work necessary to bring those cases to fruition and obtain positive results. These attorneys prevailed in the individual cases and were awarded very significant monetary damages. After a growing number of these individual cases were tried and millions of dollars were lost, the defendants faced real lasting exposure and risk that the owners and company could be significantly and permanently damaged. The problems and pressure continued to mount and escalate.

Given the enormous financial pressure these mass tort claims impose, many corporate defendants often resort to bankruptcy as an alternative to resolve them. Once in bankruptcy, the company can use the bankruptcy code to flush out insurance proceeds and other sources of funds to then resolve the onslaught of claims. This is where the problems begin to develop.

Extremely sophisticated claim aggregating companies team up with law firms and endeavor to generate the greatest number of claims possible, literally hijacking the bankruptcy process with the singular objective of amassing enormous numbers of claims and generating an obscene amount of legal fees for themselves. The scheme is deceptively simple. Create a marketing media campaign with the alluring message that anyone with any casual contact with the defendants who suffered an injury afflicting millions might be entitled to millions of dollars. Marketers often point to verdicts in the original test cases to suggest that claimants could receive millions even though they know that the actual amount any individual victim will receive in this mass tort bankruptcy scenario is a small fraction of that amount. It is a baited hook intended to attract as many prey as possible.

The claimants are caught in the net of these sophisticated marketing scams and are shamelessly victimized yet again. Claimants are induced to execute nearly identical retainer agreements with the law firms which categorically provide for a 40% contingency fee on any recovery the victim receives with the implication that there is a lot of intense attorney work to be done to earn that fee. These simple but quite onerous contingency fee agreements ultimately entitle the attorneys and their sophisticated partners to reap the benefits of these massive payouts resulting not from legal skill but from amassing claims all for doing nothing more than assisting the claimants in completing a proof of claim form.

The numbers are staggering. For example, in this case, while the claimants’ attorneys may share in a pool of $91,000,000 aggregate legal fees, the individual claimants who elect an express payment of $3,500.00 only net $2,100.00, after the attorneys take its $1,400.00 contingency fee!

Overall, the claimants will never receive more than 20% – and likely much less – of their awarded claim value while the law firms collect 40% of the total pot. This is absurd. Some might say it has criminal implications.3

The colossal financial upside for the claimants’ attorneys which have systematically accumulated literally thousands and thousands of claims is both breathtaking and mind boggling. It is impossible to understate the added harm, humiliation and injury that these attorneys have inflicted upon the 80,000+ claimants in this bankruptcy, all of whom have already suffered unimaginable and indescribable injuries and damages.

In this Motion, the Claimants herein seek various relief:

• Substitute in new counsel of record Friedman Partners and the Scheer Law Group in place of SLATER to protect and preserve their rights and claims;

• Have their prior legal services agreements with SLATER terminated and voided;

• Have the Court deny SLATER’s any fees under the 40% contingency fee agreement or reduce those fees to quantum meruit.

The Claimants herein represent only a miniscule sample of all of the claimants that SLATER represents in this case. Claimants are informed and believe that the allegations contained in this Motion apply to all other claimants represented by SLATER in this case.

As a result, Claimants seek additional prospective relief. Claimants request that the Court set an Order to Show Cause as follows:

(1) Directing SLATER to demonstrate that the other claimants it represents are not materially dissimilar to the Claimants herein;

(2) Allow these other claimants which SLATER currently represents to have the same relief and remedies sought by the Claimants in this Motion, and

(3) Enjoin SLATER from continuing to disseminate misinformation to all claimants concerning their rights to terminate SLATER’s representation of them.

SLATER’s business practices in this case, as well as those by other mass tort law firms that follow the same claims accumulation business model, should be closely examined and no longer tolerated by this Court or other bankruptcy courts administrating mass torts. If society is going to utilize the bankruptcy courts to solve societal issues then the bankruptcy courts need to recognize the actual work being done on behalf of claimants and set up protections and guardrails to ensure that claims are properly vetted and that insurance funds and other proceeds intended to compensate the claimants, are distributed directly to claimants and not to claim preparers seeking extraordinary payments akin to personal injury lawyers, for what is clearly ordinary paralegal level work.

This Motion is intended to be Ground Zero.

III. THE SLATER FIRM AND ITS AGGREGATORS ARE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM

On its splashy website, with eleven (11) offices around the country, SLATER represents that it is “a prominent full-service law firm with over 40 years of experience representing survivors of catastrophic and traumatic events.” Specializing in mass tort cases, SLATER touts that its attorneys “take a personal approach to representation. We fight for the results you truly desire, not just those that are easily achieved. As dedicated advocates, we are constantly available to our clients to provide guidance and support. Knowing how overwhelming the litigation process can become, our team is here to address your concerns, so that you can focus on the most critical aspect of any accident: your recovery.” (https://sssfirm.com/child-sexual-abuse-cases/boy-scouts-of-america-case-overview/)

In mass torts bankruptcy cases such as here, nothing could be further from the truth. Instead of championing the cause of the vulnerable victims, SLATER uses its clients as pawns to instead extract extraordinarily disproportionate and unreasonable fees from these cases.

While SLATER and similar firms will likely contend that the huge aggregation of thousands of claims allows it to be a powerful and heavy hitting presence in the bankruptcy litigation, in reality, that is simply not the case. It is a red herring and offers a feeble justification for the egregious and outrageous amount of fees it seeks in mass tort cases. SLATER’s mammoth economic benefits in fees recovered far outweigh any benefit each individual claimant could possibly receive. In fact, this Court has found as much in its opinion denying the Coalitions request of payment of its fees.

Indeed, in the mass tort context of bankruptcy cases, the expertise of law firms like SLATER lies not in actually litigating the individual claimants’ claims to maximize monetary damages for the injured and damaged victims, but rather in partnering with savvy and shrewd marketing, media and advertising firms such as Pintas with its well-honed proficiency in accumulating vast and astonishing numbers of claims to funnel to SLATER to capitalize upon. What SLATER has effectively created is simply a “Claims Machine” designed to spit out huge wads of cash for itself!

The entire bankruptcy system as currently constructed and applied rewards those law firms for their self-serving business model designed for its own personal gain and benefit, underscores and highlights the great and desperate need for reform to rebalance the system and protect the individual claimants who are the true victims, the injured, the aggrieved and the damaged. By permitting big firms like SLATER to continue to operate in the manner described here in mass tort cases, for their often obscene financial benefit, to the detriment of the individual victims who are the most vulnerable, simply empowers and entitles SLATER to “re-victimize” the victims over and over again.

These selfish tactics perpetrated by legal counsel, who are officers of the court, is unacceptable and abhorrent in our practice of law. It should no longer be tolerated in the bankruptcy system. The interests of the injured victims must be protected and safeguarded. The Debtor’s bankruptcy case will never be able to make right the horrible wrongs that were done long ago in the claimants’ lives, and no compensation can possibly heal the life-long damage which has been done to them. But this Court cannot allow firms such as SLATER to repeatedly take great financial advantage of the individual claimants under the guise of legal representation. Claimants request that this Court take action now.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On February 18, 2020, Boy Scouts of America filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. This bankruptcy is jointly administrated with the bankruptcy filing of Delaware BSA, LLC. The joint case is being administered by the Honorable Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein.

The Chapter 11 Plan was confirmed by order of the Court on September 8, 2022.

The Settlement Trust is nearing completion of the first set of distributions and thus these matters are ripe for adjudication.

V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEYS

Claimants seek to substitute Friedman Partners and the Scheer Law Group in place of the SLATER firm, for all purposes, in this bankruptcy action. Claimants request an Order approving this substation of counsel.

It is a long-standing and well-established general principle and that a client has the right to change his or her attorney at any stage of proceedings. Over 100 years ago, the Second Circuit held that a client may apply to the court for substitution of counsel without assigning a reason, and the court may grant such substitution while imposing terms to protect the displaced attorney’s rights, such as ensuring payment of fees or preserving liens. The Flush, 277 F. 25 (2nd. Cir. 1921).

In this case, for the reasons set forth in great detail below, Claimants seek to substitute Friedman Partners and the Scheer Law Group in the place of SLATER for all purposes. Not only do the Claimants have the right to have counsel of their choosing at any time in this proceeding, but SLATER has completely failed to meet many of the most important professional and ethical obligations and responsibilities which are critical to an effective attorney-client relationship in its representation of the Claimants.

Proposed new counsel are experienced and seasoned bankruptcy attorneys and are committed to represent the Claimants in all regards to the best of their abilities. Claimants request that the substitution of counsel to Friedman Partners and the Scheer Law Group be approved.

VI. THIS COURT SHOULD TERMINATE SLATER’S LEGAL SERVICES AGREEMENT

Each and every attorney practicing in the law in the State of Delaware is subject to the Delaware Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“LRPC”), which governs all aspects of that attorney’s practice in the State.

A review of the various Rules clearly and unambiguously demonstrates SLATER’s repeated and flagrant violations of the LRPC.

A. RULES GOVERNING LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS

Like many states, Delaware adopted the ABA Model Rules in large part in enacting the LRPC. Several of those Rules are of particular importance in this case as they relate to SLATER’s professional activities and conduct in the representation of the Claimants. For ease of reference, Claimants provide the text of the sections cited in the attached appendix with emphasis added.

B. IN ITS REPRESENTATION OF THE CLAIMANTS HEREIN AND THE OTHER CLIENT CLAIMANTS, SLATER VIOLATED MANY OF THE LRPC PROFESSIONAL RULES

As discussed above, SLATER’s business model is incredibly simple and effective. SLATER partners with mass marketers and paid claims aggregators to accumulate as many claims as possible under a standard but onerous 40% contingency fee agreement. The immense accumulation of a massive number of claims is done with the false promise of huge monetary awards. With each new claimant added by SLATER, the mutual interests of the Claimants and SLATER actually diverge until SLATER becomes essentially an “adversary” to their claimant clients.

The most critical point is that whether SLATER represents one claimant or 14,600 claimants its duties, responsibilities and obligations as the attorney of record is exactly the same to each client claimant at all times. An attorney representing thousands of claimants in a mass torts case must still comply with all applicable rules of professional conduct as set forth in the LRPC. Neither the size nor complexity of the representation exempts an attorney from their ethical and professional obligations to each and every client. No matter how they attempt to justify it, neither SLATER nor any other mass tort law firm representing huge groups of claimants can escape this requirement.

Under the LRPC Rule 1.1, attorneys are required to provide competent and diligent representation to their clients, and comply with all professional rules, regardless of the number of claimants they represent. Attorneys must possess the knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the representation, which includes understanding the relevant issues of fact and law. They must also act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing claimants, such as responding promptly to requests for information.

This duty applies universally, including in mass torts cases, where the scale of representation does not diminish the attorney’s obligation to meet these standards. The LRPC do not provide any exceptions to the duty of competence and diligence based on the number of claimants or clients a lawyer represents. Instead, the rules impose uniform obligations on attorneys to ensure that all clients receive adequate representation. For example, Rule 8.4(a) prohibits lawyers from violating or attempting to violate the rules of professional conduct, regardless of the circumstances. This principle was reinforced in Matter of Abbott, 308 A.3d 1139 (2023), where the court clarified that the rule applies broadly and is not limited to specific contexts.

Notably, while SLATER views its 14,600 claimant clients as a source of power and prestige, it is this massive number of clients that causes escalating ethical concerns due to all the conflicts of interest. In In re Katz, 981 A.2nd 1133, 1147, the Court noted: “A leading treatise on lawyer ethics by Professors Hazard and Hodes begins its overview on the subject of “conflicts of interest in the practice of law” by noting that “[l]oyalty to clients is one of the core values of the legal profession, perhaps equal in importance with maintaining confidentiality and diligently or zealously working to advance a client’s interests.” The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics provided, in part, that “[i]t is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” Accordingly, the Hazard and Hodes treatise concludes “already present in this [1908] formulation are the modern themes that client consent can ‘cure’ many conflicts of interest but only if it is informal [sic] consent.”

Concerns such as these resulted in Rule 1.7(b)(4) which requires the informed consent of each affected client to be confirmed in writing. SLATER completely glosses over these conflicts of interest not only as between its client claimants but also as between its own financial interests in the case and those claimant clients.

While attorneys may limit the scope of their representation through their agreements with clients, such limitations do not exempt them from their duty to provide competent representation. The duty of competence is “circumscribed by the scope of representation agreed to,” but attorneys cannot limit their responsibilities to the extent that they fail to provide meaningful legal advice or act negligently. In re Seare, 493 B.R. 158 (D. Nev. 2013). This principle ensures that attorneys remain accountable for the quality of their representation, even when handling numerous claimants.

Failure to comply with professional conduct rules can result in disciplinary actions, including disqualification, suspension, or other sanctions. For instance, a law firm was found to have violated its ethical and legal duties, leading to forfeiture of its fees. See In re Mercury, 280 B.R. 35 (Bkrtcy. S.D. NY 2002). Similarly, an attorney’s repeated failure to meet deadlines and conduct discovery can result in disciplinary sanctions. In re Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115 (SCt. DE 2012). These cases highlight the serious consequences of failing to adhere to ethical standards, regardless of the scale of representation.

As a result, it is inescapable and undeniable that even attorneys representing thousands of claimants in mass torts cases such as SLATER are unequivocally required to comply with all applicable rules of professional conduct. The complexity or size of the case does not diminish or excuse the attorneys’ ethical and professional obligations, including providing competent and diligent representation, avoiding unethical conduct, communicating and obtaining consent to settle, and adhering to all jurisdictional rules of professional conduct.

SLATER is in clear violation of many of its ethical and professional obligations. A summary of the firm’s LRPC violations are as follows:

(1) Total Failure of Communication

Communication between an attorney and client is literally the cornerstone and foundation of the attorney-client relationship. Not only is it prominently mentioned in the Preamble to the LRPC but it is encompassed in Rule 1.4 and Comment thereto.

SLATER’s lack of any meaningful much less personal communication with the Claimants is indefensible.

(a) No Communication. There has been little or no communication whatsoever, and the Claimants are often unable to speak to a SLATER attorney. Communication with SLATER staff is not a substitute for communication with an attorney, where the legal issues and advice are concerned.4 To the extent that legal issues and advice are communicated by SLATER staff, there is concern that there has been unauthorized practice of law. LRPC requires that SLATER attorneys are required to communicate with their client.

(b) Payment Options. SLATER attorneys completely failed with honesty and candor to discuss and advise the Claimants an analysis of the settlement options available to Claimants.

(c) Settlement. The LRPC requires that SLATER discuss settlement options with the Claimant and that a settlement cannot be accepted (or rejected) without the express consent of the Claimants. The Claimants never provided SLATER with any express or implied authority to make decisions on settlement offers without communicating with the Claimants or obtaining their express consent.5 This is a complete failure and the fact that SLATER represents 14,600 claimants is no excuse for its noncompliance.

(d) Failure to Advise on Conflicts of Interest or Dilution.

Representing 14,600 claimants cause unique issues for SLATER in the representation of the entire group of claimant clients, which it was clear that either SLATER failed to appreciate, or most likely chose to not fully disclose to the claimant clients.

(e) Failure to Act in Claimants’ Best Interests. As legal counsel to the Claimants, SLATER was bound to act in their best interests. The overwhelming issue that SLATER acted in its best interests alone. The Claimants became simple a “number” as opposed to a valued client, and that number was $1,400. Every Claimant represented a minimum fee of $1,400 to SLATER, and to SLATER it all adds up to a minimum payday of $20,000,000.00. To get there, SLATER violated numerous Rules of the LRPC and broke the trust and confidence that should be at the core of every professional attorney-client relationship. SLATER acted for itself, not its client claimants.

C. THE LIMITATIONS ON SLATER’S REPRESENTATION AND ITS BUSINESS PRACTICES OUTWEIGHS ANY BENEFIT FROM BEING IN A LARGE GROUP

SLATER will likely contend that the accumulation of large numbers of claimant clients provides the firm a decided advantage and weight at the negotiations table with the Debtor, and that this advantage outweighs the disadvantages of that huge group representation. In this case, that is false and simply a disingenuous attempt to justify their massive attorney’s fees.

The “heavy lifting” at the settlement negotiation table was done by the Official Tort Claimants Committee. SLATER did not litigate any issue and did not perform any significant or meaningful legal work. SLATER did not do any work beyond that of a paralegal at best. SLATER’s presence added little if anything to the survivors’ settlement, which clearly has resulted in relatively nominal awards as compared to the magnitude of SLATER’s fee award. At the end of the day, the survivor claimants could have opted into the same settlement had they been in pro se without SLATER’s representation.

SLATER cannot use the fact that the firm represents 14,600 claimants as any justified excuse for its blatant disregard for and clear violation of its professional and ethical duties and obligations under the LRPC, which were enacted specifically to protect the clients from their attorneys.

For all practical purposes, it is literally impossible for SLATER to represent 14,600 individual claimant clients and fully discharge all its ethical and professional duties and responsibilities set forth in the LRPC. SLATER owes each and every client the same professional and ethical duties, no matter how many clients the firm represents.

D. LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND CONSENT TO SETTLE IS PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE

LRPC Rule 1.4 requires attorneys to have a high level of communication with clients on a variety of topics. The Commentary to LRPC Rule 1.4 requires that attorneys obtain the express consent or authorization of a client to settle a case or a claim unless the client made its intentions known in advance. The LRPC rules are both clear and unambiguous as well as basic and fundamental to the attorney-client relationship. It is undisputed that SLATER has violated these Rules by its business practices and business model.

The intent of the client to authorize a settlement must be expressed and manifested to others. Unexpressed intent or authorization that is not communicated cannot prevail in determining whether the attorney was authorized to settle the case. See Shields v. Keystone Cogeneration Systems, Inc., 620 A.2d 1331 (1992).

An attorney in Delaware who settles a claim without communication, explanation, or consent from the client violates the LRPC. LRPC Rule 1.8(g) explicitly prohibits a lawyer from participating in an aggregate settlement of claims without obtaining informed consent from each client. The rule requires that the lawyer disclose the existence and nature of all claims involved and the participation of each person in the settlement, and that the client’s consent be documented in writing. Settling a claim without the client’s consent or explanation violates this rule, as it deprives the client of the opportunity to make an informed decision regarding their legal matter. Additionally, Rule 1.4 mandates that lawyers keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. Failure to communicate with the client about the settlement terms or obtain their consent contravenes this fundamental duty of communication and transparency. Because of the importance of client consent and transparency, such attorney conduct breaches the ethical obligations of honesty, trustworthiness, and client communication, as outlined in the LRPC. Failure to adhere to the principles of the LRPC constitutes professional misconduct.

LRPC Rule 8.4 explicitly states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, or to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct knowingly. Settling a claim without the client’s consent or explanation inherently involves deceit and misrepresentation, as it deprives the client of their right to make informed decisions regarding their legal matters, and is considered a violation of professional conduct. See Matter of Abbott, 308 A.3d 1139 (2023).

Delaware case law underscores the necessity of client consent and communication in legal representation. For example, in Matter of Lankenau, the court found that an attorney’s failure to disclose relevant information during disciplinary proceedings violated rules prohibiting dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Matter of Lankenau, 158 A.3d 451 (2017). Similarly, Rule 4.1(a) and (b) emphasize that lawyers must avoid making false statements or failing to disclose material facts when necessary to prevent fraudulent acts by clients. In re Sanclemente, 86 A.3d 1119 (2014). These principles apply broadly to situations where attorneys act without adequately informing or obtaining consent from their clients.

The Delaware Supreme Court also has consistently enforced ethical rules to ensure attorneys uphold their professional responsibilities to all of their clients. In In re Kingsley, 950 A.2d 659 (2008), the court addressed violations of professional conduct rules, emphasizing the importance of compliance with ethical standards and client-focused practices. Additionally, in In re Sanclemente, 86 A.3d 1119 (2014), the court highlighted the attorney’s duty to follow established procedures and avoid actions that could harm clients or the administration of justice.

Claimants can find no reported cases which diminish or limit an attorney’s duties and responsibilities or commitment to maintaining high ethical standards in the legal profession under the LRPC, where multiple clients are represented in a case. In fact, the attorney owes the exact same duties and obligations to each and every client at all times.

As a result, it is clear that attorneys who violate professional conduct rules by settling claims without client consent may face disciplinary actions, including suspension or disbarment. For instance, in Matter of Abbott, an attorney’s actions that violated consent orders and professional conduct rules led to significant sanctions. Matter of Abbott, 308 A.3d 1139 (2023). Similarly, in In re Davis, the court imposed disciplinary measures for unauthorized practice and violations of ethical obligations. In re Davis, 43 A.3d 856 (2012).

In summary, settling a claim without communication, explanation, or consent from the client constitutes a violation of the LRPC. This includes disclosure of SLATER’s pecuniary interests in the settlement and its strong preference for how the case is settled. Such actions breach ethical obligations of honesty, transparency, and client communication, as established by LRPC Rule 8.4 and supported by Delaware case law. Attorneys engaging in this conduct risk disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or disbarment, underscoring the importance of maintaining ethical standards in legal practice.

VII. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY ALL FEES TO PRIOR COUNSEL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REDUCE THOSE FEES TO A QUANTUM MERUIT AMOUNT

Because of the great risk of damage and abuse to clients, LRPC Rule 1.5 is very specific in its treatment of contingency fee arrangements between an attorney and his or her client.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client’s interest. . . .

A. SLATER SHOULD BE DENIED ALL FEES

To be clear, violations of the LRPC, including lack of communication, unauthorized settlements, and conflicts of interest, are grounds for disciplinary action. Attorneys acting pro se or representing themselves remain subject to the LRPC, as highlighted in Matter of Abbott, where the court affirmed that violations of the LRPC can lead to disciplinary measures regardless of the context. Matter of Abbott, 308 A.3d 1139 (2023). These violations may also impact the enforceability of fee agreements and the attorney’s ability to collect fees.

Due to fraud in the inducement of the contingency fee agreements, the ongoing fraud during the 17 months when the claims were under investigation, and the firm’s continuing lies to Claimants regarding their fees being guaranteed and that Claimants will have to pay twice, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the SLATER firm should be denied their fees altogether.

In June 2024, the Trustee for the Settlement Trust advised SLATER that they were going to cease processing any of the claims filed by SLATER due to a large number of irregularities within those claims. For the next seventeen (17) months, the SLATER firm literally and unashamedly lied to each and every client by representing to them that their claims were being processed when, in reality, SLATER knew that the Settlement Trust had ceased processing the SLATER claims and that those claims were under investigation by the Trust.

In September 2025, SLATER negotiated a settlement with the Settlement Trust Trustee whereby all of the SLATER claims would be set aside and reviewed by a third-party neutral reviewer. On or about September 9, 2025, SLATER sent a Notice informing the claimant clients that the Settlement Trust had ceased processing claims and regarding the negotiated resolution. A true and correct copy of a sample Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”. The Notice stated that SLATER firm took full responsibility for these issues and explained that SLATER would be cutting their contingency fees by 10% of the actual dollar value SLATER would have received.

In reality however, it was not a 10% reduction of SLATER’s contingency fees, but rather was only a cut of 4%, which was very ambiguous in the Notice provided by the firm. The final sentence of the Notice makes vague reference to clients terminating the SLATER firm providing if the client decides to terminate their relationship with the firm, the claim will still need to be subjected to the additional review and prior to being reconsidered by the Settlement Trust.

As noted herein, SLATER’s misrepresentations to its client claimants continued as those clients began to contact the firm and notify the firm that they did not wish to continue with SLATER’s legal representation. In each case, the client was informed by SLATER that the firm’s contingency fee agreement was “iron clad” and that no matter what SLATER did, the clients would still need to pay the 40% fee to SLATER in addition to any other fee charged by a new substituted counsel.

In fact, Delaware law is quite clear. In a contingency agreement, when a firm is discharged prior to the end of the case, the discharged firm is ONLY entitled to quantum meruit or the reasonable value of its services. Furthermore, in the case of malfeasance – such as exists here–where SLATER lied from the very beginning of the legal engagement through today – fees may be denied it their entirety.

SLATER partnered with other firms including Pintas which claims to be one of the largest “Partnering Law Firms” in the United States. The Pintas firm claims to represent 30,000 clients in all fifty (50) states, yet only list two (2) attorneys on its website. Pintas leverages technology and media to target potential clients through advertising, social media and other sophisticated technology in order to obtain tremendous quantities of clients in major mass tort cases. Pintas then refers (i.e., sells) these clients (i.e., leads) to law firms such as SLATER in return for a 60/40 split of the fees collected by SLATER. It is a massive fee share operation. Using Pintas and other claim aggregators to obtain clients, SLATER was able to aggregate nearly 15,000 claims in the Boy Scouts case. Hence, due to its 40% contingency fee agreement as applied to all 14,600 claims, SLATER as a law firm became one of the largest beneficiaries of the Settlement Trust and recipient of trust funds. Said another way, SLATER seeks to recover 40% of the distributions from the trust while their clients only receive a maximum of 15% of their claim value.

Due to all the intentional and serious violations of the LRPC as set forth in detail herein, there is good cause to terminate the Claimants’ agreement with SLATER, and as a result, deny all of SLATER’s fees. This result would clearly send a message to SLATER and other law firms that employ the same business model taking advantage of claimants in mass tort bankruptcy cases for their own financial gain.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases, together with the last four digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, are as follows: Boy Scouts of America (6300) and Delaware BSA, LLC (4311). The Debtors’ mailing address is 1325 West Walnut Hill Lane, Irving, Texas 75038.
2. All of the clients of the SLATER firm represented by the movants believed that they are going to collect 100% of their award letter. The reality is that it is unlikely any claimant will see a distribution that exceeds twenty (20%) percent of the award letter. The magnitude of this problem is crystalized when you factor in the fact that many of these claimants have fallen victim to loan companies which have advanced monies based on the award letters.
3. A person who, having devised … a scheme or artifice to defraud – in this case the Settlement Trust and the claimants – and for the purpose of executing … such a scheme or artifice or attempting to do so– (2) files a document – in this case the POC – in a proceeding under title 11; or (3) makes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or in relation to a proceeding under title 11, at any time before or after the filing of the petition, … shall be fined $5000.00 under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 18 U.S.C.§ 157
4. This is particularly true considering that the document explaining the claimants’ options runs some thirty plus pages.
5. This is never more blatant than in failing to communicate with regard to the concerns of the Settlement Trust or the agreed solution for reviewing the SLATER claims which were never discussed with ANY claimant represented by SLATER.

Rebecca Ellis writes Oct. 2, 2025:

In the biggest sex abuse settlement in U.S. history, some claim they were paid to sue

…Becker Law Group said in a July court filing that four of the firm’s clients recently told the firm they weren’t abused. Patrick McNicholas, who co-counsels cases with the firm, said the lawsuits were weeded out as part of the firm’s vetting process.

Slater Slater Schulman, which has filed more cases than any other law firm, stated in a September filing that client John Doe J.S. “should not have been included.” The firm previously said in a lawsuit that he had been sexually assaulted at Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall in Downey beginning in 2006 when he was 13.

Slater Slater Schulman has found similar problems in its avalanche of sex abuse cases against the Boy Scouts of America. On Sept. 9, retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Barbara Houser, who is overseeing the $2.4-billion victim settlement trust, singled out Slater Slater Schulman for a pattern of “irregularities” and “procedural and factual problems” among its plaintiffs. The firm previously said it represented roughly 14,000 victims.

The firm was asked to pay for an “independent third party” to investigate its cases for fraud before going through the trust’s standard vetting process. Clifford Robert, an outside attorney representing the firm in its issues with the Boy Scout cases, said Slater Slater Schulman is “working tirelessly” to address the issues and that justice for survivors is its top priority.

Tammy Rogers, 56, hired the Slater firm in 2022 to sue after a staff member at MacLaren Children’s Center, a county-run children’s facility now infamous for abuse, allegedly molested her when she was about 9. She said she has grown unnerved by the financial incentive lawyers like hers have in amassing unwieldy numbers of clients.

“You can’t get ahold of them,” she said of her firm, which has filed cases on behalf of hundreds of new plaintiffs since the settlement was finalized. “I called them repeatedly, repeatedly, repeatedly.”

County and plaintiff lawyers nailed down the $4-billion figure on Oct. 30. Since then, thousands more plaintiffs have been added.

“[Firms think] ‘there’s a fund out there, and I’m going to do everything in my power to get as much as I can,’” said one attorney suing the county over sex abuse, who declined to be named, fearing professional repercussions.

It’s a fund, critics say, with few safeguards for fake claims.

The cases will be reviewed by retired Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Louis Meisinger, who mediated similar settlements for the victims of the 2023 Maui wildfires and the 2017 Las Vegas concert mass shooting. Any plaintiff who wants to skip that vetting process can take $150,000 in a lump sum at the start of next year…

The county was never interested in a fight.

Once the deluge of lawsuits started, county lawyers had just one goal: to make the cases go away without the county going bankrupt.

They did not want to risk a trial. Early in negotiations, county lawyers understood they were looking at a number of cases of brutal rape and molestation that could easily make a disgusted jury award the type of budget-busting $135-million verdict that got handed to the Moreno Valley Unified School District in 2023 for the sexual abuse of two students by a middle school teacher. The district hired him despite a past arrest in the molestation of his foster son, according to the lawsuit.

ChatGPT says:

There is considerably more concerning material on Slater Slater Schulman than the September 4 Los Angeles Times story alone suggests. But I would distinguish evidence of serious mishandling from proof that the firm knowingly submitted fraudulent claims. I have not found a court finding that Slater itself committed fraud.

The strongest evidence comes from Slater’s own admission in the Boy Scouts case.

The Scouting Settlement Trust told Slater in June 2024 that it had identified irregularities in the firm’s submissions and stopped processing all of Slater’s Matrix claims. In a September 9, 2025 notice to its clients, Slater acknowledged this and said:

“We take full responsibility.”

The firm also acknowledged that there were “procedural and factual problems” in some of its submissions. It agreed that every undetermined Slater claim would undergo an extra independent third-party review before the Trust would consider it. Slater paid for that additional review.

That is not somebody accusing Slater of wrongdoing. That is Slater admitting a serious breakdown in its own mass-claim operation.

The consequences were substantial enough that Slater voluntarily cut its fee by 10 percent of the fee it otherwise would have received. For a standard 40 percent contingency, that reduced the fee to 36 percent.

There is a potentially more serious disclosure problem.

The chronology is ugly. Slater says the Trust informed it about the irregularities and froze its claims in June 2024. Slater’s disclosure to clients did not go out until September 9, 2025, roughly fifteen months later.

Fourteen former Slater clients subsequently alleged in bankruptcy court that Slater affirmatively misled them during that period about why their claims were delayed. Their motion says clients were told their claims were “in the queue” when, according to the Trust’s later disclosure, Slater’s claims had actually been frozen pending investigation.

That allegation matters much more than the original submission errors. Errors can arise from running 14,000 cases. Knowingly giving clients a false explanation for a fifteen-month freeze would present an entirely different ethical problem.

But this distinction is important: the clients’ misrepresentation allegations have not, as far as I can find, been adjudicated on the merits. The fee-forfeiture fight was still pending in 2026. A July filing expressly said the merits of the alleged misconduct remained pending.

Slater has conceded at least one bad L.A. County abuse plaintiff.

This is especially relevant to today’s story.

In September 2025, Slater told the court that one of its L.A. County plaintiffs, John Doe J.S., “should not have been included.” Slater had previously filed a lawsuit alleging that J.S. was sexually assaulted at Los Padrinos beginning when he was 13.

One erroneous claimant proves very little by itself. But it becomes more interesting when placed beside the Boy Scouts episode. In two enormous sexual-abuse inventories handled by the same firm, Slater has now encountered claim-quality problems serious enough to remove at least one L.A. plaintiff and subject its entire remaining Boy Scouts inventory to extraordinary independent vetting.

The Boy Scouts Trust’s response was unusual and broad.

The Trust initially halted Slater’s Matrix claims. After investigating, the Trust and Slater BoyScouts agreed that every undetermined Slater claim would pass through a neutral before entering the normal claims process. Claims could be flagged for further investigation, require corrected or additional submissions, or potentially fail to proceed.

Former DOJ official Lawrence Friedman subsequently moved to strip or drastically reduce Slater’s fees, alleging that the firm’s roughly 14,600-claim operation had essentially no adequate quality-control system. That characterization remains an advocate’s allegation.

Some former clients have made allegations beyond sloppy claim preparation.

The October 2025 motion alleges that Slater told departing clients that their 40 percent contingency contracts were “iron clad,” threatened liens, told them they would owe Slater regardless of changing lawyers and otherwise discouraged them from terminating the firm.

The former clients asked the bankruptcy court to terminate their fee agreements and deny or drastically reduce Slater’s fees. Fourteen former clients were pursuing that relief together.

Slater has fought those allegations and its outside lawyer Clifford Robert described them as “scurrilous.”

Today’s L.A. audit suddenly looks much more significant in that context.

The LA Times article on Sep. 4, 2026 says Slater represents about 3,700 L.A. County plaintiffs and has temporarily stopped payouts because the claims administrator is auditing some of its cases.

The article then specifically connects this development to the Boy Scouts history. In that proceeding, Judge Barbara Houser sought independent review after a pattern of “irregularities” and “procedural and factual problems” appeared in Slater claims.

Slater Slater Schulman has already acknowledged serious factual and procedural defects in another gigantic sexual-abuse claims inventory. Those defects were sufficiently pervasive that the Boy Scouts Settlement Trust froze the firm’s claims, required extraordinary third-party review of every remaining claim, and prompted Slater to accept responsibility and reduce its fees. Former clients are separately accusing Slater of concealing that freeze for fifteen months and misleading them about the status of their cases. Meanwhile, in the L.A. County litigation, Slater has acknowledged that at least one abuse plaintiff “should not have been included,” and its 3,700-case inventory is now undergoing another unexpected audit.

I dug through the Boy Scouts record. The frustrating result is that the number we most want has not been publicly disclosed. I found no Trust filing giving a Slater-specific table of claims that passed, were flagged, required correction, were withdrawn, or were disallowed. But the record gets us much closer than the Times story does.

The Trust did not merely spot-check Slater. It froze every Slater Matrix claim.

The September 9, 2025 joint notice filed by the Scouting Settlement Trust and Slater says that in June 2024 the Trust identified irregularities in some Slater submissions and “paused the processing of all Matrix claims submitted by the Slater Firm” while it investigated. The notice then says the Trust confirmed, and Slater agreed, that there were “procedural and factual problems” in some submissions.

This is a joint filing signed by counsel for the Trust and Slater.

Every undetermined Slater claim was then put through an extraordinary second gate.

Slater agreed to pay for an independent neutral. The neutral received Slater’s internal documents and communications relevant to each undetermined claim, as well as the documents Slater had submitted to the Trust. A claim could pass the neutral and enter normal processing. Otherwise it could be flagged, further investigated, supplemented with additional information, disallowed, or subjected to other action. The filing specifically connects the irregularities to the Trust’s fraud protocol.

That is more serious than I initially appreciated. The neutral was not simply checking forms for missing signatures. The neutral was comparing individual claims against Slater’s own internal files and communications.

Slater told clients it bore responsibility.

In its September 2025 client notice, Slater said the Trust had stopped processing its claims, acknowledged “procedural and factual problems,” and told clients that some would need to reconfirm facts, supply additional information, or submit new or more complete claim forms. Slater wrote, “we take full responsibility,” apologized for the delay, and voluntarily reduced its contingency fee.

Slater accepts responsibility for sufficiently serious defects in its own claims operation to cause a roughly 15-month freeze and extraordinary outside review.

The affected inventory appears to have been enormous.

Slater and associated claim aggregators were credited with about 14,600 Boy Scouts proofs of claim. An earlier bankruptcy filing listed Adam Slater as representing 14,170 claims.

Bloomberg Law reported that the Trust had paused “nearly 10,000” Slater claims.

I found at least one concrete example of a Slater claim that successfully emerged from the special review.

On January 2, 2026, the Trustee reported on claimant E.K., a Slater client. E.K.’s claim had previously been held because of the Slater irregularities but was by then at the Trust’s ordinary “Initial Review” stage. The Trust had not issued an additional-information request based on E.K.’s questionnaire. That means at least this claim had cleared the special Slater neutral-review gate.

I also found a concrete Slater claim containing what the Trust called “material discrepancies.”

A different Slater claimant filed a certification in April 2026 concerning an Additional Information Request from the Trust. The Trust had identified alleged material discrepancies between the claimant’s original proof of claim and later Claims Questionnaire. They concerned the acts of abuse, the abuser’s identity, and the frequency of abuse. The claimant said he had answered the request and expressly wanted Slater to continue representing him.

We do not know whether Slater created the inconsistencies, whether the claimant changed his recollection, whether the original claim was wrong, or whether the discrepancies were innocently resolved. It is evidence of exactly the sort of factual inconsistency the Trust was checking for, not evidence that this claimant or Slater committed fraud.

The overall Trust numbers tell us that a large volume of the frozen inventory eventually started moving.

As of July 1, 2026, the Trust reported 58,090 Matrix questionnaires and 55,825 determined Matrix claims. Only 2,265 Matrix claims remained undetermined across the entire Trust population. It had issued 55,664 determinations and more than $1.05 billion in Matrix disbursements.

That creates a strong inference that a substantial share of Slater’s frozen inventory eventually cleared the neutral process. Otherwise it would be difficult to get the entire 58,090-claim universe down to only 2,265 undetermined claims. But the Trust does not break that July figure down by law firm, so I would not try to calculate a Slater pass rate from it.

The most damaging allegation against Slater may actually concern what happened after the June 2024 freeze.

Fourteen former Slater clients alleged that Slater knew its claims had been frozen but did not disclose that to clients for about fifteen months. They say clients who called were instead told their claims were simply waiting “in the queue.” They accuse the firm of affirmatively misleading clients and of lacking meaningful quality controls over its 14,600-case inventory.

Those are allegations in adversarial filings. Slater denies misconduct and has called the accusations “scurrilous.” I still have not found a ruling establishing that Slater deliberately lied to those clients.

One number I cannot find anywhere is precisely the number that would make this story explosive.

Nobody in the public filings I found says:

“9,8xx Slater claims reviewed, 7,xxx passed, 1,xxx corrected, xxx flagged, xxx disallowed.”

Nor have I found a Slater-specific count of referrals under the Trust’s fraud protocol. The September 2025 notice conspicuously explains all of those possible outcomes without giving a single outcome number.

That omission itself gives you a very good reporting target.

After the Boy Scouts Settlement Trust discovered irregularities in Slater Slater Schulman’s claims, it froze every Matrix claim submitted by the firm. Slater ultimately acknowledged “procedural and factual problems” in some submissions, accepted responsibility for the resulting delay, reduced its fees and agreed to pay for an independent neutral to examine every undetermined claim against Slater’s own internal files. The neutral could clear a claim, demand additional investigation or information, or send it toward disallowance. Public records show both Slater claims that subsequently cleared the special review and Slater claims containing material factual discrepancies. What the Trust has never disclosed is the crucial denominator: how many of the nearly 10,000 reportedly frozen Slater claims were flagged, corrected, withdrawn, disallowed or referred for fraud investigation.

And today’s L.A. development makes that unanswered question much more important. Slater now has another giant sexual-abuse inventory, roughly 3,700 L.A. County cases, subjected to an unexpected audit and accompanying payment freeze. The prior Boy Scouts episode therefore stops looking like an isolated administrative mishap and starts looking like something worth testing for a recurring claims-management problem. That still is not proof of fraud.

The records I would try to pry loose next are the neutral’s engagement agreement, invoices paid by Slater, periodic reports to Houser, correspondence transmitting batches of cleared or flagged claims, and any Trust filings under seal concerning the investigation. Those documents should reveal either the number of claims passing through the neutral or enough dates and batch sizes to reconstruct it.

Here are some excerpts from a March 9, 2026 pro se filing in the Boy Scouts bankruptcy case:

“The Trust and attorneys of the claimant are SSS, failed in all aspects of their representation. SSS was terminated by the claimant for cause, based on claims of the claim, due to negligence and mishandling of the claim, communication failures, unethical conduct, lying to the claimant, and charging unreasonable and unconscionable fees. SSS conduct culminated in extreme emotional hardship for the claimant. SSS then filed an attorney lien with the BSA Settlement Trust against the claimants’ settlement funds and is preventing distribution of the settlement funds that have been approved through the BSA Trust over one year ago.”

The claimant further alleged that a junior attorney “erased, omitted, and changed significant information in the claim that could have severely jeopardized the claimant’s recovery had the claimant not caught the mistakes.”

THE 40 PERCENT FEE

“SSS stated in an email on July 17, 2025 ‘that we have to agree to a percentage fee’ and in another email on July 25, 2025 states ‘we can only agree to a percentage’. Claimant asks why ‘we have to’ and why ‘we can only’? What prevents a quantum meruit fee for work performed?”

The claimant alleged that Slater’s 40 percent contingency fee exceeded the permissible fee under New York law and accused the firm of attempting to justify the fee by claiming the case originated from its Pennsylvania office:

“Rather, this is an excuse to cover up the fact that Mr. Linc Leder Esq. and, or Mr. Adam Slater Esq. of SSS would have liked to recover a 40% fee from the claimant, and possibly their other NY clients, instead of the 33.3% that New York allows.”

The claimant added:

“What would be a very good reason why senior management at SSS might try to prosecute a 40% contingency fee from its NY clients. If caught in the error to then excuse for SSS to attribute the error to the ‘case was originated in the Pennsylvania office’, or another state, that permits a 40% contingency fee, just as they did in this claimant’s case.”

THE TRUST INVESTIGATION

This is probably the strongest allegation in the new filing:

“In June 2024, the Honorable Barbara J. Houser (Ret.) (the Trustee), in her capacity as trustee of the BSA Settlement Trust (the Trust), filed a notice to apprise the Court of irregularities that the trustee identified in the Claims of Slater Slater Schulman.”

The claimant continued:

“Thus, the Trust paused the processing of all SSS claims while the irregularities were investigated. Secretly, SSS acknowledged to the Trust that there were procedural and factual problems with their claim submissions. As a result of the investigation into SSS and at the expense of SSS, a Neutral was hired to review all claims SSS submitted to the Trust. The extra steps that the SSS claims had to undergo caused months of delays with the processing of all their claims, including mine.”

The claimant then makes the concealment allegation:

“Ms. Smith, Mr. Leder, Mr. Slater, nor anyone at SSS communicated to the claimant that all of Slater Slater Schulman BSA abuse claims were on hold and under investigation for fraud by Judge Houser and the BSA Trust.”

“According to NYS Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4, Ms. Smith, Mr. Leder, and Mr. Slater had an ethical obligation to communicate this important information to the claimant. Ms. Smith and Mr. Leder deliberately lied and withheld this information from the claimant for 9 months until claimant terminated SSS on February 3, 2025.”

“During the time span from June 2024 when Judge Houser placed a hold on the processing of all SSS claims due to ‘irregularities’ through the time when claimant terminated SSS on February 3, 2025, Mr. Leder Esq. and Ms. Smith willfully lied to and mislead the claimant by saying that her claim was being processed, that they would continue to advocate on the claimants behalf, that when claimant requested them to contact the BSA Trust, they had done so but had not received a response, and that the Trust would not speak with SSS attorneys or the claimant when the claimant requested a phone conversation.”

“Had claimant known that SSS was under investigation for fraud beginning June 2024, she would have terminated SSS immediately and not waited 9 more months to do so.”

THE CLAIMANT’S CONCLUSION

“The SSS law firm deliberately misled, lied, and attempted to use strong arm tactics with this claimant in an effort to squeeze out more settlement money for themselves. The emotional distress caused by having to defend herself against this predatory law firm has traumatized the claimant further.”

“It has reopened many of the claimant’s emotional wounds.”

“Given the serious ethical misconduct noted here against the SSS law firm, the claimant respectfully makes the following request.”

THE CLAIMANT’S EARLIER GRIEVANCE

The claimant’s earlier grievance, included as an exhibit, says:

“SSS was sloppy, careless, and incompetent with my claim when they erased and changed phrases, omitted information that I had previously included, and did not fix typos as requested. Had I not caught the mistakes, they could have affected the outcome of my claim.”

“SSS was unwilling to represent me with the Trust when I asked. This supports termination for ‘cause.’”

“SSS has refused to provide ANY itemized records of their work, whether it be ‘time stamped’ or an itemized estimate.”

“SSS, particularly Jessica Smith, is trying to convince me that by law, I must pay them a percentage of the money that I recover.”

The claimant accused the firm of trying “to deceive clients into thinking that they cannot terminate the retainer agreement and that they owe SSS the contingency fee no matter what.”

THE RETAINER AND FEE NEGOTIATION EMAILS

One exhibit shows Slater partner Jessica Smith telling the claimant on July 17, 2025:

“I kindly request a longer period of time to discuss this with my partners. I promised you I will be fair in this process. I believe we have to agree to a percentage. Can you kindly confirm a percentage of your claim that you believe is fair and allow me until next Friday to respond?”

The claimant answered:

“I will not confirm to a percentage. The fact is that we don’t even have a valid Retainer Agreement. Therefore, I will not agree to a percentage. I believe I did give you until Friday July 25 to respond.”

Smith subsequently wrote:

“We have carefully reviewed your request, and after thorough consideration, we believe that our retainer agreement is valid and aligned with applicable New York law, which typically mandates a retroactive reduction to 33.33%.”

“In the spirit of collaboration and to assist you as best as we can, we are happy to extend a further reduction of our fee to 20%. We can only agree to a percentage.”

SLATER’S OWN ADMISSION

This comes from Slater Slater Schulman’s September 9, 2025 email to its own clients:

“The Scouting Settlement Trust (‘the Trust’) advised in June 2024 that it believed there were irregularities in some of our firm’s claim submissions to the Trust. The Trust paused the processing of all claims submitted by our law firm while an investigation of the irregularities was conducted.”

“What this means for you (unless you were an exigent health claimant) is that your claim has not been reviewed by the Trust – and it may still take additional time before it is. This is neither your fault nor the Trust’s; and we take full responsibility.”

Slater then acknowledged:

“Our firm has cooperated fully in the Trust’s investigation. We now agree that there are procedural and factual problems in some of our claim submissions to the Trust.”

“Because of the problematic claims, we have agreed that all of our claim submissions to the Trust be vetted by an independent third party before they are reviewed by the Trust’s claims determination team.”

“Some claim submissions may pass through the third party’s review and proceed on to the Trust for its regular claims determination process. Other claim submissions may be flagged for irregularities that require us to contact our clients to investigate our clients’ claims more thoroughly, obtain additional information, and/or provide new or more complete claim forms to the Trust.”

“We apologize for the delay caused to date and further apologize that the remaining review process will result in additional delays in the determination of submitted claims.”

That email is signed:

Joseph M. Slater

Adam P. Slater

Jonathan E. Schulman

Posted in Abuse, Los Angeles, Los Angeles Times | Comments Off on LAT: ‘Payouts in L.A. County’s $4-billion sex abuse settlement delayed to two largest law firms’

The Comparator Test: Does Penn Apply the Same Standard?

Claude says Sep. 1, 2026:

Amy Wax appears to have left her strongest Ahmad Almallah comparator out of her own federal complaint. In Wax v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, decided August 27, 2025, Judge Timothy J. Savage, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, rejected Almallah as a comparator because Wax had pleaded one relevant fact about him, his participation in an October 2023 rally. Savage emphasized what was missing. Wax had not alleged that Almallah or her other proposed comparators repeatedly made harmful statements about members of the university community, engaged in a comparable pattern of conduct, or accumulated anything resembling Wax’s disciplinary history.

But by the time Wax filed her federal lawsuit in January 2025, a more relevant allegation against Almallah had been public for more than a year. The original December 5, 2023 complaint in Yakoby v. University of Pennsylvania alleged that a Jewish Penn student who took a course from Almallah in fall 2022 was singled out during a dispute over Israel and the West Bank barrier. According to the complaint, after the student defended the barrier, Almallah and other students confronted her for approximately thirty minutes. She later complained to Penn.

The March 2024 amended complaint supplied considerably more detail. It alleged that the student, identified as SAA Member #1, was a Jewish Penn alumna majoring in Modern Middle East Studies, that Almallah knew she was Jewish and had family in Israel, that he repeatedly singled her out, and that she contacted Penn professor Al Filreis seeking an urgent meeting about what had happened. These remain litigation allegations rather than established facts. They describe the sort of student-facing conduct missing from Wax’s allegations about her comparators.

Wax had a second chance to plead it. The docket in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania shows she filed an amended complaint on March 3, 2025, more than a year after the Yakoby amendment. The classroom allegation still did not appear.

The allegations later acquired additional legal significance. In June 2025, Judge Mitchell Goldberg’s Yakoby opinion recited allegations concerning antisemitic incidents involving individual members of Students Against Antisemitism and concluded that the organization had adequately pleaded associational standing. Goldberg did not find that the underlying accusations against Almallah or other faculty members were true. The allegations are evidence of what had been publicly alleged, communicated to Penn, and placed into federal litigation. They are not proof that the alleged conduct occurred as described.

Yet Wax’s January 2025 verified complaint relied on Almallah’s rally speech. Wax alleged that Almallah participated in a rally where “intifada revolution” was chanted and argued that Penn’s failure to discipline him demonstrated selective enforcement. Her lawyers had made the same argument in a pre-suit letter to Penn that named Almallah, the Annenberg lecturer Dwayne Booth, and the English and cinema studies professor Julia Alekseyeva. That was a weaker comparator allegation for the purpose Savage applied. The Yakoby allegations describe a Penn instructor, a student in his classroom, an extended confrontation connected to the student’s identity-linked position on Israel, and a subsequent complaint to Penn personnel.

Savage may still have decided the comparator issue correctly. Almallah differs from Wax in another significant respect. Penn’s current English Department faculty directory classifies Ahmad Almallah as non-standing faculty, whereas Wax holds a tenured chair on Penn’s standing faculty. The classroom account also remains contested litigation material. But if the question is whether Penn treated politically charged faculty conduct consistently, rather than whether Wax satisfied the technical comparator requirements of federal employment-discrimination law, Almallah becomes far more important. His Penn faculty page lists him as teaching ENGL 3010 in fall 2026. That does not establish that Penn never investigated, warned, or reprimanded him privately. It establishes that the alleged episode did not terminate his teaching relationship with Penn.

Huda Fakhreddine supplies the half of the comparison Almallah lacks. A January 9, 2026 Third Circuit opinion in Fakhreddine v. University of Pennsylvania identifies her as a tenured Penn professor of Arabic literature, a far stronger employment-status comparator to Wax than Almallah or Booth. Penn’s Middle Eastern Languages and Cultures department lists her as an associate professor. The opinion also records the public statements that later became the subject of congressional scrutiny. Fakhreddine wrote on October 7, 2023 that “while we were asleep, Palestine invented a new way of life.” The opinion recounts that at an October 16 rally she made additional statements about Israel and antisemitism and applauded another speaker whose remarks included telling Jews to return to various places, including Berlin. These characterizations do not come from Wax’s lawsuit. They appear in the factual history recited by the Third Circuit in Fakhreddine’s own litigation against Penn.

Fakhreddine also presents a student-facing allegation. The Yakoby amended complaint alleged that students in Arabic courses were required to attend portions of the Palestine Writes Literature Festival, held on Penn’s campus in September 2023, and alleged that Fakhreddine told her students attendance was mandatory. Judge Goldberg later summarized the complaint as alleging that Fakhreddine and Abdulrahman Atta required Jewish members of Students Against Antisemitism to attend the festival and penalized students who did not.

That allegation belongs alongside the materially different account offered by the Penn chapter of the American Association of University Professors. The AAUP chapter said students in some courses were required to attend a specified number of cultural events during the semester, could choose which part of Palestine Writes to attend, and could receive alternative assignments if they objected. The competing accounts make Fakhreddine more useful as a case study. They allow the allegation, the defense, and the limits of the public evidence to be separated instead of treating disputed accusations as established fact.

The resulting comparison goes beyond a claim that Penn protects one political coalition and punishes another. Almallah supplies the stronger alleged individualized student encounter and weaker employment equivalence, because he is non-standing faculty. Fakhreddine supplies the stronger tenure equivalence and weaker publicly established evidence of individualized mistreatment of a student. Neither reproduces the entire Wax pattern. Nobody yet identified combines tenure, repeated controversial public statements, individualized student-facing allegations, prior administrative warnings, recurrence after notice, and a comparable disciplinary history in a single person. That absence is a finding.

Dwayne Booth provides a sharper comparison in one respect, because Penn publicly explained why it would protect his speech. In a February 4, 2024 statement, Interim President J. Larry Jameson called the political cartoons that the Annenberg lecturer posted on his personal website “reprehensible, with antisemitic symbols.” Jameson stressed that the cartoons appeared on a personal website and were not taught in the classroom. He reaffirmed Penn’s commitment to open expression and academic freedom and the right of members of the university community to express views others might find loathsome.

That statement comes close to announcing a Penn limiting principle: even expression the university president considers reprehensible and antisemitic may remain protected when it is extramural and lacks a classroom nexus. Booth counts because Penn itself named the fact that protected him. The cartoons were outside the classroom.

Penn described Wax’s case very differently. Its September 24, 2024 final determination said the Faculty Hearing Board found that Wax had engaged in “flagrant unprofessional conduct” that denied students equal educational opportunity. Penn cited a history of sweeping derogatory generalizations about groups, her disclosure and continued discussion of student grades by race after being cautioned about confidentiality, and discriminatory or disparaging statements made inside the classroom, outside it, and in public. Penn’s theory was cumulative. It aggregated extramural speech with classroom behavior, student-related conduct, prior warnings, and the effect Penn believed the total pattern had on students’ confidence that Wax would evaluate them impartially.

The Booth comparison then acquires two further complications. First, Penn protected him under pressure. The Daily Pennsylvanian reported in September 2025 that documents concerning Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro’s representative at Penn, Robert Fox, showed Fox considered Jameson’s defense of Booth inadequate and appeared to advocate Booth’s firing. Jameson and the Annenberg School refrained from firing Booth, who remained at Penn through the end of the 2024-25 academic year. Penn did not capitulate whenever politically powerful people demanded punishment of a left-wing faculty member.

Second, Booth left anyway. On March 19, 2025, Annenberg Dean Sarah Banet-Weiser told the school’s part-time lecturers that their contracts would not be renewed for 2025-26. A school spokesperson cited financial constraints and the termination of three federal grants. Booth told the paper his course had been canceled and blamed university capitulation to political threats over funding. The public record supports two readings and settles neither. A school that pauses every part-time lecturer contract at once has an obvious budgetary explanation available whatever else it wants. Anyone building the comparator case has to hold both possibilities open.

The harder question is why Penn compartmentalized Booth’s extramural expression while Wax’s extramural expression became part of an aggregated professional-conduct case. Penn has an answer. Booth’s cartoons were not taught in his classroom, while Penn’s case against Wax reached far beyond public commentary. The historical inquiry is whether Penn has applied that distinction consistently when other professors’ public speech becomes entangled with complaints about students or teaching.

Anthea Butler provides a pre-Wax control, because her controversy arrived before the institutional battle over Wax began. In 2015 Butler wrote on Twitter, “If only there was a ‘coon of the year’ award,” during a discussion widely understood to concern Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson. Butler disputed the interpretation that she had applied the epithet to Carson. The controversy generated extensive demands that Penn act against her. In a 2016 interview with Billy Penn, Butler said critics had called “every dean” and the president’s office and routinely contacted Penn demanding that the university get rid of her. She described Penn as supportive of her and emphasized the protection supplied by tenure.

The Butler comparison has a limit. One inflammatory and disputed tweet about a national political figure does not equal years of Wax statements combined with classroom complaints, student-grade confidentiality issues, repeated warnings, and the finding that students could reasonably question her impartiality. Butler is useful for a narrower proposition. Penn had a tenured professor whose extramural political speech generated national outrage, accusations of racism, and direct complaints to senior administrators. The public record does not show a comparable major-sanction proceeding. Her Penn career advanced. In 2021 Penn appointed Butler to the Geraldine R. Segal Professorship in American Social Thought, an endowed chair awarded to a nationally recognized scholar whose interests include human rights, civil liberties, and race relations. Penn’s religious studies department now lists her as emerita. Her arc ended in retirement.

So Butler cuts both ways. She supports the proposition that Penn has historically afforded substantial latitude to offensive extramural expression. She does not by herself demonstrate ideological favoritism, because the conduct was materially less extensive than Wax’s. Butler is a historical baseline.

The deeper methodological problem lies in the gap between Savage’s legal comparator test and the historical question. Savage applied ordinary employment-discrimination doctrine. To support an inference of discriminatory enforcement, Wax needed people sufficiently similar to her in employment status and misconduct. He therefore emphasized her years of statements, repeated complaints, prior restrictions and warnings, and disciplinary history when explaining why Booth, Almallah, Fakhreddine and the other proposed comparators were not similarly situated.

That reasoning may be appropriate for deciding whether Wax adequately pleaded a federal discrimination claim. It cannot answer whether Penn created the difference through its own earlier enforcement choices. Prior disciplinary history is partly endogenous to the institution whose consistency is under examination.

Imagine two professors who commit comparable first acts. Penn warns Professor A and does not warn Professor B. Both later commit another comparable act. Penn now treats A more severely because A has already been warned. Years later, B is rejected as a comparator because B lacks A’s disciplinary history. The legal conclusion follows from conventional comparator doctrine. It leaves untouched the historical question of whether the institution treated equivalent conduct equally at the beginning of the sequence. The apparently neutral distinguishing variable, prior disciplinary history, is partly a product of earlier decisions by Penn.

Wax’s own sequence shows where her clock starts. On August 9, 2017 she and Larry Alexander published an op-ed in The Philadelphia Inquirer calling for the restoration of bourgeois cultural norms. The law school compiled the faculty responses on its own website, including an open letter from thirty-three of her colleagues. Penn took no disciplinary action. Then a September 2017 video conversation with Brown economist Glenn Loury surfaced, in which Wax described the class rank of Black students in her required first-year course. On March 13, 2018, Dean Ted Ruger announced that Wax would no longer teach that course. He said she had spoken disparagingly and inaccurately about student performance and had transgressed the confidentiality of student grades. Ruger described that 2018 removal to the faculty senate chair in 2022 as the first restriction in a longer escalation.

Everything Penn later counted as Wax’s disciplinary history begins in those nineteen months. So the comparator question has a location and a date. What did Penn do when another professor reached the same point: one extramural publication that outraged a large part of the faculty, followed within a year by a second incident touching a course and the students in it?

The better test is therefore longitudinal. The relevant comparison runs stage by stage: Wax’s first controversial extramural statement against another professor’s first controversial extramural statement, her first student complaint against another professor’s first student complaint, her first alleged classroom problem against another professor’s first alleged classroom problem, her first administrative warning against what Penn did when comparable complaints reached administrators, and then repetition after notice against repetition after notice. Only after reconstructing the cases stage by stage does the final difference in sanctions become evidence of anything.

Penn’s own faculty rules add a complication, because much of the comparison may be invisible. The Faculty Handbook’s sanctions procedure distinguishes major sanctions from minor sanctions. Minor sanctions may include private or public letters of reprimand and monitoring of future research, teaching, or student supervision. After a minor sanction, a dean or the provost may publicize the fact. After a major sanction, the president must publish a statement in Almanac describing the case and its disposition.

The absence of a public disciplinary announcement therefore cannot establish that Penn did nothing. Almallah, Fakhreddine, Booth, Butler, or another professor could have received a private warning or minor sanction that never entered the public record. The defensible claim is narrower: no comparable completed major sanction has been identified in the public record for these professors. Wax’s proceeding became public in part because Penn classified and imposed major sanctions, which triggered mandatory publication. Any serious comparator study has to distinguish no public evidence of discipline from no discipline.

The strongest symmetry test may lie in Penn’s stated rationale for moving against Wax. In his January 18, 2022 statement, Ruger said Wax had repeatedly made derogatory public statements about the characteristics and abilities of many people who studied, taught, and worked at Penn. He said complaints asserted that students could not take her classes “without a reasonable belief that they are being treated with discriminatory animus.” Those complaints, he said, required a process capable of determining whether Wax’s conduct was adversely affecting her teaching and classroom activities.

Penn’s final Wax determination used similar reasoning. Provost John Jackson wrote that academic freedom should be broad and that teachers must conduct themselves in a manner conveying willingness to assess all students fairly. The Hearing Board, Penn said, had concluded that Wax’s conduct left many students understandably concerned that she could not and would not be an impartial judge of their academic performance.

That produces a more precise comparator question than asking whether another professor said something equally offensive. Did Penn employ the same inference when students belonging to other identity groups argued that professors’ public political or demographic statements gave them reason to fear biased treatment in class?

Fakhreddine makes that question difficult. The Third Circuit’s 2026 opinion recounts congressional questioning of Penn about whether Jewish students could expect fair treatment from Fakhreddine after her public statements. The argument resembles the rationale Penn treated as decisive in the Wax proceedings: public speech, followed by a claim that students reasonably doubt the professor’s ability to evaluate members of a particular group impartially. That does not establish that Fakhreddine should have been disciplined, nor that the accusations against her were accurate. It establishes a symmetry test that can be investigated using Penn’s own stated logic rather than an outside definition of offensiveness.

The Almallah allegations raise a related question, because they describe direct interaction with a Jewish student. The public record also shows that Penn did not ignore outside scrutiny of Almallah and Fakhreddine, who are married and whose cases have often moved through the university together. The Penn AAUP reported in 2024 that Penn informed both of them that a congressional committee had requested their curricula vitae, syllabi, course-wide communications, and communications relating to the Gaza Solidarity Encampment, Faculty for Justice in Palestine, and Palestine Writes. According to the AAUP account, Penn agreed to provide at least some of those materials. That evidence complicates any claim that Penn regarded allegations against them as beyond institutional concern.

The Yakoby litigation gives this inquiry continuing importance. Judge Goldberg’s June 2, 2025 opinion concluded that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that Penn acted with the deliberate indifference necessary for their Title VI claim, although he allowed an opportunity to amend parts of the case. His opinion emphasized that Penn had taken numerous steps in response to antisemitism complaints, including creating an action plan, task force, advisory group, and additional security measures. The court rejected the simple picture of a university doing nothing.

The dispute did not end there. According to a May 27, 2026 report in The Philadelphia Inquirer, a Third Circuit panel heard argument over whether the students’ antisemitism case should proceed. Their lawyer argued that Penn’s failures to enforce its rules left students insecure and deprived them of educational opportunities. Penn’s lawyer emphasized the university’s extensive remedial efforts. The panel did not issue a decision at the argument. The appellate fight bears on the Wax comparison because it may further develop the public record concerning what Penn knew, when administrators knew it, what remedies they chose, and how courts characterize the adequacy of those responses.

Wax’s own case is also unfinished. She filed her opening Third Circuit brief on January 15, 2026, arguing that Savage failed to accept her well-pleaded allegations as true on a motion to dismiss. Penn responded on March 18, 2026 that she had improperly introduced a retaliation theory she never preserved below. The comparator holding may not survive the appeal in its current form, and a reversal would put the same seven names back before a district court on a fuller record.

The emerging result is more useful than “Penn punishes conservatives and protects progressives.” That proposition is too easy to state and, on the present evidence, too strong to sustain. Savage was right that the seven people Wax named were poor comparators if the question is whether any one of them duplicated her employment status, pattern of speech, student-related conduct, warnings, and accumulated disciplinary history.

But Savage’s legal analysis leaves the institutional-history question open. Once the cases are decomposed into stages, four comparators become useful for different reasons. Almallah supplies the strongest publicly alleged individualized student encounter, and he lacks Wax’s standing-faculty status. Fakhreddine supplies tenure equivalence and a close parallel over whether public statements could cause students to doubt a professor’s impartiality, and the student-facing allegations against her are disputed and less individualized. Booth supplies Penn’s clearest public statement that even expression it considers reprehensible and antisemitic can remain protected when it is extramural and disconnected from teaching, along with a departure whose cause the public record does not settle. Butler supplies a pre-Wax control showing substantial institutional tolerance for a tenured professor’s inflammatory extramural racial speech despite complaints reaching senior administrators.

None of them alone proves that standards apply by coalition. Together they give that proposition a serious empirical test. The question is no longer whether another Penn professor can be found saying something appalling. The question is what Penn did at equivalent moments after comparable problems came to its attention. Who received the first warning? Whose public speech was treated as protected extramural expression? When did Penn infer from public statements that students might reasonably fear biased treatment? Which student complaints triggered formal inquiry? Which did not? Which professors were told that repetition would carry consequences? Which forms of teaching or student contact were restricted? And when controversial conduct continued after notice, did Penn escalate in a comparable way?

That is the comparator investigation capable of making or breaking the coalition thesis. It replaces anecdotal outrage with a sequence of institutional decisions. If the cases converge once employment status, classroom nexus, student complaints, prior notice, recurrence, and confidentiality violations are held reasonably constant, the selective-enforcement argument weakens. If materially similar conduct repeatedly produces different institutional responses at the same stage of escalation, the claim gets much stronger. Either outcome beats assembling quotations from professors on the opposite side of Amy Wax.

What does the case show about how much Wax is serving as her own lawyer and is that serving her?

Claude says:

Wax has counsel of record, including Samantha Harris, who does this work for a living. So the question is not literally whether she filed pro se. It is how much the litigation tracks her own public argument, and there the record says: closely.

The verified complaint is the tell. Verification is not required in federal court. She swore to the facts personally. That is a party taking ownership of a pleading.

She named Booth’s blood libel cartoon, Almallah’s rally chant, and Alekseyeva’s remark about the murdered UnitedHealthcare executive. Those are the examples she and her defenders had been using in public for a year. They work in an op-ed. They are vivid, quotable, and morally shocking, and they let the reader feel the asymmetry in a sentence. They are the wrong examples for a comparator pleading, which needs dull similarity in rank, duty, and conduct. The one fact that fit Penn’s own stated theory against her, the alleged Almallah classroom confrontation with a Jewish student who then complained to the administration, had been public since December 2023 and detailed since March 2024. She left it out in January 2025 and left it out again in the March 3, 2025 amendment.

Savage’s line captures it. He wrote that as much as Wax would like otherwise, this is not a First Amendment case. That is a judge telling a litigant she brought the case she wanted to argue.

There is a professional irony here. Wax argued fifteen cases in the Supreme Court as an Assistant to the Solicitor General. That is the most prestigious training available, and it is training in taking a record as given and building the strongest argument from it. Her problem in this suit was the opposite kind of problem. Pleading is about choosing which facts to put in front of a court and conceding the ones that hurt. Appellate habit produces a complaint organized around a thesis. Trial habit produces one organized around the elements. She got the first.

Then she doubled the pattern on appeal. Penn’s March 18, 2026 brief says she introduced a retaliation theory she never preserved below. An appellate specialist knows issue preservation better than almost anyone alive. Doing it anyway suggests the case is being steered by the argument she wants to make rather than by the record she built.

The order of her two lawsuits points the same way. The federal civil rights claim came first, in January 2025. It carries the thesis. The Montgomery County contract claim came second, in November 2025, after she lost. That one is narrow, procedural, unglamorous, and probably her better claim. Handbook language about what counts as a major infraction is the kind of thing that wins quietly.

Whether it serves her depends on what she is buying.

As litigation, it cost her. Savage dismissed the discrimination counts with prejudice and said there was nothing she could add. That is not a pleading defect. That is a judge rejecting the theory.

As advocacy, the accounting is better than it looks. She is suspended a year at half pay with tenure intact, so she has little to lose in damages. The suit generated a federal opinion that names Booth, Almallah, and Fakhreddine, kept the comparison alive for two more years, and put Penn’s conduct in front of the public. A quiet contract win would have vanished.

But she paid for that and did not have to. Savage’s opinion is now the authoritative public document about her, and it says she failed to allege facts showing discrimination. Courts get cited. Reporters read holdings. A complaint built stage by stage, starting with the 2017 op-ed and the March 2018 removal and asking what Penn did when other professors reached the same point, would have been both the stronger legal document and the stronger public one. She could have had both artifacts. She chose the one that says what she has been saying.

Based on the court documents, has Wax lost touch with reality?

Claude says:

Court filings are adversarial artifacts. They are written to win, they are drafted or at minimum signed by counsel, and they compress a person into a legal theory. Reading a mental state off a complaint is like reading a man’s character off his résumé. Samantha Harris signed these filings. A lawyer facing Rule 11 exposure does not sign a pleading from someone unmoored. Savage’s language is doctrinal. He said Wax failed to allege facts showing her race was a factor, and that the statutes protect speakers rather than speech. That is a judge rejecting a legal theory.

There is also affirmative evidence of intact reality-testing in the record. After losing in August 2025, she filed a narrow breach-of-contract suit in Montgomery County built on Faculty Handbook language about what counts as a major infraction. That is a sober, well-calibrated second move by someone who understood she had lost the big one. Her appellate brief argues that the district court failed to take her well-pleaded allegations as true on a motion to dismiss, which is the correct standard and a real argument, whatever its merits here.

What the record does show is a mismatch between the story she wants told and the test the law applies. She pleaded the examples that persuade an audience rather than the ones that satisfy a comparator analysis. She kept a theory the court had already rejected instead of rebuilding around Penn’s own stated rationale. On appeal she raised a retaliation argument she had not preserved. That pattern has a name, and it is motivated reasoning, which is universal among people who have argued a position in public for years and then find themselves inside a forum with different rules. It is the failure to imagine the adversary’s strongest response. Very intelligent people are worse at this than average, not better, because their fluency lets them talk past the objection.

Something else may be at work. She might not be trying primarily to win. A federal opinion that names Booth, Almallah, and Fakhreddine puts the comparison into the permanent public record in a way a quiet contract victory never could. If that was the goal, the filings look less like miscalculation and more like a trade she made.

I would also watch the phrase itself. “Lost touch with reality” is the accusation her opponents make, and picking it up as an analytic category imports their frame. The more defensible claim, and the one your material supports, is narrower: she litigated the case she has been arguing in public rather than the case the record gave her, and that choice cost her the counts that were dismissed with prejudice. That is a claim about judgment under adversarial conditions. It can be shown from the documents. The other cannot, and would be the kind of sentence you would not want to defend on the front page.

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PragerU Salaries & Bonuses

Prager University Foundation raised $76.57 million in 2025 and closed the year with $105.50 million in net assets. Contributions run about 95 percent of revenue. The foundation pays its chief executive more than a million dollars a year, has paid the founder’s company $3,573,626 since 2015, and pays the founder’s son more than half a million dollars a year. Those figures come off the e-filed returns, which anyone can pull from ProPublica’s Nonprofit Explorer.

2012 2013 2015 2016 2018 2019 2020 20222023 2024 2025

Marissa Streit was recruited by Dennis Prager and Allen Estrin to help launch the project, and PragerU now says she took the helm in 2011. The federal filings tell a slower story. The 2013 and 2015 returns list Estrin as chief executive officer and Streit as chief operating officer, and Estrin signed both returns over the printed word President while the same documents called him CEO in Part VII. Item F of the 2013 return names him principal officer, at 2325 Dulles Corner Boulevard in Herndon, Virginia, which is the office of Sterling Foundation Management, the firm run by board chairman Roger Silk. Streit becomes principal officer and chief executive with the 2016 return. Public leadership and filing title are two different records at this organization, and the gap between them runs through everything that follows.

Her base has sat near $738,000 since 2022, at $737,361 that year and $738,851 in 2024. On top of that comes a bonus the returns describe as based on annual revenues, estimated and accrued by December 31 and reconciled after the audit. The bonus was zero in 2019 and zero in 2020. Then $94,500 in 2021, $211,321 in 2022, $168,354 in 2023, $249,999 in 2024 and $249,999 in 2025. Her reportable compensation was $988,850 in 2024, her total package $1,022,373, and $1,031,315 in 2025. Two consecutive years landing one dollar under a round number point to a ceiling of $250,000. The returns disclose no ceiling. An earlier version of the arrangement did.

Candid, which publishes the standard reference on this question, drew its 2024 compensation report from the 2022 filings of more than 128,000 tax-exempt organizations. Among nonprofits with budgets above $50 million, median compensation ran $559,770 for male chief executives and $430,640 for female ones. The Chronicle of Philanthropy reported the full spread in that budget band: roughly $237,000 at the tenth percentile and above $1.5 million at the ninetieth. Streit sits in the upper stretch of that band, inside it.

Sal Khan founded Khan Academy, which does what PragerU does in a different key, free instructional video at scale. Khan Academy spent about $87.5 million in 2025 and Khan drew $871,000, according to an analysis of the filings by Class Central. Turning Point USA reported $85 million in revenue and paid Charlie Kirk about $390,000 in 2023, per Forbes. The Heritage Foundation, which holds $413.8 million in assets, paid president Kevin Roberts $953,920 in 2023, including a bonus of $300,300, as CharityWatch read out of Schedule J.

So PragerU pays its chief executive more than the Heritage Foundation pays its president, more than Khan Academy pays the man whose name is on it, and more than twice what Turning Point USA paid its founder. It also pays her within the going rate for a nonprofit of its size.

Scale it against the money coming in. Streit’s package equals 1.35 percent of 2025 revenue. Khan’s equals about 1 percent of Khan Academy’s spending. Kirk’s equaled about half a percent of Turning Point’s. Her own share has been falling as the organization grows. She took $205,000 against $5.34 million of revenue in 2016, which is 3.8 percent. In 2018 it was 2.1 percent. In 2025, 1.35 percent. The dollars rise and the fraction shrinks.

The staff grew faster than any of it. The count of people receiving more than $100,000 in reportable compensation, which sits on the last line of Part VII Section A, ran one in 2012, one in 2013, two in 2015, two in 2016, five in 2018, eight in 2019, twenty-one in 2020, thirty-six in 2022, forty-one in 2023, sixty-one in 2024 and eighty-one in 2025. A charity that started in a kitchen now carries a six-figure payroll the size of a mid-market network’s.

David Prager is chief development officer and Dennis Prager’s son. PragerU identifies him by that title on its own site. His total compensation ran $398,536 in 2020, when the return listed him as vice president for development, then $444,474 in 2021, $442,845 in 2022, $432,396 in 2023, $459,736 in 2024 and $523,616 in 2025. The 2024 Schedule J breaks that year into $385,041 of base and a $25,000 bonus. Before he came on payroll his firm Palm Tree Consulting received $155,700 in 2018 and $38,700 in 2019, both disclosed on Schedule L with the family relationship stated. Development chiefs are the best-paid non-chief-executive officers at large nonprofits, and PragerU turns donor cultivation into 95 percent of its income. Half a million dollars against $76.57 million raised is 0.68 percent of the money the job exists to bring in. The rate fits the job description. How a founder’s son moved from an outside related-party consulting arrangement onto the payroll, what process governed the hire, and what comparables the board used are questions the filings do not answer.

Then Kansas and Brooklyn, the company Dennis Prager owns, which received $150,000 in 2015, $200,000 in 2016, $250,000 in 2017, $237,500 in 2018, $301,667 in 2019, $382,913 in 2020, $462,083 in 2021, $493,333 in 2022, $375,000 in 2023, $446,130 in 2024 and $275,000 in 2025. Total, $3,573,626. Average, $324,875 a year. As a share of revenue it fell from 4.2 percent in 2015 to 0.36 percent in 2025.

The company is Prager’s personal-services corporation and it predates PragerU by more than a decade. The El Camino Community College District board of trustees approved a campus lecture by him for May 15, 2005 at a fee of $6,600, and its December 20, 2004 agenda directs the check to Kansas and Brooklyn, noting that Mr. Prager comes to campus to lecture students studying speech communications. A 2009 conference program book gives the company’s address as 26500 Agoura Road in Calabasas, the same address that later appears beside its name in PragerU’s contractor tables. Actors, hosts and writers have used loan-out corporations like this for decades. The performer sells his services to several buyers, the corporation collects the fees and pays him a salary while carrying his retirement plan and his business expenses. Under subchapter S he splits the income between salary and distribution and lowers his self-employment tax. The buyer skips payroll tax, benefits and workers compensation and writes one check against an invoice.

His rate through that company was $6,600 for a lecture in 2005. Hungarian reporting on a contract obtained through a public-records request puts two separate $15,000 fees from Mathias Corvinus Collegium in 2021, one for a speech and one for a podcast appearance. PragerU paid the same company $462,083 that year, roughly thirty appearances at his own going rate. Whatever the charity buys, it is not priced like the thing El Camino bought, and the returns never say what it is. Across eleven years they give one description: consulting services performed by Dennis Prager. No hours, no deliverables, no scope. He appears on camera, hosts the Fireside Chats, headlines the donor events and lends the name the organization is built on. Any of that is a plausible service. So is the use of his name, his likeness or his archives, and if the contract licenses those the organization would still be entitled to call it consulting on a Form 990.

Section 4958 asks whether an exempt organization has given an excessive economic benefit to a disqualified person directly or indirectly. The regulation counts all consideration exchanged between the parties and applies whether or not the amount is determined by the organization’s revenues. It also carries an initial contract exception that shelters fixed payments under a contract signed with someone who was not yet a disqualified person, which is the natural defense for a company that predates the charity by a decade. PragerU has never claimed it. Schedule J line 8 asks whether any Part VII amounts were paid under such a contract, and the answer is No in every year.

For 2015, 2016 and 2017 the payment showed up only as a line in the top-five contractor table, with the organization answering No to the Form 990 question about business transactions with interested persons and filing no Schedule L. Money paid to an employee lands in Part VII Section A with a title, an hours figure and a compensation column, and above the threshold it lands again on Schedule J split into base, bonus, other, deferred and nontaxable benefits. Money paid to a contractor lands in Part VII Section B as a name, an address, a phrase and a single number. For three years that single number was all a reader got.

The non-disclosure had a consequence in print. On August 22, 2019 the Los Angeles Times reported that PragerU’s growth had been lucrative for Prager, who it said had started collecting fees from the charity the previous year, and that filings showed $237,500 going to his consulting firm and $155,700 to his son for help with fundraising. By then Kansas and Brooklyn had taken $837,500 across four years. The paper read the first Schedule L, saw a related-party disclosure appear for the first time, and drew the reasonable inference that the arrangement was new. Streit was quoted in the same passage calling what Prager makes “negligible,” and saying that in a for-profit he would earn far more, because the organization is driven by impact. That year the foundation paid her $397,864, about 1.7 times what it paid his company. The Center for Media and Democracy published the four-year sequence five months later.

The disclosure begins with the 2018 return, the year Prager first appears in Part VII as President and Founder. Then the 2020 return moves three things at once. The Schedule L description changes from consulting services performed by Dennis Prager, founder and president, to consulting services performed by Dennis Prager, co-founder. He disappears from Part VII and has not reappeared through 2025. And the Schedule O explanation of how pay gets set, which in 2019 covered the chief executive and executive director, becomes determining compensation for the chief executive officer, executive director and founder. The board says it sets the founder’s compensation in the same return in which it stops listing him as an officer.

Follow the checkbox that carries the disclosure. Every return from 2018 through 2025 answers No to line 28a and Yes to line 28c, the question about an entity 35 percent owned by a person described in 28a. From the 2019 form onward, line 28a names creators and founders by those words. Since Prager left Part VII after 2019, founder status is the only category that can be carrying the Yes. PragerU has reached Schedule L through founder status for six straight years. That status already sat in the Schedule L instructions in 2015, 2016 and 2017, when the organization answered No. The printed checkbox on the face of the return in those years named only officers, directors, trustees and key employees, so a preparer had a narrow reading available. Two readings of the same form existed. PragerU took the narrow one, the IRS closed the gap with the 2019 form, and PragerU began disclosing a year before that.

The bonus arrangements have their own chronology and it runs in three acts. In 2016 both senior executives were paid flat. Allen Estrin, co-founder, listed as executive director at thirty hours a week, took $200,000 with no bonus. Streit took $205,000, also flat. Schedule J that year answered No to the question about pay contingent on revenues.

Two years later the answer is Yes and the formula is written down. The 2018 Schedule J says Streit receives 1.25 percent of fundraising with an annual amount not to exceed $400,000, and that chief marketing officer Craig Strazzeri receives 0.9 percent of online fundraising. Strazzeri had been hired for exactly that work, and Pepperdine introduced him in February 2018 as an expert in digital marketing, social media and online fundraising. A percentage set by contract with a stated ceiling counts as a fixed payment under the instructions for Schedule J, and the regulation agrees, giving the example of a performing arts chief executive paid a base plus 2 percent of season subscription sales above a threshold.

Do the arithmetic on that year. A bonus of $122,864 at 1.25 percent implies a fundraising base near $9.83 million, against total revenue of $18.60 million. So the word fundraising in her contract covers something narrower than everything the organization took in, and the return never defines it. Strazzeri’s $23,715 at 0.9 percent implies online fundraising near $2.64 million.

Act two is the shutdown. The 2019 Schedule J says Strazzeri received bonuses based on levels of online fundraising and that the structure was discontinued as of December 2019. Streit is not mentioned in that year’s explanation at all, and her bonus is zero. In the 2020 return the revenue-contingent line is answered No, her bonus is zero again, and her base jumps to $497,998. The organization ran a year with no revenue-linked executive pay of any kind.

Act three is the replacement, and it arrives without a published formula. By the 2022 return the revenue line is Yes again and Streit’s bonus is $211,321 on a base of $737,361. The explanation says she receives bonuses based upon revenues raised annually, that the compensation committee considers reasonableness while using compensation studies, and that the committee reviews each year’s bonus before it is paid out. The instructions draw a line worth knowing here. A bonus equal to a percentage of revenues goes on line 5 even if it also depends on hitting a target. A flat dollar amount paid only on hitting a target does not. PragerU keeps answering Yes, so the current arrangement is still a percentage calculation of some kind. A percentage calculation that lands on $249,999 two years running is a percentage with a ceiling, and the ceiling appears nowhere.

Something else has gone quiet. The line asking whether any compensation is contingent on net earnings is answered No in 2019 and 2022 and Yes in 2023, 2024 and 2025. The 2023 return explains it: the organization trialed a year-end bonus to staff, no officers included, based on PragerU net earnings. In 2024 and 2025 the answer stays Yes and the explanation is gone, though the instructions require a description in Part III. The 2023 return also said a minority portion of the chief marketing officer’s and chief financial officer’s year-end bonuses is tied to annual revenues, and that sentence is likewise gone from the two later returns. In 2024 the chief financial officer took a $116,000 bonus on a base of $349,517, for $497,870 in all. Since the non-fixed payment line is answered No, that bonus has to be covered by the revenue or net-earnings lines, and the only sentence that ever covered it was deleted. The same schedule discloses that C-level employees occasionally use first-class travel on long or red-eye flights and that the value is not included in their taxable compensation.

Revenue-linked pay to insiders has a body of law behind it. Section 4958 asks whether the total is reasonable. A charity earns a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness when a conflict-free body approves the arrangement in advance, obtains appropriate comparability data first, and documents the basis contemporaneously. The regulation is specific about the data. One example holds that a board relying solely on a national survey of university president pay, undivided by revenue, size or geography, has not obtained appropriate comparability data. Another example runs the other way and lets a board keep relying on the prior year’s independent survey once it determines that market conditions have not changed materially, so the 2025 return citing a September 2024 study is unremarkable. A third provision covers exactly this shape of arrangement, a capped bonus, and requires the comparability data to support the maximum payable counting base and bonus together.

PragerU cites compensation studies dated November 2018, November 2020, November 2022 and September 2024, and names neither the preparer nor the peer group. The timing raises a question the returns cannot answer. Streit’s reportable compensation was $669,500 in 2021, of which $94,500 was bonus, so her base was roughly $575,000. Her 2022 base is $737,361. The raise happened during 2022 and the study PragerU cites for that period is dated November 2022. The regulation requires the data before the determination. Which came first is in the minutes and nowhere else. Schedule J checks a box for an independent compensation consultant every year while Schedule O describes a professional and independent search firm. Those are different vendors doing different work, and neither is named.

Streit calls the organization an edu-tainment nonprofit, and its 2022 annual report told donors that PragerU competes for the same human capital sought by global media companies like Paramount and Disney. A board that believes it hires against commercial entertainment would rationally reject a peer set of conventional education charities. Whether the September 2024 study actually used media-company comparables, or whether Paramount and Disney are donor-facing language and the study benchmarks against nonprofits, is the single most useful thing anyone could learn about this organization’s governance.

The board has been shrinking throughout, from ten voting members in 2017 and 2018 to nine, then seven, then eight, and five in 2025.

One sentence changed in a way California law makes checkable. Through the 2022 return, Schedule O told readers that the foundation’s governing documents, including its bylaws, audited financial statements, federal Forms 990 and conflict of interest policy, are available to the public on request. From the 2023 return the audited financial statements are dropped from that list. Government Code section 12586(e) requires California charities above $2 million in revenue to prepare audited statements and make them available to the public.

Where the money goes is no mystery. The top of the contractor table is paid distribution. Facebook took $1,200,928 in 2018, $3,633,880 in 2019, $3,212,997 in 2020, $9,233,065 in 2022, $8,723,880 in 2023, $11,631,889 in 2024 and $12,353,874 in 2025. Google took $612,388, $3,173,229, $3,975,480, $7,028,439, $8,326,786, $10,545,412 and $8,057,879 across the same years. Fox News Network, X Corp at $1,575,000 in 2024, EKF Promotions, Givingtons and HSP Direct fill out the lists. This is a donor-funded audience acquisition operation with a video studio attached, and the family payments are a rounding error against the ad buy.

Its own returns also show what it pays for on-camera talent. In 2019 the top-five contractor table lists Candace Owens as presenter and show host at $445,626. Kansas and Brooklyn received $301,667 that year.

A hundred and five million dollars in net assets sounds like a war chest. Against $76.57 million of annual revenue it comes to about seventeen months of operating money, which sits inside what charity analysts treat as prudent.

The headline compensation figures are not outside the range large nonprofits produce. What invites investigation is the structure behind them: a chief executive whose bonus is calculated off revenue under a formula the public cannot see, a founder paid for more than a decade through his own corporation for services the returns never describe, a son who moved from related-party consultant to highly paid development chief, and compensation studies the filings invoke and never disclose.

The filings create an odd asymmetry. We know what the board wants the government to know, that outside experts and studies were used, that the committee approved the arrangements, that the amounts were treated as reasonable. We do not know the peer institutions, the formula now in force, the terms of the Kansas and Brooklyn contract, the services delivered under it, or the minutes recording who recused. Those are the facts that would let an outsider reproduce the board’s conclusion.

Marissa Streit runs the organization that carries Dennis Prager’s name, and the usual shorthand for her, chief executive of Dennis Prager’s nonprofit, understates what she did. Prager supplied the name, the worldview and the public legitimacy. Allen Estrin supplied the video concept. Streit built the institution that carries both, and PragerU’s growth from an online experiment with $523,785 in revenue in 2012 to $76.57 million in revenue and $105.50 million in net assets in 2025 is substantially her professional achievement.

She was born in Los Angeles around 1981, to an Australian father and a Moroccan mother who had met in Israel. Her parents divorced when she was seven and she moved to Israel with her mother, keeping her American ties through her father and sister. She has called Israel her spiritual homeland, and her mother worked on the integration of Moroccan Jews into Israeli society.

The story she tells about her own formation happened at Yad Vashem when she was thirteen or fourteen. She asked how the Holocaust could have happened without anyone stopping it. A docent told her that most people do not fight, or wait until it is too late, and rely on others to do the fighting. She has repeated that exchange for two decades, including in her own words to donors in a PragerU report, where she concluded that if we do not fight, we will lose everything. Her politics make more sense read through that sentence than through any party platform. She describes education, media, Big Tech, antisemitism and campus politics using one recurring structure: institutions are captured, ordinary people hesitate, and passivity in the presence of evil becomes a form of participation in it.

After the army she returned to Los Angeles at about twenty-one and went to UCLA, where she studied business and economics. She has said she made good money teaching Hebrew school while a student, because she spoke Hebrew and knew Israeli history, and that this was where she discovered she liked teaching. She later took a graduate degree from American Jewish University, which PragerU describes as a master’s in education and nonprofit management. The Jewish Journal reported her describing it as an MBA in nonprofit management. Those two descriptions have not been reconciled against the university’s record.

Streit says she taught kindergarten through eighth grade, with fourth and fifth her preferred years, then became an assistant administrator, then a school head, and started a preschool. She told The Guardian in 2026 that she was assistant principal at a parochial school in Los Angeles and then ran another school nearby for about four years. She declined to name either school, saying she did not want them subjected to political attack, and PragerU declined as well. The paper reported that it could not independently locate records of her teaching or administrative positions. Seven years earlier the Los Angeles Times had described her as headmistress of a Manhattan Beach school, and PragerU’s current biography says she led two Southern California schools. Her own account puts the headship somewhere around 2005 to 2009, in or near the South Bay, at a small religious school.

She says the schools radicalized her. She told the Los Angeles Times she was disturbed by low standards and by union protections, recalling colleagues telling her that a plumber could be fired and a bad teacher could not. Anti-Zionism and American coverage of Israel bothered her at the same time, and the two grievances converged into one: the institutions that form young minds were teaching what she believed to be false, while conservatives complained about it instead of building an alternative. She then spent under a year as director of operations at what became the Israeli-American Council, before PragerU.

The chronology of her arrival is muddier than it should be. The Los Angeles Times reported that Prager and Estrin recruited her to launch the group in 2009. PragerU’s own institutional history says the foundation was incorporated in 2010, the website launched in 2011, and Streit became its first employee that year, with the first headquarters in her kitchen. Her LinkedIn dates her tenure as chief executive to April 2011, and a 2019 PragerU booklet says she joined in 2011 and calls her CEO. The federal filings tell a slower story. The 2012 return lists Marissa Sharpe as chief operating officer at forty hours a week and $105,000. The 2013 return lists Marissa Streit in the same role at the same hours for $113,750, while Allen Estrin appears as chief executive officer and signs the return over the printed word President. Item F of that return names Estrin as the organization’s principal officer. The 2015 return still calls her chief operating officer, at $153,333. She first appears as chief executive, and as principal officer, in the 2016 return, at $205,000.

Streit recalls donors resisting the idea of spending heavily on short videos and resisting even harder the idea of paying to advertise them. Her answer was what she calls the Hollywood model. If Disney spends to market a film, why would an ideological nonprofit assume good arguments distribute themselves. Content without paid promotion, she told NPR, is a beautiful car with no gasoline, and she runs PragerU more like a business than a nonprofit. The returns bear her out. In 2025 the foundation paid Facebook $12,353,874 and Google $8,057,879. Across 2018 through 2025 those two platforms took more than $80 million of donor money. Streit turned donations into advertising, advertising into audience, audience into proof of influence, and influence back into donations. It is direct-response marketing applied to ideas, and it is the single most consequential decision in the organization’s history.

Prager tells donors that Streit and Estrin run the place day to day while he supplies the values and the content. She also saw early that depending on other people’s platforms was dangerous, and after years of fights over restricted and demonetized videos she pushed PragerU toward channels it owns: an app, an email list, its own player. By 2023 she was claiming more than a million app downloads and two million new email subscribers in a year, figures that come from PragerU rather than from any audit.

Then came the move from media company into schools. She launched PragerU Kids, Florida approved the material as a supplemental classroom resource in 2023, and other states followed; PragerU now claims partnerships with twelve. NPR obtained emails showing that the donor David Blumberg introduced Streit to Florida education commissioner Manny Diaz Jr. in January 2023 to discuss exactly that. Historians and climate scientists have argued that the material blurs advocacy and instruction. Her answer is a market argument rather than a claim of neutrality. Children already receive an overwhelmingly left-of-center account, she says, and PragerU offers an alternative; she told the Washington Post that she is not claiming anyone should use only PragerU. She does not appear embarrassed that her organization has a worldview. She rejects the premise that the schools it competes with lack one. By 2025 she was arguing in The Daily Wire for abolishing the federal Department of Education.

She has been building a public identity alongside the institution. Real Talk with Marissa Streit launched in 2022 and now runs to more than 170 weekly episodes across education, Israel, geopolitics, health and culture. That role grew after Dennis Prager’s spinal injury in November 2024, when she became the organization’s voice on his condition and, increasingly, its public face. The injury also demonstrated how far she had already separated the institution from the man. Contributions rose in 2025 rather than collapsing. The 2025 annual report describes a new Leadership Council of thinkers assembled to preserve what it calls the same moral clarity Dennis has always championed, which is an attempt to convert a personality into a governing tradition. She began as the operator who distributed Dennis Prager. She is becoming the person who decides what counts as Dennis Prager.

A June 2014 federal campaign filing records a $500 contribution from Streit listing her employer as the Milstein Foundation and her occupation as executive director, three years into her PragerU tenure. Merona Leadership Foundation, created in 2014 with Gila Milstein as president, is reported to list Streit as secretary on its 2015 and 2016 returns, without compensation. Over the same period the Adam and Gila Milstein Family Foundation was underwriting PragerU videos such as “The Middle East Problem” in April 2014, “BDS: The Attempt to Strangle Israel” that July, and “Is the UN Fair to Israel?” that September. Estrin’s line about her early days, that she was a general without an army, reads differently once you can see where some of the army came from.

Her ideas have been flat while her scale has grown. There is no early, middle and late Streit in the sense of conversions. The themes hold: identification with Israel, distrust of unionized public schooling, confidence in markets, fear of ideological conformity, and a conviction that conservatives lose because they argue well and distribute badly. What changed is ambition. First she wanted to fix a school. Then to make five-minute lessons. Then to advertise them to millions. Then to own the pipes. Then to publish books, lesson plans and children’s programming, and to get them adopted by states.

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